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Social empiricism

Noûs 28 (3):325-343 (1994)

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  1. Objectivity in Science: New Perspectives From Science and Technology Studies.Flavia Padovani, Alan Richardson & Jonathan Y. Tsou (eds.) - 2015 - Cham: Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, vol. 310. Springer.
    This highly multidisciplinary collection discusses an increasingly important topic among scholars in science and technology studies: objectivity in science. It features eleven essays on scientific objectivity from a variety of perspectives, including philosophy of science, history of science, and feminist philosophy. Topics addressed in the book include the nature and value of scientific objectivity, the history of objectivity, and objectivity in scientific journals and communities. Taken individually, the essays supply new methodological tools for theorizing what is valuable in the pursuit (...)
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  • Frank Sulloway's Born to Rebel.Miriam Solomon - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (1):171.
    Born to Rebel is an innovative and important work with much to say to philosophers of science, as well as historians and sociologists of science. Sulloway uses, successfully, quantitative statistical methods that others have despaired of using to analyze the complexities of historical change. In particular, he investigates scientific decision-making during scientific controversies with a multivariate analysis. The goal is to discern, precisely, the contribution of factors such as religious belief, social class, age, years of education, nationality, sex and personality.
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  • Science, values, and pragmatic encroachment on knowledge.Boaz Miller - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 4 (2):253-270.
    Philosophers have recently argued, against a prevailing orthodoxy, that standards of knowledge partly depend on a subject’s interests; the more is at stake for the subject, the less she is in a position to know. This view, which is dubbed “Pragmatic Encroachment” has historical and conceptual connections to arguments in philosophy of science against the received model of science as value free. I bring the two debates together. I argue that Pragmatic Encroachment and the model of value-laden science reinforce each (...)
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  • Catching the WAVE: The Weight-Adjusting Account of Values and Evidence.Boaz Miller - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 47:69-80.
    It is commonly argued that values “fill the logical gap” of underdetermination of theory by evidence, namely, values affect our choice between two or more theories that fit the same evidence. The underdetermination model, however, does not exhaust the roles values play in evidential reasoning. I introduce WAVE – a novel account of the logical relations between values and evidence. WAVE states that values influence evidential reasoning by adjusting evidential weights. I argue that the weight-adjusting role of values is distinct (...)
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  • The Autonomy of Social Epistemology.Michael A. Bishop - 2005 - Episteme 2 (1):65-78.
    Social epistemology is autonomous: When applied to the same evidential situations, the principles of social rationality and the principles of individual rationality sometimes recommend inconsistent beliefs. If we stipulate that reasoning rationally from justified beliefs to a true belief is normally sufficient for knowledge, the autonomy thesis implies that some knowledge is essentially social. When the principles of social and individual rationality are applied to justified evidence and recommend inconsistent beliefs and the belief endorsed by social rationality is true, then (...)
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  • Moderate Epistemic Relativism and Our Epistemic Goals.Jonathan M. Weinberg - 2007 - Episteme 4 (1):66-92.
    Although radical forms of relativism are perhaps beyond the epistemological pale, I argue here that a more moderate form may be plausible, and articulate the conditions under which moderate epistemic relativism could well serve our epistemic goals. In particular, as a result of our limitations as human cognizers, we find ourselves needing to investigate the dappled and difficult world by means of competing communities of highly specialized researchers. We would do well, I argue, to admit of the existence of unresolvable (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Democratic University: The Role of Justice in the Production of Knowledge.Elizabeth S. Anderson - 1995 - Social Philosophy and Policy 12 (2):186-219.
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  • The Moral Terrain of Science.Heather Douglas - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S5):1-19.
    The moral terrain of science, the full range of ethical considerations that are part of the scientific endeavor, has not been mapped. Without such a map, we cannot examine the responsibilities of scientists to see if the institutions of science are adequately constructed. This paper attempts such a map by describing four dimensions of the terrain: (1) the bases to which scientists are responsible (scientific reasoning, the scientific community, and the broader society); (2) the nature of the responsibility (general or (...)
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  • Feminist Philosophy of Science: Values and Objectivity.Sharon Crasnow - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (4):413-423.
