This thesis modifies the wording of William Clifford’s 1877 evidence principle (that ‘it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence’) to propose an explicitly moral principle, restricted to descriptive beliefs (about what is or is not the case) and excluding prescriptive beliefs (about what ought or ought not to be the case). It considers potential counter-examples, particularly William James’s 1896 defence of religious belief; and concludes that the modified principle survives unscathed. It then searches (...) for suitable criteria for ‘sufficient’ and ‘insufficient’ evidence, first within a Bayesian framework enriched by pragmatic considerations, and finally by returning to Clifford’s conception of our shared responsibilities to our shared epistemic asset. Combined with elements of Edward Craig’s (1990, 1999) ‘state-of-nature’ theory of knowledge this gets us to a minimum threshold to avoid insufficient evidence and an aspirational criterion of sufficient evidence. (shrink)

Two prominent theoretical frameworks in moral psychology, Moral Foundations and Dual Process Theory, share a broad foundational assumption that individual differences in human morality are dispositional and in part due to genetic variation. The only published direct test of heritability, however, found little evidence of genetic influences on moral judgments using instrumentation approaches associated with Moral Foundations Theory. This raised questions about one of the core assumptions underpinning intuitionist theories of moral psychology. Here we examine the heritability of moral psychology (...) using the moral dilemmas approach commonly used in Dual Process Theory research. Using such measures, we find consistent and significant evidence of heritability. These findings have important implications not only for understanding which measures do, or do not, tap into the genetically influenced aspects of moral decision-making, but in better establishing the utility and validity of different intuitionist theoretical frameworks and the source of why people differ in those frameworks. (shrink)

Resumen: Este artículo propone una reflexión acerca de una colección de ukiyo-e del Archivo Central Andrés Bello de la Universidad de Chile. La anchura del problema es extendida en dos constelaciones exploratorias: por una parte, indagar lo controvertible, aparentemente, de interrogar el objeto japonés desde las lógicas disciplinares occidentales, es decir, por medio de la dicotomía Occidente-Oriente. De otra parte, caracterizar cómo esta tensión inicial fue desatendida o invertida, como un paradigma de lo social en el ukiyo-e y, con ello, (...) el principio de asociatividad de las imágenes en el espacio del museo.: This article proposes a reflection about a collection of ukiyo-e from the Archivo Central Andrés Bello of the Universidad Chile. The breadth of the problem is extended on two exploratory constellations: on the one hand, to inquire the controversy, apparently, to interrogate the Japanese object from Western disciplinary logics, that means, through the West-East dichotomy. On the other hand, to characterize how this initial tension was neglected or inverted, as a social paradigm on ukiyo-e, and with it, the principle of associativity of the images in the space of the museum. (shrink)

1) Introduction. 2) The key libertarian insight into property and orthodox libertarianism’s philosophical confusion. 3) Clearer distinctions for applying to what follows: abstract liberty; practical liberty; moral defences; and critical rationalism. 4) The two dominant (‘Lockean’ and ‘Hobbesian’) conceptions of interpersonal liberty. 5) A general account of libertarianism as a subset of classical liberalism and defended from a narrower view. 6) Two abstract (non-propertarian, non-normative) theories of interpersonal liberty developed and defended: ‘the absence of interpersonal initiated imposed constraints on want-satisfaction’, (...) abbreviated to ‘no initiated imposed costs’; and ‘no imposed costs’. 7) Practical implications for both main abstract conceptions of liberty derived and compared. 8) How this positive analysis relates to morals. 9) Concluding conjectures: the main abstract theory of liberty captures the relevant interpersonal conception; the new paradigm of libertarianism solves the old one’s problems. (shrink)

Since W. B. Gallie introduced the notion of essentially contested concepts (ECCs) in 1956, social science scholars have increasingly used his framework to analyze key concepts drawing “endless disputes” from contestant users. Despite its merits, the ECC framework has been limited by a neglect of social, cultural, and political contexts, the invisibility of actors, and its ahistorical character. To understand how ECCs evolve and change over time, I use a conceptual history approach to study the concept of philanthropy, recently labeled (...) as an ECC. Using France during classical modernity as a case study, I analyze key events and actors from the concept’s inception in 1712 as a virtue of the Enlightenment to its triumph after 1789 as a secular alternative to Catholic charity, until its decline at the end of the nineteenth century as a new consensus emerged around the concept of solidarity. By introducing the notion of historically contested concepts, I make several contributions to research on ECCs, conceptual contestation, and conceptual change. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article argues that Malthusianism as a series of discursive regimes, developed in the Victorian-era, serves in times of austerity to reproduce an elite understanding of social exclusion in which those in a state of poverty are to blame for their own situation. It highlights that Malthusianism is present in the public discourse, becoming an underlining feature in news coverage of the so-called ‘underclass’. Our findings broadly contradict the normative claim that journalism ‘speaks truth to power’, and suggest instead that (...) overall as a political practice, journalism tends to reproduce and reinforce hegemonic discourses of power. The piece is based on critical discourse analysis, which has been applied to a significant sample of news articles published by tabloid newspapers in Britain which focussed on the concept of the ‘underclass’. By looking at the evidence, the authors argue that the ‘underclass’ is a concept used by some journalists to cast people living in poverty as ‘undeserving’ of public and state support. In so doing, these journalists help create a narrative which supports cuts in welfare provisions and additional punitive measures against some of the most vulnerable members of society. (shrink)

