It is simply a fact that it is not in the same intention that Dewey relates to Hegel in a programmatic article such as “The Present position of Logical Theory,” in his Lectures on Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit, in his Lectures on the Logic of Hegel, and in the articles collected in The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy. Dewey’s references to Hegel differ in status and functions, and these differences have to be made explicit if one wants to elaborate a (...) consistent account of Dewey’s relation to Hegel. The article proceeds in four steps. It distinguishes between what relates to Dewey’s reading of Hegel, to Dewey’s use of Hegel, and to Dewey’s reconstruction of Hegel. In a last and concluding step, it deals with the methodological originality of Dewey’s project of actualizing Hegel. (shrink)

This is an introduction to a special issue on recognition and democracy. We outline the constitutive and enabling relations between democracy and recognition. We distinguish between pre-political and political forms of identity and recognition, between horizontal and vertical forms of recognition, and between democratic and other ways or arranging the vertical and horizontal aspects of political life. We also distinguish between the roles of a subject and a co-author of law. The intruduction also includes an overview of the individual articles (...) in this special issue. The issue tries to fill some theoretical gaps in theories of democracy and recognition, with a special emphasis on feminist politics. (shrink)

Koopman’s book revolves around the notion of transition, which he proposes is one of the central ideas of the pragmatist tradition but one which had not previously been fully articulated yet nevertheless shapes the pragmatist attitude in philosophy. Transition, according to Koopman, denotes “those temporal structures and historical shapes in virtue of which we get from here to there”. One of the consequences of transitionalism is the understanding of critique and inquiry as historical pro...

In gegenwärtigem sozialen Protest lässt sich, mit Eva von Redecker, eine „Revolution für das Leben“ ausmachen: eine neue Protestform, die sich durch einen Bezug auf bedrohtes Leben auszeichnet und die Vulnerabilität politisiert. Im vorliegenden Beitrag möchte ich mit John Dewey ein Verständnis von Politisierung durch sozialen Protest entwickeln und dieses in Bezug auf die „Revolution für das Leben“ erläutern. Dazu schlage ich vor, Politisierung als Problematisierung auf drei Ebenen zu begreifen. Sozialer Protest artikuliert, erstens, ausgehend von Erfahrungen, Sachverhalte als Probleme (...) von öffentlicher Bedeutung, die einer Lösung bzw. Bearbeitung bedürfen. Zweitens thematisiert er diese zugleich als Probleme zweiter Ordnung, d.i. als Probleme sozialer Institutionen und gesellschaftlicher (Selbst-) Gestaltung. Und schließlich stellt sozialer Protest die Grenzen politischer Gemeinschaft zur Disposition, indem er zugleich Probleme dritter Ordnung, d.i. politischer Teilhabe adressiert. In diesem Sinne ist auch die „Revolution für das Leben“ zu verstehen: sie artikuliert Vulnerabilität nicht nur als sachliches Problem des Schutzes von akut bedrohten Leben, sondern auch als soziales Problem gestaltbarer Praktiken der Sorge um verletzliche Leben sowie als politisches Problem des Ausschlusses aus der Gemeinschaft derjenigen, deren Leben als der Sorge und des Schutzes wert und würdig anerkannt werden. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article argues that Dewey has a “progressive historicist” theory of ethics and social philosophy. That theory is here explicated with the notion of an “evaluative framework,” which can be embodied both implicitly in practice and in explicit theories and judgments. Such historicism, in which each stage has overcome the deficiencies of the previous stage, has ample resources to avoid unconstrained relativism, in terms of three aspects: the “dynamic,” the “dialogic,” and the “historical.” The article poses, however, a challenge (...) for such “progressive historicisms”: while there are determinate oughts within each stage of history before the inadequacies of that stage have come to the fore, it is indeterminate what one ought to do during the intermediate phases once such inadequacies have come to one's knowledge and before a new solution has been generally socially accepted and habitualized. The last subsection briefly outlines various responses historicism might give. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this article I will first reconstruct a Deweyan model of social ontology, based on the process of habituation. Habit ontology leads to a social philosophy that is not merely descriptive, since it involves a critical redescription of the social world. I will argue that a habit-modeled social ontology is critical insofar as it includes an account of social transformation and of the inevitability of social conflict. Such an understanding is based on a diagnosis of social pathologies of our (...) form of life and includes an account of the experience of domination. Accordingly, it is described as a matter of an imbalance of recognition that embodies subjugating patterns and is seen from the critical perspective of freedom understood as emancipation from oppression. This leads to a reconstruction of the genesis of critical attitudes from life's processes of habituation, which leads to an extended naturalist account of social authority. (shrink)

