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Sensations and brain processes

Philosophical Review 68 (April):141-56 (1959)

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  1. Treading the primrose path of dalliance in psychology.B. A. Farrell - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):624.
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  • Será Procedente o Argumento de Kripke Contra a Teoria da Identidade Tipo-Tipo?Domingos Faria - 2014 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 70 (1):112-131.
    Resumo O meu objetivo neste artigo é examinar criticamente o argumento de Kripke contra a teoria da identidade tipo-tipo. Assumindo a tese da necessidade da identidade, bem como a tese da designação rígida, Kripke sustenta que se a dor é idêntica à estimulação das fibras C, então a dor é necessariamente idêntica à estimulação das fibras C. No entanto, precisamente porque a proposição expressa pela frase “a dor não é idêntica à estimulação das fibras C” é uma possibilidade metafísica, Kripke (...)
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  • Neuroethics and the problem of other minds: Implications of neuroscience for the moral status of brain-damaged patients and nonhuman animals. [REVIEW]Martha J. Farah - 2008 - Neuroethics 1 (1):9-18.
    Our ethical obligations to another being depend at least in part on that being’s capacity for a mental life. Our usual approach to inferring the mental state of another is to reason by analogy: If another being behaves as I do in a circumstance that engenders a certain mental state in me, I conclude that it has engendered the same mental state in him or her. Unfortunately, as philosophers have long noted, this analogy is fallible because behavior and mental states (...)
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  • Perceptual objects may have nonphysical properties.Aaron Ben-Ze’ev - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):22-23.
    Byrne & Hilbert defend color realism, which assumes that: (a) colors are properties of objects; (b) these objects are physical; hence, (c) colors are physical properties. I accept (a), agree that in a certain sense (b) can be defended, but reject (c). Colors are properties of perceptual objects – which also have underlying physical properties – but they are not physical properties.
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  • Qualia and vagueness.Anthony Everett - 1996 - Synthese 106 (2):205-226.
    In this paper I present two arguments against the thesis that we experience qualia. I argue that if we experienced qualia then these qualia would have to be essentially vague entities. And I then offer two arguments, one a reworking of Gareth Evans' argument against the possibility of vague objects, the other a reworking of the Sorites argument, to show that no such essentially vague entities can exist. I consider various objections but argue that ultimately they all fail. In particular (...)
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  • Book review: Why the mind-body problem cannot be solved. [REVIEW]Robert Evans - 2004 - Minds and Machines 14 (3):403-407.
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  • Mental causation and mental properties.Michael Esfeld - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (1):5-18.
    The aim of this paper is to defend the causal homogeneity of functional, mental properties against Kim’s attack. It is argued that (a) token identity is sufficient for mental causation, that (b) token identity implies a sort of functional reduction, but that (c) nonetheless functional, mental properties can be causally homogeneous despite being multiply realizable: multiple composition is sufficient for multiple realizability, but multiple composition does not prevent the realizers from having their pertinent effects in common. Thus, the causal exclusion (...)
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  • Replacing Functional Reduction with Mechanistic Explanation.Markus I. Eronen - 2011 - Philosophia Naturalis 48 (1):125-153.
    Recently the functional model of reduction has become something like the standard model of reduction in philosophy of mind. In this paper, I argue that the functional model fails as an account of reduction due to problems related to three key concepts: functionalization, realization and causation. I further argue that if we try to revise the model in order to make it more coherent and scientifically plausible, the result is merely a simplified version of what in philosophy of science is (...)
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  • Nomic-Role Nonreductionism: Identifying Properties by Total Nomic Roles.Ronald P. Endicott - 2007 - Philosophical Topics 35 (1&2):217-240.
    I introduce "nomic-role nonreductionism" as an alternative to traditional causal-role functionalism in the philosophy of mind. Rather than identify mental properties by a theory that describes their intra-level causal roles via types of inputs, internal states, and outputs, I suggest that one identify mental properties by a more comprehensive theory that also describes inter-level realization roles via types of lower-level engineering, internal mental states, and still higher-level states generated by them. I defend this position on grounds that mental properties should (...)
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  • Introduction: The Character of Physicalism.Andreas Elpidorou - 2018 - Topoi 37 (3):435-455.
    The aim of this editorial introduction is twofold. First, Sects. 1–8 offer a critical introduction to the metaphysical character of physicalism. In those sections, I present and evaluate different ways in which proponents of physicalism have made explicit the metaphysical dependence that is said to hold between the non-physical and the physical. Some of these accounts are found to be problematic; others are shown to be somewhat more promising. In the end, some important lessons are drawn and different options for (...)