Thomas Hodgskin (1797–1869) is still studied as a forerunner of modern socialism: in fact, he is typically characterized as a prominent “Ricardian socialist”. Among the most influential of Hodgskin’s works was his pamphlet Labour Defended Against the Claims of Capital (1825a), thus prefiguring with its very title announces a denunciation of capitalism. Hodgskin’s work should be considered instead in its entirety, paying proper attention to its nuances. If Hodgskin indeed chastised “capitalism,” he meant precisely what we now call “crony capitalism.” (...) He did not condemn the “higgling of the market,” which he thought should be the sole mechanism by which resources, including human labour, are allocated. But he saw clearly that legislative meddling served specific interests and often prevented market forces to emerge and blossom. If he was unfriendly towards the “capitalist” class, it was only because he saw them as disproportionally benefiting from the favour of political power. Hodgskin denounced the idle classes but did not want to substitute the market process with any alternative distributive scheme. He considered a sound understanding of an innovation-fostering economy incompatible with archaic distribution of privilege on the part of government. His work can help to clarify how embracing the market economy did and does not entail a defence of the status quo. (shrink)

Scholars have paid great attention to the neo-Darwinism of Ronald Fisher. He was one of the founding fathers of the modern synthesis and, not surprisingly, his writings and life have been widely scrutinized. However, less attention has been paid to his interests in the human sciences. In assessing Fisher’s uses of the human sciences in his seminal book the Genetical Theory of Natural Selection and elsewhere, the article shows how Fisher’s evolutionary thought was essentially eclectic when applied to the human (...) context. In order to understand how evolution works among humans, Fisher made himself also a sociologist and historian. More than a eugenically minded Darwinist, Fisher was also a sophisticated scholar combining many disciplines without the ambition to reduce, simplistically, the human sciences to biology. (shrink)

The article discusses the conditions under which can we say that people enter the economic system voluntarily. “The Need for an Exit Option” briefly explains the philosophical argument that voluntary interaction requires an exit option—a reasonable alternative to participation in the projects of others. “The Treatment of Effective Forced Labor in Economic and Political Theory” considers the treatment of effectively forced interaction in economic and political theory. “Human Need” discusses theories of human need to determine the capabilities a person requires (...) to have an acceptable exit option. “Capability in Cash, Kind, or Raw Resources” considers what form access to that level of capability should take—in cash, kind, or raw resources, concluding that a basic income guarantee is the most effective method to ensure an exit option in a modern, industrial economy. (shrink)

This paper argues that the independence from intercultural disagreement, that Peter Jones attributes to human rights, implies that those rights are best understood as modelled on the Will Theory of rights and are derived from each person’s foundational right to equal (negative) freedom.

Research Articles Eric Mack, Social Philosophy and Policy, FirstView Article.

Darwinian natural selection draws on Malthus’ harsh vision of human society to explain how organisms come to be adapted to their environments. Natural selection produces the appearance of teleology, but requires only efficient causal processes: undirected, heritable variation combined with effects of the variations on survival and reproduction. This paper draws a sharp distinction between the resulting form of backwards-directed teleology and the future-directed teleology we ascribe to intentional human activity. Rather than dismiss teleology as mere illusion, the paper concludes (...) with an account of how future-directed teleology came to be a justifiable part of how we understand ourselves. (shrink)

Despite the harsh scientific basis of Social Darwinism, its followers strove to unify nature with humane feelings—for world views necessarily attempt such reconciliations. To answer the difficult “problem of evil” posed by natural selection and survival of the fittest, Social Darwinists such as Charles Darwin, Alfred Russel Wallace, and Herbert Spencer resorted to three kinds of theodicy: sentimental denial of the problem, belief in progress, and belief in perfection. Spencer's writings particulary display at different times both a rigid individualism and (...) a softer organicism. Eventually, however, T. H. Huxley would abandon the attempt, acknowledging in effect that no complete world view was possible. (shrink)