    Feminist philosophy of science appears to present problems for the ideal of value-free science. These difficulties also challenge a traditional understanding of the objectivity of science. However, feminist philosophers of science have good reasons for desiring to retain some concept of objectivity. The present essay considers several recent and influential feminist approaches to the role of social and political values in science, with particular focus on feminist empiricism and feminist standpoint theory. The similarities and difference, as well as the strengths (...)
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  • Modeling herding behavior and its risks.Michael Weisberg - 2013 - Journal of Economic Methodology 20 (1):6 - 18.
    (2013). Modeling herding behavior and its risks. Journal of Economic Methodology: Vol. 20, Methodology, Systemic Risk, and the Economics Profession, pp. 6-18. doi: 10.1080/1350178X.2013.774843.
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  • Scientific Consensus and Expert Testimony in Courts: Lessons from the Bendectin Litigation.Boaz Miller - 2016 - Foundations of Science 21 (1):15-33.
    A consensus in a scientific community is often used as a resource for making informed public-policy decisions and deciding between rival expert testimonies in legal trials. This paper contains a social-epistemic analysis of the high-profile Bendectin drug controversy, which was decided in the courtroom inter alia by deference to a scientific consensus about the safety of Bendectin. Drawing on my previously developed account of knowledge-based consensus, I argue that the consensus in this case was not knowledge based, hence courts’ deference (...)
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  • Autonomy and Objectivity of Science.Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen - 2012 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 26 (3):309-334.
    This article deals with the problematic concepts of the rational and the social, which have been typically seen as dichotomous in the history and philosophy of science literature. I argue that this view is mistaken and that the social can be seen as something that enables rationality in science, and further, that a scientific community as well as an individual can be taken as an epistemic subject. Furthermore, I consider how scientific communities could be seen as freely acting and choosing (...)
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  • (1 other version)Structure and Scientific Controversies.William Goodwin - 2013 - Topoi 32 (1):101-110.
    In this paper, I highlight the importance of models and social structure to Kuhn’s conception of science, and then use these elements to sketch a Kuhnian classification of scientific controversies. I show that several important sorts of non-revolutionary scientific disagreements were both identified and analyzed in Structure. Ultimately, I contend that Kuhn’s conception of science supports an approach to scientific controversies that has the potential to both reveal the importantly different sources of scientific disagreements and to provide useful resources for (...)
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  • When is consensus knowledge based? Distinguishing shared knowledge from mere agreement.Boaz Miller - 2013 - Synthese 190 (7):1293-1316.
    Scientific consensus is widely deferred to in public debates as a social indicator of the existence of knowledge. However, it is far from clear that such deference to consensus is always justified. The existence of agreement in a community of researchers is a contingent fact, and researchers may reach a consensus for all kinds of reasons, such as fighting a common foe or sharing a common bias. Scientific consensus, by itself, does not necessarily indicate the existence of shared knowledge among (...)
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  • Engagement for progress: applied philosophy of science in context.Heather Douglas - 2010 - Synthese 177 (3):317-335.
    Philosophy of science was once a much more socially engaged endeavor, and can be so again. After a look back at philosophy of science in the 1930s-1950s, I turn to discuss the current potential for returning to a more engaged philosophy of science. Although philosophers of science have much to offer scientists and the public, I am skeptical that much can be gained by philosophers importing off-the-shelf discussions from philosophy of science to science and society. Such efforts will likely look (...)
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  • Bias in Peer Review.Carole J. Lee, Cassidy R. Sugimoto, Guo Zhang & Blaise Cronin - 2013 - Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology 64 (1):2-17.
    Research on bias in peer review examines scholarly communication and funding processes to assess the epistemic and social legitimacy of the mechanisms by which knowledge communities vet and self-regulate their work. Despite vocal concerns, a closer look at the empirical and methodological limitations of research on bias raises questions about the existence and extent of many hypothesized forms of bias. In addition, the notion of bias is predicated on an implicit ideal that, once articulated, raises questions about the normative implications (...)
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  • A Feminist Approach to Values in Science.Kristina Rolin - 2012 - Perspectives on Science 20 (3):320-330.
