- Suspension, Higher-Order Evidence, and Defeat.Errol Lord & Kurt Sylvan - 2021 - In Jessica Brown & Mona Simion (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Probabilistic promotion and ability.Luke Elson - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6.details
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Normative Source and Extensional Adequacy.Jeff Behrends - 2016 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 10 (3):1-26.details
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Consequentialism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Contrastive Reasons and Promotion.Justin Snedegar - 2014 - Ethics 125 (1):39-63,.details
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What makes reasons sufficient?Mark Schroeder - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2):159-170.details
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Promotionalism, Orthogonality, and Instrumental Convergence.Nathaniel Sharadin - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.details
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Against zetetic encroachment.Michael Vollmer - 2024 - Synthese 203 (6):1-23.details
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The Relation Between Moral Reasons and Moral Requirement.Brendan de Kenessey - 2023 - Erkenntnis.details
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What the Cluster View Can Do for You.Daniel Fogal & Alex Worsnip - 2024 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies of Metaethics 19. Oxford University Press USA.details
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The Force of Habit.William Hornett - 2023 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 104 (3):1-30.details
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Consequentialism and Reasons for Action.Christopher Woodard - 2020 - In Douglas W. Portmore (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism. New York, USA: Oup Usa. pp. 179–196.details
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Reasons for action: making a difference to the security of outcomes.Mattias Gunnemyr & Caroline Torpe Touborg - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 180 (1):333-362.details
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Practical reasons, theoretical reasons, and permissive and prohibitive balancing.John Brunero - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-23.details
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Parity, moral options, and the weights of reasons.Chris Tucker - 2022 - Noûs 57 (2):454-480.details
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Explaining Normative Reasons.Daniel Fogal & Olle Risberg - 2023 - Noûs 57 (1):51-80.details
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Supererogation and Conditional Obligation.Daniel Muñoz & Theron Pummer - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1429–1443.details
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(1 other version)Fault Lines in Ethical Theory.Shyam Nair - 2020 - In Douglas W. Portmore (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism. New York, USA: Oup Usa. pp. 67-92.details
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How AI can AID bioethics.Walter Sinnott Armstrong & Joshua August Skorburg - forthcoming - Journal of Practical Ethics.details
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Why understanding-why is contrastive.Miguel Egler - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6061-6083.details
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Normative metaphysics for accountants.Barry Maguire & Justin Snedegar - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):363-384.details
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In defence of object-given reasons.Michael Vollmer - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (2):485-511.details
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Ideal rationality and the relation between propositional and doxastic justification.Bada Kim - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):1-16.details
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The Reasons Aggregation Theorem.Ralph Wedgwood - 2022 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 12:127-148.details
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Collective Reasons and Agent-Relativity.Alexander Dietz - 2022 - Utilitas 34 (1):57-69.details
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How to be a deontic buck-passer.Euan K. H. Metz - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3193-3211.details
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Reasons and oughts: an explanation and defence of deontic buck-passing.Euan Hans Metz - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Readingdetails
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Suspension of Judgement: Fittingness, Reasons, and Permissivism.Michael Vollmer - 2023 - Episteme:1-16.details
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Reasons, Competition, and Latitude.Justin Snedegar - 2021 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 16. Oxford University Press.details
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Hyperintensionality and Normativity.Federico L. G. Faroldi - 2019 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.details
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Reason to promotion inferences.Joshua DiPaolo & Jeff Behrends - 2015 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (2):1-10.details
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(1 other version)Probabilistic promotion and ability.Luke Elson - unknowndetails
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Free choice reasons.Daniel Bonevac - 2019 - Synthese 196 (2):735-760.details
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