The moral and political thought of Herbert Spencer is usually associated with some form of evolutionism. This is unsurprising, since Spencer himself thought of his ideas as founded on evolutionary theory. But it is regrettable, because no one believes in Spencer's form of evolutionism any more, and even if they did, they would not think that it supported his views in the way that he confidently believed. And so Spencer has been largely neglected since his death. His libertarianism is thought (...) to be without foundation, and so few have thought it worth study. But in this paper I try to show that Spencer's moral and political conclusions can be based on some of the non-evolutionary arguments that he offered. Although these arguments are not entirely compelling, they have force in a way that his evolutionary claims do not. (shrink)

ABSTRACT According to many contemporary observers, including Hillel Steiner [1], Herbert Hart [2], John Gray [3] and Isaiah Berlin [4], the equal liberty principle lies at the heart of liberalism. Yet despite its central place in liberal theory, it has attracted little critical appraisal. This paper seeks to examine the meaning and some of the policy implications of the equal liberty principle, paying particular attention to the elucidations produced by Herbert Spencer, Steiner and Hart — the only systematic analysts of (...) the notion of equal liberty. In part 1, the meaning of the equal liberty principle is discussed, and it is shown to be intrinsically ambivalent. In part 2, where certain policy implications are considered, the conclusion is reached that the equal liberty principle is ambiguous in its policy prescriptions, and requires to be supplemented by some other principle before it can be unequivocally applied. (shrink)

In this essay, I identify the reasons that libertarian principles have failed to capture the popular imagination as an acceptable form of civil society. By the term “libertarian” I mean a belief in and commitment to a set of methods and policies that have as their common aim greater freedom under law for individuals. The term “freedom” in this context means not only a commitment to civil liberties, such as freedom of expression, but also to economic liberties, including a commitment (...) to a laissez-faire policy of free enterprise and free trade between countries. Libertarians, therefore, are committed to the absolute minimum state intervention in the economy as well as in people's private lives. In a world constrained by these libertarian principles, people should be permitted to do as they please, constrained only by rules that prevent them from encroaching on the liberty of others. (shrink)

Both Adam Smith and Herbert spencer, albeit in quite different ways, have been enormously influential in what we today take to be philosophies of modern capitalism. Surprisingly it is Spencer, not Smith, who is the individualist, perhaps an egoist, and supports a "night watchman" theory of the state. Smith's concept of political economy is a notion that needs to be revisited, and Spencer's theory of democratic workplace management offers a refreshing twist on contemporary libertarianism.

People disagree about the causes of social inequality and how to most effectively intervene in them. These may seem like empirical questions for social scientists, not philosophers. However, causal explanation itself depends on broadly normative commitments. From this it follows that (moral) philosophers have an important role to play in determining those causal explanations. I examine the case of causal explanations of poverty to demonstrate these claims. In short, philosophers who work to reshape our moral expectations also work, on the (...) back end, to restructure acceptable causal explanations—and hence solutions—for social inequality. Empirical and normative inquiry, then, are a two-way street. (shrink)

One of the most interesting phenomena in the history of the English language is the remarkable rise of the word right, in its many interrelated senses and uses. This article tries to trace the changes in the meaning and use of this word, as well as the rise of new conversational routines based on right, and raises questions about the cultural underpinnings of these semantic and pragmatic developments. It explores the hypothesis that the `discourse of truth' declined in English over (...) the centuries; that the use of `right' and `wrong' as parallel concepts increased; and it notes that the use of right as an adjective increased enormously in relation to the use of true. Originally, right meant `straight', as in a right line. Figuratively, perhaps, this right in the sense `straight' was also used in an evaluative sense: `good', with an additional component building on the geometrical image: `clearly good'. Spoken of somebody else's words, “right” was linked with `true'. But in the course of the 17th and 18th centuries right appears to have begun to be used more and more with reference to thinking rather than speaking. The association of right with thinking seems to have spread in parallel with a contrastive use of right and wrong — a trend apparently encouraged by the influence of the Reformation, especially within its Calvinist wing. Another interesting development is that over the last two centuries or so the discourse of `right' and `wrong' appears to have found a competitor in a discourse of `cooperation' and mutual concessions. Judging by both the frequency and range of its use, the word right flourished in this atmosphere, whereas wrong was increasingly left behind. This article traces the transition from the Shakespearean response “Right.”, described by the OED as `you are right; you speak well', to the present-day “Right.” of non-committal acknowledgement and it links the developments in semantics and discourse patterns with historical phenomena such as Puritanism, British empiricism, the Enlightenment and the growth of democracy. (shrink)