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  • Socially Responsible Science and the Unity of Values.Miriam Solomon - 2012 - Perspectives on Science 20 (3):331-338.
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  • Putting pragmatism to work in the Cold War: Science, technology, and politics in the writings of James B. Conant.Justin Biddle - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (4):552-561.
    This paper examines James Conant’s pragmatic theory of science – a theory that has been neglected by most commentators on the history of 20th-century philosophy of science – and it argues that this theory occupied an important place in Conant’s strategic thinking about the Cold War. Conant drew upon his wartime science policy work, the history of science, and Quine’s epistemological holism to argue that there is no strict distinction between science and technology, that there is no such thing as (...)
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  • Democracy, Public Policy, and Lay Assessments of Scientific Testimony.Elizabeth Anderson - 2011 - Episteme 8 (2):144-164.
    Responsible public policy making in a technological society must rely on complex scientific reasoning. Given that ordinary citizens cannot directly assess such reasoning, does this call the democratic legitimacy of technical public policies in question? It does not, provided citizens can make reliable second-order assessments of the consensus of trustworthy scientific experts. I develop criteria for lay assessment of scientific testimony and demonstrate, in the case of claims about anthropogenic global warming, that applying such criteria is easy for anyone of (...)
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  • Group Justification in Science.Kristina Rolin - 2010 - Episteme 7 (3):215-231.
    An analysis of group justification enables us to understand what it means to say that a research group is justified in making a claim on the basis of evidence. I defend Frederick Schmitt's (1994) joint account of group justification by arguing against a simple summative account of group justification. Also, I respond to two objections to the joint account, one claiming that social epistemologists should always prefer the epistemic value of making true judgments to the epistemic value of maintaining consistency, (...)
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  • Scientific freedom: its grounds and their limitations.Torsten Wilholt - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (2):174-181.
    In various debates about science, appeal is made to the freedom of scientific research. A rationale in favor of this freedom is rarely offered. In this paper, two major arguments are reconstructed that promise to lend support to a principle of scientific freedom. According to the epistemological argument, freedom of research is required in order to organize the collective cognitive effort we call science efficiently. According to the political argument, scientific knowledge needs to be generated in ways that are independent (...)
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  • It Isn't The Thought That Counts.Miriam Solomon - 2001 - Argumentation 15 (1):67-75.
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  • Progress in Science and Science at the Non-Western Peripheries.Deepanwita Dasgupta - 2009 - Spontaneous Generations 3 (1):142-157.
    Assuming that progress in science means effectiveness at problem-solving, this paper discusses how a progressive scienti?c tradition can be created by a peripheral scienti?c community. A mechanism of peripheral scienti?c growth is proposed, and it is illustrated with an Indian case study. The conclusion of the paper is that scienti?c collaboration between metropolitan and peripheral research communities is frequently characterized by a persistent inequality of intellectual authority due to inequalityin their epistemic transactions.
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  • Diversity and Dissent in the Social Sciences: The Case of Organization Studies.Kristina Rolin - 2011 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 41 (4):470-494.
    I introduce a case study from organization studies to argue that social epistemologists’ recommendation to cultivate diversity and dissent in science is unlikely to be welcomed in the social sciences unless it is coupled with another epistemic ideal: the norm of epistemic responsibility. The norm of epistemic responsibility enables me to show that organization scholars’ concern with the fragmentation of their discipline is generated by false assumptions: the assumption that a diversity of theoretical approaches will lead to fragmentation and the (...)
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  • Kuhn's constructionism.K. Brad Wray - 2010 - Perspectives on Science 18 (3):311-327.
    I challenge Hacking's characterization of Kuhn's constructionism. I argue that Kuhn does not believe that nature has no joints. Rather, Kuhn believes there is no unique correct way to cut nature into kinds. I also argue that Kuhn is not an externalist. He believes that disputes in science are resolved on the basis of a consideration of the epistemic merits of the theories. Subjective factors merely ensure that competing theories are developed, and the strengths and weaknesses of the theories are (...)
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  • The brain/body problem.Marya Schechtman - 1997 - Philosophical Psychology 10 (2):149 – 164.
    It is a commonplace of contemporary thought that the mind is located in the brain. Although there have been some challenges to this view, it has remained mainstream outside of a few specialized discussions, and plays a prominent role in a wide variety of philosophical arguments. It is further assumed that the source of this view is empirical. I argue it is not. Empirical discoveries show conclusively that the brain is the central organ of mental life, but do not show (...)
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  • Social values and scientific evidence: The case of the HPV vaccines.Kristen Intemann & Inmaculada de Melo-Martín - 2010 - Biology and Philosophy 25 (2):203-213.
    Several have argued that the aims of scientific research are not always independent of social and ethical values. Yet this is often assumed only to have implications for decisions about what is studied, or which research projects are funded, and not for methodological decisions or standards of evidence. Using the case of the recently developed HPV vaccines, we argue that the social aims of research can also play important roles in justifying decisions about (1) how research problems are defined in (...)
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  • Naturalized metaphilosophy.David R. Morrow & Chris Alen Sula - 2011 - Synthese 182 (2):297-313.
    Traditional representations of philosophy have tended to prize the role of reason in the discipline. These accounts focus exclusively on ideas and arguments as animating forces in the field. But anecdotal evidence and more rigorous sociological studies suggest there is more going on in philosophy. In this article, we present two hypotheses about social factors in the field: that social factors influence the development of philosophy, and that status and reputation—and thus social influence—will tend to be awarded to philosophers who (...)
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  • Commentary: Making meaning—a response to Chokr.Miriam Solomon - 1993 - Social Epistemology 7 (4):359 – 364.
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  • Norms and naturalism: Comments on Miriam Solomon's social empiricism.Helen E. Longino - 2008 - Perspectives on Science 16 (3):pp. 241-245.
    Miriam Solomon's social empiricism is marked by emphasis on community level rationality in science and the refusal to impose a distinction between the epistemic and the non-epistemic character of factors ("decision vectors") that incline scientists for or against a theory. While she attempts to derive some norms from the analysis of cases, her insistent naturalism undermines her effort to articulate norms for the (appropriate) distribution of decision vectors.
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  • Solomon's empirical/non-empirical distinction and the proper place of values in science.Sharyn Clough - 2008 - Perspectives on Science 16 (3):pp. 265-279.
    In assessing the appropriateness of a scientific community's research effort, Solomon considers a number of "decision vectors," divided into the empirical and non-empirical. Value judgments get sorted as non-empirical vectors. By way of contrast, I introduce Anderson's discussion of the evidential role of value judgments. Like Anderson, I argue that value judgments are empirical in the relevant sense. I argue further that Solomon's decision matrix needs to be reconceptualized: the distinction should not be between the empirical vs. non-empirical, but between (...)
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  • (1 other version)Science, biases, and the threat of global pessimism.K. Brad Wray - 2001 - Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2001 (3):S467-.
    Philip Kitcher rejects the global pessimists' view that the conclusions reached in inquiry are determined by the interests of some segment of the population, arguing that only some inquiries, for example, inquiries into race and gender, are adversely affected by interests. I argue that the biases Kitcher believes affect such inquiries are operative in all domains, but the prevalence of such biases does not support global pessimism. I argue further that in order to address the global pessimists' concerns, the scientific (...)
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  • An ethics of expertise based on informed consent.Kevin C. Elliott - 2006 - Science and Engineering Ethics 12 (4):637-661.
    Ethicists widely accept the notion that scientists have moral responsibilities to benefit society at large. The dissemination of scientific information to the public and its political representatives is central to many of the ways in which scientists serve society. Unfortunately, the task of providing information can often give rise to moral quandaries when scientific experts participate in politically charged debates over issues that are fraught with uncertainty. This paper develops a theoretical framework for an “ethics of expertise” (EOE) based on (...)
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  • Epistemic Landscapes and the Division of Cognitive Labor.Michael Weisberg & Ryan Muldoon - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (2):225-252.
    Because of its complexity, contemporary scientific research is almost always tackled by groups of scientists, each of which works in a different part of a given research domain. We believe that understanding scientific progress thus requires understanding this division of cognitive labor. To this end, we present a novel agent-based model of scientific research in which scientists divide their labor to explore an unknown epistemic landscape. Scientists aim to climb uphill in this landscape, where elevation represents the significance of the (...)