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  • Phenomenal character, phenomenal concepts, and externalism.Jonathan Ellis - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (2):273 - 299.
    A celebrated problem for representationalist theories of phenomenal character is that, given externalism about content, these theories lead to externalism about phenomenal character. While externalism about content is widely accepted, externalism about phenomenal character strikes many philosophers as wildly implausible. Even if internally identical individuals could have different thoughts, it is said, if one of them has a headache, or a tingly sensation, so must the other. In this paper, I argue that recent work on phenomenal concepts reveals that, contrary (...)
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  • Neuroscience as a Human Science: Integrating Phenomenology and Empiricism in the Study of Action and Consciousness. [REVIEW]Ralph D. Ellis - 2013 - Human Studies 36 (4):491-507.
    This paper considers where contemporary neuroscience leaves us in terms of how human consciousness fits into the material world, and whether consciousness is reducible to merely mechanical physical systems, or on the contrary whether consciousness is a self-organizing system that can in a sense use the brain for its own purposes. The paper discusses how phenomenology can be integrated with new findings about “neural plasticity” to yield new approaches to the mind–body problem and the place of consciousness as a causal (...)
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  • Enactivism and the New Teleology: Reconciling the Warring Camps.Ralph D. Ellis - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (2):173-198.
    Enactivism has the potential to provide a sense of teleology in purpose-directed action, but without violating the principles of efficient causation. Action can be distinguished from mere reaction by virtue of the fact that some systems are self-organizing. Self-organization in the brain is reflected in neural plasticity, and also in the primacy of motivational processes that initiate the release of neurotransmitters necessary for mental and conscious functions, and which guide selective attention processes. But in order to flesh out the enactivist (...)
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  • Context and consciousness.Colin G. Ellard - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):681-682.
    The commentary argues that we cannot be sure that human consciousness has survival value and that in order to understand the origins and, perhaps, the function of consciousness, we should examine the behavioural and neural precursors to consciousness in nonhumans. An example is given of research on the role of context in decisions regarding fleeing from probable predators in the Mongolian gerbil.
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  • Physicalism and the Identity of Identity Theories.Samuel Z. Elgin - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (1):161-180.
    It is often said that there are two varieties of identity theory. Type-identity theorists interpret physicalism as the claim that every property is identical to a physical property, while token-identity theorists interpret it as the claim that every particular is identical to a physical particular. The aim of this paper is to undermine the distinction between the two. Drawing on recent work connecting generalized identity to truth-maker semantics, I demonstrate that these interpretations are logically equivalent. I then argue that each (...)
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  • Physicalism and the Identity of Identity Theories.Samuel Z. Elgin - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (1):161-180.
    It is often said that there are two varieties of identity theory. Type-identity theorists interpret physicalism as the claim that every property is identical to a physical property, while token-identity theorists interpret it as the claim that every particular is identical to a physical particular. The aim of this paper is to undermine the distinction between the two. Drawing on recent work connecting generalized identity to truth-maker semantics, I demonstrate that these interpretations are logically equivalent. I then argue that each (...)
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  • Consciousness, memory, and the hippocampal system: What kind of connections can we make?Howard Eichenbaum & Neal J. Cohen - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):680-681.
    Gray's account is remarkable in its depth and scope but too little attention is paid to poor correspondences with the literature on hippocampal/subicular damage, the theta rhythm, and novelty detection. An alternative account, focusing on hippocampal involvement in organizing memories in a way that makes them accessible to conscious recollection but not in access to consciousness per se, avoids each of these limitations.
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  • El Realismo Científico y la Mente.Ricardo Restrepo Echavarría - 2023 - Discusiones Filosóficas 24 (42):75-95.
    El Realismo Científico Estándar sostiene el enfoque metafísico de que el mundo es como es independiente de la mente. Sin embargo, el presente artículo demuestra cómo esta postura es incompatible con todas las teorías no-eliminativistas sobre la mente, lo cual hace que la postura sea inconsistente, incompatible con la ciencia, elimina la consciencia, la intencionalidad, la causación mental y la ética. Se propone una tesis realista alternativa que conserva la idea de que el mundo en general es de la forma (...)
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  • The promise and problems of connectionism.Michael G. Dyer - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):32-33.
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  • On the proper treatment of Smolensky.Hubert L. Dreyfus & Stuart E. Dreyfus - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):31-32.
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  • Identités psychophysiques et inférence à la meilleure explication.Filipe Drapeau Vieira Contim & Pascal Ludwig - 2013 - Philosophiques 40 (1):171-195.
    Filipe Drapeau Vieira Contim,Pascal Ludwig | : La plupart des théoriciens de l’identité des types souscrivent à un physicalisme a posteriori à l’égard des propriétés phénoménales. Selon cette conception, les énoncés d’identité esprit/cerveau peuvent être justifiés par une inférence à la meilleure explication (IME) partant du fait empirique des corrélations esprit/cerveau. Nous soutenons que la théorie de l’identité ne peut pas s’appuyer sur cette méthodologie abductive. Nous montrons tout d’abord que l’on ne peut pas justifier les énoncés d’identité esprit/cerveau au (...)
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  • Redefining Physicalism.Guy Dove - 2018 - Topoi 37 (3):513-522.
    Philosophers have traditionally treated physicalism as an empirically informed metaphysical thesis. This approach faces a well-known problem often referred to as Hempel’s dilemma: formulations of physicalism tend to be either false or indeterminate. The generally preferred strategy to address this problem involves an appeal to a hypothetical complete and ideal physical theory. After demonstrating that this strategy is not viable, I argue that we should redefine physicalism as an interdisciplinary research program seeking to explain the mental in terms of the (...)
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  • Was Spinoza a Naturalist?Alexander Douglas - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (1):77-99.
    In this article I dispute the claim, made by several contemporary scholars, that Spinoza was a naturalist. ‘Naturalism’ here refers to two distinct but related positions in contemporary philosophy. The first, ontological naturalism, is the view that everything that exists possesses a certain character permitting it to be defined as natural and prohibiting it from being defined as supernatural. I argue that the only definition of ontological naturalism that could be legitimately applied to Spinoza's philosophy is so unrestrictive as to (...)
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  • Non-reductivism and the metaphilosophy of mind.Giuseppina D’oro, Paul Giladi & Alexis Papazoglou - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (5):477-503.
    ABSTRACTThis paper discusses the metaphilosophical assumptions that have dominated analytic philosophy of mind, and how they gave rise to the central question that the best-known forms of non-reductivism available have sought to answer, namely: how can mind fit within nature? Its goal is to make room for forms of non-reductivism that have challenged the fruitfulness of this question, and which have taken a different approach to the so-called “placement” problem. Rather than trying to solve the placement problem, the forms of (...)
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  • Idealism and the philosophy of mind.Giuseppina D'Oro - 2005 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 48 (5):395-412.
    This paper defends an idealist form of non-reductivism in the philosophy of mind. I refer to it as a kind of conceptual dualism without substance dualism. I contrast this idealist alternative with the two most widespread forms of non-reductivism: multiple realisability functionalism and anomalous monism. I argue first, that functionalism fails to challenge seriously the claim for methodological unity since it is quite comfortable with the idea that it is possible to articulate a descriptive theory of the mind. Second, that (...)
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  • Token physicalism and functional individuation.James DiFrisco - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (3):309-329.
    Token physicalism is often viewed as a modest and unproblematic physicalist commitment, as contrasted with type physicalism. This paper argues that the prevalence of functional individuation in biology creates serious problems for token physicalism, because the latter requires that biological entities can be individuated physically and without reference to biological functioning. After characterizing the main philosophical roles for token physicalism, I describe the distinctive uses of functional individuation in models of biological processes. I then introduce some requirements on token identity (...)
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  • Some assumptions underlying Smolensky's treatment of connectionism.Eric Dietrich & Chris Fields - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):29-31.
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  • Social constructionism as cognitive science.Thomas E. Dickins - 2004 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 34 (4):333–352.
    Social constructionism is a broad position that emphasizes the importance of human social processes in psychology. These processes are generally associated with language and the ability to construct stories that conform to the emergent rules of "language games". This view allows one to espouse a variety of critical postures with regard to realist commitments within the social and behavioural sciences, ranging from outright relativism to a more moderate respect for the "barrier" that linguistic descriptions can place between us and reality. (...)
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  • Peculiarities in Mind; Or, on the Absence of Darwin.Tanya de Villiers-Botha - 2011 - South African Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):282-302.
    A key failing in contemporary philosophy of mind is the lack of attention paid to evolutionary theory in its research projects. Notably, where evolution is incorporated into the study of mind, the work being done is often described as philosophy of cognitive science rather than philosophy of mind. Even then, whereas possible implications of the evolution of human cognition are taken more seriously within the cognitive sciences and the philosophy of cognitive science, its relevance for cognitive science has only been (...)
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  • The essential opacity of modular systems: Why even connectionism cannot give complete formal accounts of cognition.Marten J. den Uyl - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):56-57.
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  • Possible roles for a predictor plus comparator mechanism in human episodic recognition memory and imitative learning.Simon Dennis & Michael Humphreys - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):678-679.
    This commentary is divided into two parts. The first considers a possible role for Gray's predictor plus comparator mechanism in human episodic recognition memory. It draws on the computational specifications of recognition outlined in Humphreys et al. to demonstrate how the logically necessary components of recognition tasks might be mapped onto the mechanism. The second part demonstrates how the mechanism outlined by Gray might be implicated in a form of imitative learning suitable for the acquisition of complex tasks.
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  • Overworking the hippocampus.Daniel C. Dennett - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):677-678.
    Gray mistakenly thinks I have rejected the sort of theoretical enterprise he is undertaking, because, according to him, I think that "more data" is all that is needed to resolve all the issues. Not at all. My stalking horse was the bizarre (often pathetic) claim that no amount of empirical, "third-person point-of-view" science (data plus theory) could ever reduce the residue of mystery about consciousness to zero. This "New Mysterianism" (Flanagan, 1991) is one that he should want to combat as (...)
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  • Consciousness, Supervenience, and Identity: Marras and Kim on the Efficacy of Conscious Experience.Liam P. Dempsey - 2012 - Dialogue 51 (3):373-395.
    In this paper, I argue that while supervenience accounts of mental causation in general have difficulty avoiding epiphenomenalism, the situation is particularly bad in the case of conscious experiences since the function-realizer relation, arguably present in the case of intentional properties, does not obtain, and thus, the metaphysical link between supervenient and subvenient properties is absent. I contend, however, that the identification of experiential types with their neural correlates dispels the spectre epiphenomenalism, squares nicely both with the phenomenology of embodiment (...)
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  • The psychological appeal of connectionism.Denise Dellarosa - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):28-29.
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  • Crítica de Chomsky ao materialismo.Daniel Luporini de Faria - 2012 - Cadernos Do Pet Filosofia 3 (6):18-26.
    No presente artigo, pretende-se expor e analisar as críticas que Noam Chomsky dirige contra o materialismo em filosofia da mente. Para o referido autor, a rigor, não faria sentido questionar o estatuto ontológico da mente, na medida em que os próprios físicos e filósofos materialistas desconhecem 90% da matéria que constitui o universo. Deste modo, Chomsky dirá que no tempo de Descartes, da filosofia mecânica, o que se fazia era ciência normal, ao passo que após o advento das ideias de (...)
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  • Productance physicalism and a posteriori necessity.Don Dedrick - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):28-29.
    The problem of nonreflectors perceived as colored is the central problem for Byrne & Hilbert's (B&H's) physicalism. Vision scientists and other interested parties need to consider the motivation for their account of “productance physicalism.” Is B&H's theory motivated by scientific concerns or by philosophical interests intended to preserve a physicalist account of color as a posteriori necessary?
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  • Orange laser beams are not illusory: The need for a plurality of “real” color ontologies.Lieven Decock & Jaap van Brakel - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):27-28.
    Reflectance physicalism only provides a partial picture of the ontology of color. Byrne & Hilbert’ account is unsatisfactory because the replacement of reflectance functions by productance functions is ad hoc, unclear, and only leads to new problems. Furthermore, the effects of color contrast and differences in illumination are not really taken seriously: Too many “real” colors are tacitly dismissed as illusory, and this for arbitrary reasons. We claim that there cannot be an all-embracing ontology for color.
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  • The problem of consciousness for philosophy of mind and of psychiatry.Felipe De Brigard - 2017 - Ideas Y Valores 66 (S3):15-45.
    RESUMEN Muchos psiquiatras se encuentran constantemente con pacientes cuyos síntomas incluyen trastornos o alteraciones de la conciencia. Infortunadamente, el significado del término conciencia es poco claro. Este artículo hace un repaso sistemático de varios significados atribuidos a dicho término, así como de diversos problemas filosóficos asociados. Asimismo, reconstruye varias teorías filosóficas y científicas de la conciencia, identificando sus ventajas y desventajas. Al final, ofrece algunas sugerencias para el uso del término conciencia en la psiquiatría. ABSTRACT Psychiatrists often encounter patients whose (...)
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  • El problema de la conciencia para la filosofía de la mente y de la psiquiatría.Felipe De Brigard - 2017 - Ideas Y Valores 66 (S3):15-45.
