Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. (1 other version)Meetings.Peter Slezak - 1984 - Dialectica 38 (1):80-80.
    SummaryJ.R. Lucas has argued that it follows from Godel's Theorem that the mind cannot be a machine or represented by any formal system. Although this notorious argument against the mechanism thesis has received considerable attention in the literature, it has not been decisively rebutted, even though mechanism is generally thought to be the only plausible view of the mind. In this paper I offer an analysis of Lucas's argument which shows that it derives its persuasiveness from a subtle confusion. In (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Minds, machines and self-reference.Peter Slezak - 1984 - Dialectica 38 (1):17-34.
    SummaryJ.R. Lucas has argued that it follows from Godel's Theorem that the mind cannot be a machine or represented by any formal system. Although this notorious argument against the mechanism thesis has received considerable attention in the literature, it has not been decisively rebutted, even though mechanism is generally thought to be the only plausible view of the mind. In this paper I offer an analysis of Lucas's argument which shows that it derives its persuasiveness from a subtle confusion. In (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Other bodies, other minds: A machine incarnation of an old philosophical problem. [REVIEW]Stevan Harnad - 1991 - Minds and Machines 1 (1):43-54.
    Explaining the mind by building machines with minds runs into the other-minds problem: How can we tell whether any body other than our own has a mind when the only way to know is by being the other body? In practice we all use some form of Turing Test: If it can do everything a body with a mind can do such that we can't tell them apart, we have no basis for doubting it has a mind. But what is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   89 citations  
  • Rationality As A Meta-Analytical Capacity of the Human Mind: From the Social Sciences to Gödel.Nathalie Bulle - 2023 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 53 (3):167-193.
    In contrast to dominant approaches to human reason involving essentially a logical and instrumental conception of rationality easily modeled by artificial intelligence mechanisms, I argue that the specific capacities of the human mind are meta-analytic in nature, understood as irreducible to the analytic or the logical, or else the computational. Firstly, the assumption of a meta-analytical level of rationality is derived from key insights developed in various branches of the social sciences. This meta-analytical level is then inferred from Gödel’s incompleteness (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • On the Anti-Mechanist Arguments Based on Gödel’s Theorem.Stanisław Krajewski - 2020 - Studia Semiotyczne 34 (1):9-56.
    The alleged proof of the non-mechanical, or non-computational, character of the human mind based on Gödel’s incompleteness theorem is revisited. Its history is reviewed. The proof, also known as the Lucas argument and the Penrose argument, is refuted. It is claimed, following Gödel himself and other leading logicians, that antimechanism is not implied by Gödel’s theorems alone. The present paper sets out this refutation in its strongest form, demonstrating general theorems implying the inconsistency of Lucas’s arithmetic and the semantic inadequacy (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Superminds: People Harness Hypercomputation, and More.Mark Phillips, Selmer Bringsjord & M. Zenzen - 2003 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer Verlag.
    When Ken Malone investigates a case of something causing mental static across the United States, he is teleported to a world that doesn't exist.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Descartes's diagonal deduction.Peter Slezak - 1983 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 34 (March):13-36.
    I OFFER AN ANALYSIS OF DESCARTES'S COGITO WHICH IS RADICALLY NOVEL WHILE INCORPORATING MUCH AVAILABLE INSIGHT. BY ENLARGING FOCUS FROM THE DICTUM ITSELF TO THE REASONING OF DOUBT, DREAMING AND DEMON, I DEMONSTRATE A CLOSE PARALLEL TO THE LOGIC OF THE LIAR PARADOX. THIS HELPS TO EXPLAIN FAMILIAR PARADOXICAL FEATURES OF DESCARTES'S ARGUMENT. THE ACCOUNT PROVES TO BE TEXTUALLY ELEGANT AND, MOREOVER, HAS CONSIDERABLE INDEPENDENT PHILOSOPHICAL PLAUSIBILITY AS AN ACCOUNT OF MIND AND SELF.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Simulating convesations: The communion game. [REVIEW]Stephen J. Cowley & Karl MacDorman - 1995 - AI and Society 9 (2-3):116-137.
    In their enthusiasm for programming, computational linguists have tended to lose sight of what humansdo. They have conceived of conversations as independent of sound and the bodies that produce it. Thus, implicit in their simulations is the assumption that the text is the essence of talk. In fact, unlike electronic mail, conversations are acoustic events. During everyday talk, human understanding depends both on the words spoken and on fine interpersonal vocal coordination. When utterances are analysed into sequences of word-based forms, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Actions, cognition and the self.Peter Slezak - 1986 - Synthese 66 (3):405 - 435.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Was Descartes's cogito a diagonal deduction?Roy A. Sorensen - 1986 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 (3):346-351.
    Peter Slezak and William Boos have independently advanced a novel interpretation of Descartes's "cogito". The interpretation portrays the "cogito" as a diagonal deduction and emphasizes its resemblance to Godel's theorem and the Liar. I object that this approach is flawed by the fact that it assigns 'Buridan sentences' a legitimate role in Descartes's philosophy. The paradoxical nature of these sentences would have the peculiar result of undermining Descartes's "cogito" while enabling him to "disprove" God's existence.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Man not a subject for science?Peter Slezak - 1990 - Social Epistemology 4 (4):327 – 342.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations