- Belief as Question‐Sensitive.Seth Yalcin - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):23-47.details
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The Myth of the De Se.Ofra Magidor - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):249-283.details
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Objects and Attitudes.Friederike Moltmann - 2024 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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A plea for monsters.Philippe Schlenker - 2002 - Linguistics and Philosophy 26 (1):29-120.details
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De se attitudes: Ascription and communication.Dilip Ninan - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (7):551-567.details
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The contents of perception.Susanna Siegel - 2005 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The A-Theory of Time, The B-Theory of Time, and ‘Taking Tense Seriously’.Dean W. Zimmerman - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (4):401-457.details
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What Are Centered Worlds?Shen‐yi Liao - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):294-316.details
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Relative Truth and the First Person.Friederike Moltmann - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (2):187-220..details
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Defeating dr. evil with self-locating belief.Adam Elga - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):383–396.details
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Centered communication.Clas Weber - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (S1):205-223.details
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Counterfactual Attitudes and Multi-Centered Worlds.Dilip Ninan - 2012 - Semantics and Pragmatics 5 (5):1-57.details
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The philosophical significance of the De Se.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (3):253-276.details
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Secondary Qualities and Self-Location.Andy Egan - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):97-119.details
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Connectives without truth tables.Nathan Klinedinst & Daniel Rothschild - 2012 - Natural Language Semantics 20 (2):137-175.details
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Against the Russellian open future.Anders J. Schoubye & Brian Rabern - 2017 - Mind 126 (504): 1217–1237.details
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Mental Files: Replies to my Critics.François Recanati - 2013 - Disputatio 5 (36):207-242.details
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(1 other version)Assertion revisited: On the interpretation of two-dimensional modal semantics.Robert C. Stalnaker - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):299-322.details
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Indexicals.David Braun - 2012 - In Ed Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, CA: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Remembering, imagining, and the first person.James Higginbotham - 2003 - In Alex Barber (ed.), Epistemology of language. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 496--533.details
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About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication.Manuel García-Carpintero & Stephan Torre (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Color relationalism and relativism.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2017 - Topics in Cognitive Science 9 (1):172-192.details
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Two-dimensional semantics.Laura Schroeter - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Self-knowledge and self-reference.Robert J. Howell - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):44-70.details
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Propositional attitude reports.Thomas McKay - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Time's arrow and self‐locating probability.Eddy Keming Chen - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (3):533-563.details
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Coordinating perspectives: De se and taste attitudes in communication.Dirk Kindermann - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (8):912-955.details
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(1 other version)Logical foundations for belief representation.William J. Rapaport - 1986 - Cognitive Science 10 (4):371-422.details
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Formal Representations of Belief.Franz Huber - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Thought Sharing, Communication, and Perspectives about the Self.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (4):487-507.details
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Communication for Expressivists.Alejandro Pérez Carballo & Paolo Santorio - 2016 - Ethics 126 (3):607-635.details
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Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
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Generalizing Detached Self-Reference and the Semantics of Generic One.Friederike Moltmann - 2010 - Mind and Language 25 (4):440-473.details
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Lessons from Descriptive Indexicals.Kjell Johan Sæbø - 2015 - Mind 124 (496):1111-1161.details
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Being at the Centre: Self-location in Thought and Language.Clas Weber - 2016 - In Manuel García-Carpintero & Stephan Torre (eds.), About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 246-271.details
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What is Special about De Se Attitudes?Stephan Torre & Clas Weber - 2020 - In Heimir Geirsson & Stephen Biggs (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Linguistic Reference. New York: Routledge. pp. 464-481.details
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Indexical Beliefs and Communication: Against Stalnaker on Self‐Location.Clas Weber - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3):640-663.details
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Memory and time.Jordi Fernandez - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (3):333 - 356.details
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Two kinds of first-person-oriented content.Friederike Moltmann - 2012 - Synthese 184 (2):157 - 177.details
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A Puzzle about Communication.Matheus Valente & Andrea Onofri - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (3):1035-1054.details
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The Self File and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2013 - Disputatio 5 (36):191-206.details
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Tensed Thoughts.James Higginbotham - 1995 - Mind and Language 10 (3):226-249.details
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What is special about indexical attitudes?Matheus Valente - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (7):692-712.details
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Diachronic Norms for Self-Locating Beliefs.Wolfgang Schwarz - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4.details
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Implicit Bias and the Idealized Rational Self.Nora Berenstain - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5:445-485.details
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Non-World Indices and Assessment-Sensitivity.Peter Lasersohn - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (2-3):122-148.details
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Real narrow content.Uriah Kriegel - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (3):304–328.details
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De Se Thought and Communication: An Introduction.Stephan Torre - 2016 - In Manuel García-Carpintero & Stephan Torre (eds.), About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-21.details
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Why my I is your you: On the communication of de se attitudes.Emar Maier - 2016 - In Manuel García-Carpintero & Stephan Torre (eds.), About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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