L’objectif de cette article est de comprendre la neutralité axiologique non pas comme une exigence épistémologique, mais plutôt comme un idéal éducationnel. Max Weber propose une science basée sur la description factuelle, de laquelle on exclut la formulation de jugements de valeur. Or, il faut démontrer pourquoi il est préférable de séparer les jugements descriptifs des jugements évaluatifs. L’objectif de Weber est de préserver l'autonomie intellectuelle des étudiants. Pour Weber, la classe et l'académie en général sont des lieux politiques. Ces (...) rapports au sein de la classe sont nécessaires pour transmettre des connaissances, des méthodes et le goût de l'autonomie intellectuelle. Or, il serait contraire au principe d'autonomie de laisser le professeur influencer et convaincre ses étudiants, de façon partisane, d'adhérer à certaines thèses normatives. Weber propose ainsi un mécanisme pour éviter que le professeur n'ixnfluence ses étudiants de manière illégitime. (shrink)

The standard microeconomic analysis of taxation suggests that excise taxes on goods with a price-inelastic demand are more efficient in that they lead to a lower deadweight loss than taxes on goods with price-elastic demand. This argument ignores secondary effects on the rest of the economy. By narrowly focusing on the primary effects on the market where the tax is raised, the overall deadweight loss is underestimated when demand is price-inelastic. Moreover, it is overestimated when demand is price-elastic. This puts (...) into question the validity of the standard textbook argument. In this paper we address this issue by considering how taxes affect consumer behavior in other markets. From this we can clearly see how the impact of an excise tax is not limited to one market in isolation, but is spread over all markets and affects the demand for cash balances. We suggest a simple way to incorporate this important insight into a standard textbook exposition. (shrink)

This essay presents a skeleton of a potential conceptual framework for human flourishing in a free society. Its aim is to present a diagram that illustrates the ways in which its topics relate to one another and why they do. It argues for a plan of conceptualization rather than for the topics themselves. It emphasizes the interconnections among the components of the schema presented. It sees an essential interconnection between objective concepts, arguing that all of the disciplines of human action (...) can be integrated into a paradigm of human flourishing based on the nature of man and the world. (shrink)

John Rawls's A Theory of Justice was published in December 1971 and has already established itself as a landmark. No other philosophical work, in our time or before, has, to my knowledge, excited so much attention in so short a time and in such varied circles. Clearly the book answers to a set of needs that have just recently surfaced, and it was published at just the right time to benefit from changing directions in philosophy and other areas of intellectual (...) life brought on by enormous and accelerating changes in social conditions and concerns, by the disaster of Vietnam, and by the sense that something serious and sufficient must be done to counter the increasing fragmentation of knowledge and the divorce of science from society. Rawls gives one the sense of putting it all together; of seeing things clearly and seeing them whole; of joining together again economics, jurisprudence, and social and moral theory; and of putting philosophy to work once again in the service of society and humanity. In particular, he gives one the sense that there can be a science of justice, of morality, and of values. (shrink)

The mutual influence of science and values in biology is exhibited in several cases from the biological literature. It is argued in a number of cases, from R. A. Fisher's argument for the optimality of a 50:50 sex ratio to A. Jensen's defense of a genetic basis for intelligence, and including work on the evolution of sexual dimorphism and muted aggression, that the credence accorded the views is disproportionate with their theoretical and empirical warrant. It is, furthermore, suggested that the (...) proper explanation for the attraction and persistence of such views lies in their conformity with ideological norms. There is thus an important, if circumscribed, role for ideological critique in the evaluation of scientific theories; in particular, it lies in the explanation of the acceptance and persistence of scientific views, given independent grounds for questioning their justifiability. (shrink)

This paper is about the relevance, to the definition of freedom, of values or goods other than freedom. In this respect,its subject matter is not at all new. However, I do believe that new light can be thrown on the nature of this relationship by paying more attention to another relationship – one which exists within the concept of freedom itself. There are two senses in which we can be said to possess freedom. Firstly, there is the sense in which (...) we can be said to be free to do a certain particular thing. Secondly,there is the sense in which we can be said to possess a certain ‘amount’,‘degree’ or ‘quantity’ of freedom, in some overall sense. 1 I believe that most recent accounts of the relationship between freedom and other goods are inconsistent, because they see those other goods as affecting the truth value of claims about freedom in the second sense, but not in the first. (shrink)

Why has Sidgwick's political philosophy fallen into oblivion while his ethics continues to be celebrated? Not because his performance in that field was inferior, nor because his choice of topics has become outdated, nor because his conclusions were largely conservative. Instead the problem stems from the weight he attached to common sentiments and beliefs in his application of the utility principle, illustrated by his treatment of topics such as secession and colonialism. Moreover hisElements of Politicsis arranged in such a way (...) that he never has to confront the basic question of what makes states legitimate. This means that neither political moralists, who want to see the utility principle applied in more radical fashion, nor political realists, for whom the problem of establishing political order is central, find much to commend in his political philosophy. (shrink)