Dewey’s social ontology could be characterized as a habit ontology, an ontology of habit qua second nature that offers us an account of intentionality, social statuses, institutions, and norms in terms of habituations. Such an account offers us a promising alternative to contemporary intentionalist and deontic approaches to social ontology such as Searle’s. Furthermore, it could be the basis of a social ontology better suited to explain both the maintenance and the transformation of social reality. In the first part I (...) will characterize Dewey’s model as a social ontology based on the notion of habit, and present it as an alternative to intentionalist approaches to social reality. In the second part I will argue that habit ontology offers us an account of social norms that is based on a peculiar understanding of the notion of ‘status’, and represents an alternative to deontic accounts. In the third part I will claim that Dewey’s notion of “public” offers us a dynamic understanding of social institutions and a ‘reactive’ notion of collective intentionality as an achievement rather than as a presupposition of social practices. In the final section I will summarize some advantages of the Deweyan over the Searlean social ontology concerning our understanding of acceptance, maintenance and transformation of statuses, and of the role played by the ‘background’. (shrink)

This paper seeks to unveil and investigate the close bond existing between the critical project developed by Axel Honneth and Hans Joas in Social Action and Human Nature (1980) and John Dewey’s naturalistic humanism and social criticism. I will contend that these authors develop an original and compelling approach to the critique of the social world, which relies on a naturalistic redefinition of human beings with intersubjective premises. By reconsidering human beings in their continuity and discontinuity with nature, they attempt (...) to identify the specific quality of human action with respect to animal behavior and to employ this category as a criterion for the critique of the social world. On the other hand, the paper will underline how Dewey significantly contributes to the outlining of a contemporary critical project with naturalistic premises. Indeed, his naturalistic humanism provides a systematic metaphysics of human experience to ground social criticism, wherein the underdeveloped elements of Social Action and Human Nature’s analysis of human action are better explained and justified from a theoretical point of view. (shrink)

This paper provides a fresh examination of John Dewey’s social philosophy in the light of new evidence made available by the recent discovery of the original manuscript Dewey wrote in preparation of the Lectures on Social and Political Philosophy delivered in China and published here for the first time. The paper reconstructs Dewey’s ambivalent relationship with social philosophy throughout his long career and focuses upon his attempt between 1919 and 1923 to develop his own’s social philosophy. It proceeds to examine (...) the contribution of the Chinese Lectures in Social and Political Philosophy to Dewey’s project in social philosophy and shows that our understanding of Dewey’s social philosophy was severely hampered by the unavailability of the original text. It concludes by assessing the critical potential of Dewey’s social philosophy. (shrink)

At the centre of Adorno’s critical theory of society lies the problem of Bann or Bannkreis: why do individuals systematically act in ways that reinforce conditions that are obviously incompatible with their freedom and pursuit of happiness? Despite criticism of Dewey’s experimentalism by several Frankfurt School critical theorists claiming that the American pragmatist fails to account for systematic blockages to critique, Dewey does in fact formulate his approach to social critique as a response to the problem that social life might (...) be made immune to transformative claims. In Human Nature and Conduct, thirty years prior to Adorno’s Bannkreis, he conceptualizes a ‘vicious circle’ in which attempts to transform social life seem to be caught and points to a way out. This article shows that Adorno and Dewey share in a project at the heart of critical theory, the project of a disclosing critique of society. In different and mutually completing ways, the Frankfurt School critical theorist and the American pragmatist point out the extent to which their contemporary societies are caught in antagonistic and painful vicious circles and thereby point to the objective possibility of another form of social life. The article is historical, but it is animated by the intent to brush a fruitful path for disclosing critique today. From Adorno, this critical practice gains the idea that theory of society can be a disclosing gesture, which presents an important corrective to Dewey’s failure to trace the eclipse of the public. From Dewey, it gets a reminder that these theories must find ways to continue into ordinary life experience through group action for their disclosure to come full circle. (shrink)