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  • The CDF collaboration and argumentation theory: The role of process in objective knowledge.William Rehg & Kent Staley - 2008 - Perspectives on Science 16 (1):1-25.
    : For philosophers of science interested in elucidating the social character of science, an important question concerns the manner in which and degree to which the objectivity of scientific knowledge is socially constituted. We address this broad question by focusing specifically on philosophical theories of evidence. To get at the social character of evidence, we take an interdisciplinary approach informed by categories from argumentation studies. We then test these categories by exploring their applicability to a case study from high-energy physics. (...)
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  • Invisible hands and the success of science.K. Brad Wray - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):163-175.
    David Hull accounts for the success of science in terms of an invisible hand mechanism, arguing that it is difficult to reconcile scientists' self-interestedness or their desire for recognition with traditional philosophical explanations for the success of science. I argue that we have less reason to invoke an invisible hand mechanism to explain the success of science than Hull implies, and that many of the practices and institutions constitutive of science are intentionally designed by scientists with an eye to realizing (...)
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  • Mind, society, and the growth of knowledge.Paul Thagard - 1994 - Philosophy of Science 61 (4):629-645.
    Explanations of the growth of scientific knowledge can be characterized in terms of logical, cognitive, and social schemas. But cognitive and social schemas are complementary rather than competitive, and purely social explanations of scientific change are as inadequate as purely cognitive explanations. For example, cognitive explanations of the chemical revolution must be supplemented by and combined with social explanations, and social explanations of the rise of the mechanical world view must be supplemented by and combined with cognitive explanations. Rational appraisal (...)
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  • Understanding knowledge transmission.Paul Faulkner - 2006 - Ratio 19 (2):156–175.
    We must allow that knowledge can be transmitted. But to allow this is to allow that an individual can know a proposition despite lacking any evidence for it and reaching belief by an unreliable means. So some explanation is required as to how knowledge rather than belief is transmitted. This paper considers two non-individualistic explanations: one in terms of knowledge existing autonomously, the other in terms of it existing as a property of communities. And it attempts to decide what is (...)
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  • (1 other version)Norms of epistemic diversity.Miriam Solomon - 2006 - Episteme 3 (1-2):23-36.
    Epistemic diversity is widely approved of by social epistemologists. This paper asks, more specifi cally, how much epistemic diversity, and what kinds of epistemic diversity are normatively appropriate? Both laissez-faire and highly directive approaches to epistemic diversity are rejected in favor of the claim that diversity is a blunt epistemic tool. There are typically a number of diff erent options for adequate diversifi cation. The paper focuses on scientifi c domains, with particular attention to recent theories of smell.
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  • Conflicts of interest in science.David B. Resnik - 1998 - Perspectives on Science 6 (4):381-408.
    : This essay provides an analysis of conflicts of interest in science. It gives an overview of some current conflict of interest policies and distinguishes between real, apparent, and potential conflicts of interest. The essay argues that scientists should disclose real, apparent, and potential conflicts of interest and that they should avoid conflicts that threaten scientific objectivity or trustworthiness. The essay also uses several hypothetical scenarios to illustrate some of the key points made in the analysis and suggests some strategies (...)
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  • The implicit epistemology of White Fragility.Alan Sokal - 2023 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 57 (2):517-552.
    I extract, and then analyse critically, the epistemological ideas that are implicit in Robin DiAngelo's best-selling book White Fragility and her other writings. On what grounds, according to DiAngelo, can people know what they claim to know? And on what grounds does DiAngelo know what she claims to know?
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  • Intellectual courage and inquisitive reasons.Will Fleisher - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (4):1343-1371.
    Intellectual courage requires acting to promote epistemic goods despite significant risk of harm. Courage is distinguished from recklessness and cowardice because the expected epistemic benefit of a courageous action outweighs (in some sense) the threatened harm. Sometimes, however, inquirers pursue theories that are not best supported by their current evidence. For these inquirers, the expected epistemic benefit of their actions cannot be explained by appeal to their evidence alone. The probability of pursuing the true theory cannot contribute enough to the (...)