    Muchos psiquiatras se encuentran constantemente con pacientes cuyos síntomas incluyen trastornos o alteraciones de la conciencia. Infortunadamente, el significado del término conciencia es poco claro. Este artículo hace un repaso sistemático de varios significados atribuidos a dicho término, así como de diversos problemas filosóficos asociados. Asimismo, reconstruye varias teorías filosóficas y científicas de la conciencia, identificando sus ventajas y desventajas. Al final, ofrece algunas sugerencias para el uso del término conciencia en la psiquiatría.
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  • Hunting for consciousness in the brain: What is (the name of) the game?José-Luis Díaz - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):679-680.
    Robust theories concerning the connection between consciousness and brain function should derive not only from empirical evidence but also from a well grounded inind-body ontology. In the case of the comparator hypothesis, Gray develops his ideas relying extensively on empirical evidence, but he bounces irresolutely among logically incompatible metaphysical theses which, in turn, leads him to excessively skeptical conclusions concerning the naturalization of consciousness.
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  • Skinner as conceptual analyst.Lawrence H. Davis - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):623.
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  • On Mental Concepts and Physical Concepts.Donald D. Davidson - 1964 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 2 (4):226-231.
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  • T‐Philosophy.Chris Daly - 2022 - Metaphilosophy 53 (2-3):185-198.
    Metaphilosophy, Volume 53, Issue 2-3, Page 185-198, April 2022.
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  • The mind-body problem and the color-body problem.Brian Cutter - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 180 (3):725-744.
    According to a familiar modern view, color and other so-called secondary qualities reside only in consciousness, not in the external physical world. Many have argued that this “Galilean” view is the source of the mind-body problem in its current form. This paper critically examines a radical alternative to the Galilean view, which has recently been defended or sympathetically discussed by several philosophers, a view I call “anti-modernism.” Anti-modernism holds, roughly, that the modern Galilean scientific image is incomplete – in particular, (...)
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  • Segmentalized consciousness in schizophrenia.Andrew Crider - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):676-677.
    Segmentalized consciousness in schizophrenia reflects a loss of the normal Gestalt organization and contextualization of perception. Grays model explains such segmentalization in terms of septohippocampal dysfunction, which is consistent with known neuropsychological impairment in schizophrenia. However, other considerations suggest that everyday perception and its failure in schizophrenia also involve prefrontal executive mechanisms, which are only minimally elaborated by Gray.
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  • True color only exists in the eye of the observer.Frans W. Cornelissen, Eli Brenner & Jeroen Smeets - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):26-27.
    The colors we perceive are the outcome of an attempt to meaningfully order the spectral information from the environment. These colors are not the result of a straightforward mapping of a physical property to a sensation, but arise from an interaction between our environment and our visual system. Thus, although one may infer from a surface’ reflectance characteristics that it will be perceived as “colored,” true colors only arise by virtue of the interaction of the reflected light with the eye (...)
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  • Pain eliminativism: scientific and traditional.Jennifer Corns - 2016 - Synthese 193 (9).
    Traditional eliminativism is the view that a term should be eliminated from everyday speech due to failures of reference. Following Edouard Machery, we may distinguish this traditional eliminativism about a kind and its term from a scientific eliminativism according to which a term should be eliminated from scientific discourse due to a lack of referential utility. The distinction matters if any terms are rightly retained for daily life despite being rightly eliminated from scientific inquiry. In this article, I argue that (...)
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  • Mental terms, theoretical terms, and materialism.James W. Cornman - 1968 - Philosophy of Science 35 (March):45-63.
    Some materialists argue that we can eliminate mental entities such as sensations because, like electrons, they are theoretical entities postulated as parts of scientific explanations, but, unlike electrons, they are unnecessary for such explanations. As Quine says, any explanatory role of mental entities can be played by "correlative physiological states and events instead." But sensations are not postulated theoretical entities. This is shown by proposing definitions of the related terms, 'observation term,' and 'theoretical term,' and then classifying the term 'sensation.' (...)
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  • Language and ontology.James W. Cornman - 1963 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41 (3):291 – 305.
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  • The notorious neurophilosophy of pain: A family resemblance approach to idiosyncrasy and generalizability.Sabrina Coninx - 2021 - Mind and Language 38 (1):178-197.
    Pain continues to be one of the most controversial subjects in neurophilosophy. One focus of current debates is the apparent absence of an ideal brain‐based biomarker that could function as a coherent and distinct indicator for pain. One prominent reaction to this in the philosophical literature is scientific pain eliminativism. In this article, I argue for a non‐eliminative alternative that builds on family resemblances and provides a useful heuristic in the tradeoff between the idiosyncrasy of the neural processes corresponding to (...)
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