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  • On the pursuitworthiness of qualitative methods in empirical philosophy of science.Nora Hangel & Christopher ChoGlueck - 2023 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 98 (C):29-39.
    While the pursuitworthiness of philosophical ideas has changed over time, philosophical practice and methodology have not kept pace. The worthiness of a philosophical pursuit includes not only the ideas and objectives one pursues but also the methods with which one pursues them. In this paper, we articulate how empirical approaches benefit philosophy of science, particularly advocating for the use of qualitative methods for understanding the social and normative aspects of scientific inquiry. After situating qualitative methods within empirical philosophy of science, (...)
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  • The Value-Free Ideal of Science: A Useful Fiction? A Review of Non-epistemic Reasons for the Research Integrity Community.Jacopo Ambrosj, Kris Dierickx & Hugh Desmond - 2023 - Science and Engineering Ethics 29 (1):1-22.
    Even if the “value-free ideal of science” (VFI) were an unattainable goal, one could ask: can it be a useful fiction, one that is beneficial for the research community and society? This question is particularly crucial for scholars and institutions concerned with research integrity (RI), as one cannot offer normative guidance to researchers without making some assumptions about what ideal scientific research looks like. Despite the insofar little interaction between scholars studying RI and those working on values in science, the (...)
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  • Pursuit and inquisitive reasons.Will Fleisher - 2022 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 94 (C):17-30.
    Sometimes inquirers may rationally pursue a theory even when the available evidence does not favor that theory over others. Features of a theory that favor pursuing it are known as considerations of promise or pursuitworthiness. Examples of such reasons include that a theory is testable, that it has a useful associated analogy, and that it suggests new research and experiments. These reasons need not be evidence in favor of the theory. This raises the question: what kinds of reasons are provided (...)
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  • Science, assertion, and the common ground.Corey Dethier - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-19.
    I argue that the appropriateness of an assertion is sensitive to context—or, really, the “common ground”—in a way that hasn’t previously been emphasized by philosophers. This kind of context-sensitivity explains why some scientific conclusions seem to be appropriately asserted even though they are not known, believed, or justified on the available evidence. I then consider other recent attempts to account for this phenomenon and argue that if they are to be successful, they need to recognize the kind of context-sensitivity that (...)
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  • Sins of Inquiry: How to Criticize Scientific Pursuits.Marina DiMarco & Kareem Khalifa - 2022 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 92 (C):86-96.
    Criticism is a staple of the scientific enterprise and of the social epistemology of science. Philosophical discussions of criticism have traditionally focused on its roles in relation to objectivity, confirmation, and theory choice. However, attention to criticism and to criticizability should also inform our thinking about scientific pursuits: the allocation of resources with the aim of developing scientific tools and ideas. In this paper, we offer an account of scientific pursuitworthiness which takes criticizability as its starting point. We call this (...)
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  • Epistemological and Ethical Aspects of Time in Scientific Research.Daria Jadreškić - 2020 - Dissertation, Leibniz University Hannover
    This dissertation explores the influence of time constraints on different research practices. The first two parts present case studies, which serve as a basis for discussing the epistemological and ethical implications of temporal limitations in scientific research. Part I is a case study on gravitational wave research, conducted by the LIGO Scientific Collaboration. This exemplifies fundamental research – without immediate societal applications, open-ended in terms of timeline and in terms of research goals. It is based, in part, on qualitative interviews (...)
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  • Responsibility for Collective Epistemic Harms.Will Fleisher & Dunja Šešelja - 2023 - Philosophy of Science 90 (1):1-20.
    Discussion of epistemic responsibility typically focuses on belief formation and actions leading to it. Similarly, accounts of collective epistemic responsibility have addressed the issue of collective belief formation and associated actions. However, there has been little discussion of collective responsibility for preventing epistemic harms, particularly those preventable only by the collective action of an unorganized group. We propose an account of collective epistemic responsibility which fills this gap. Building on Hindriks' (2019) account of collective moral responsibility, we introduce the Epistemic (...)
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