Sofern man die Existenz objektiver Erkenntnisse anerkennt, ist man mit der Frage nach den Bedingungen der Möglichkeit für diese Erkenntnisse konfrontiert. Der Grund muss in Voraussetzungen liegen, die selbst wiederum empirisch nicht zu rechtfertigen sind. Zwar verwerfen Popper und Carnap den Begriff des "synthetischen Urteils a priori", doch die Voraussetzung, dass es "in der Natur gesetzlich zugeht", räumen beide ein. Diese empirisch nicht zu rechtfertigende Prämisse ist ein synthetisches Urteil a priori. Gemäß Kant ist innerhalb der Klasse der Erkenntnisse a (...) priori zwischen reinen und nicht-reinen Erkenntnissen a priori zu unterscheiden. Es in vorliegender Arbeit argumentativ dafür plädiert, Naturgesetze als apriorische Erkenntnisse zu betrachten, die der Klasse der nicht-reinen synthetischen Urteile a priori zuzurechnen sind. Vor diesem Hintergrund kommt die Arbeit zu der Schlussthese: Ein empirischer (d. h. empirische Begriffe enthaltender) Satz (etwa ein Naturgesetz) kann über den (empirisch nicht einlösbaren, aber als Postulat durchaus sinnvollen) Anspruch auf allgemeine und notwendige Geltung verfügen und somit Bedingungen der Möglichkeit für objektive Erkenntnis formulieren. Doch sind für die Entdeckung empirischer Sätze mit Anspruch auf allgemeine und notwendige Geltung empirische Studien (etwa das physikalische Experiment) erforderlich. (shrink)

Inter-theoretical reduction has always been a major topic in the structuralist philosophy of science. This paper reviews criteria of adequacy which were put forward by Adams, Sneed, Stegmuller, Mayr, Pearce, Kamlah, and Mormann. The criteria are formalized in a simplified structuralist model, and the logical relations between them are investigated. It turns out that various parts of these criteria are incompatible.

In Sachen Funktionalanalyse befaßte man sich in der allgemeinen Wissenschaftstheorie anfänglich überwiegend mit der Logik funktionaler Erklärungen. Diese bedarf einer Ergänzung durch eine Semantik der Funktionalanalyse. Nach einer einleitenden Erörterung einiger Schwachpunkte und Grenzen der klassischen Literatur zur Logik der Funktionalanalyse wird eine Wortfeldanalyse von 'Funktion' und 'System' sowie eine phänomenologische Beschreibung der Wirkungsweise von Motiven angeboten. Im Unterschied zu Zielen, die man nur Entitäten zuschreibt, die als selbständig angesehen werden, spricht man Funktionen nur Entitäten zu, die als nichtselbständig angesehen (...) werden, die jedoch mit ihrer Funktion bezogen sind auf eine solche zielorientierte selbständige Entität. (shrink)

Rational Choice and Historical Explanation. The dichotomy between narrative and causal approaches is one of the most discussed problems in historical explanation. The main problem seems to be that many philosophers and historians do not agree with the argument of analytical philosophy of history that explanations demand law-like assumptions. Even Arthur C. Danto, however, who is often regarded as the founder of narrative explanatory approaches, did not leave causality behind. Contrarily, he defended the covering-law-scheme against unfounded criticism and showed that (...) causality and narration can be reconciled. But Danto did not say which laws should play a major role in historical explanations. This gap could be bridged by one of the most successful research programs in the social sciences over the last decades, the Rational Choice approach. This approach should, however, be reduced to its basic assumption, the presumption of subjective rationality (which principally corresponds an older hermeneutic tradition), and be integrated into the "model of a sociological explanation" (which is very popular among European sociologists). The result is a concept of a historical explanation that does justice to the linguistic turn (in its formulation by Willard Van Orman Quine), to the demands of the covering-law-scheme and to the ambitions of historians to narrate and explain a historical phenomenon at the same time. (shrink)

This paper deals with the following questions: What features of modern natural science are responsible for the fact that, of all forms of science, this form is technologically exploitable? The three notions: concept of nature, epistemic ideal, and experiment, suggest the most important components of my answer. I will argue, first, that only the peculiar interplay of the modern concept of nature with an epistemic ideal attuned to it can cast experiment in the specific, highly central role it plays in (...) the pursuit of knowledge about nature. It will then become clear that the form of science in which experiment plays such a role will, necessarily, prove technologically exploitable. (shrink)

Given the rich diversity of research fields usually ascribed to chemistry in a broad sense, the present paper tries to dig our characteristic parts of chemistry that can be conceptually distinguished from interdisciplinary, applied, and specialized subfields of chemistry, and that may be called chemistry in a very narrow sense, or 'the chemical core of chemistry'. Unlike historical, ontological, and 'anti-reductive' approaches, I use a conceptual approach together with some methodological implications that allow to develop step by step a kind (...) of cognitive architecture for chemistry, which basically contains: (1) systematic chemical knowledge on the experimental level; (2) clarification of chemical species; (3) chemical classification systems; (4) theoretical foundation through the chemical theory of structural formulas. In a succeeding paper the results will be checked for resisting physicalistic reduction. (shrink)

Idealized explanations are the one subtype of incomplete explanations which is most frequently used in the empirical sciences and at the same time least analyzed in philosphy of science. It is argued that idealized explanations, while having the same logical structure as adequate explanations, differ from these in the mode of validity of the argument. Whereas an adequate explanation shows why the occurrence of some event had to be expected, an idealized explanation argues that a certain event would occur if (...) certain conditions were fulfilled. Idealized explanations are heuristic devices which, in the long run, ought to be transformed into adequate explanations. (shrink)

This article proceeds on two main assumptions. The 'understanding' of universes of discourse and human practice can no longer be based on the rules developed by older systems of hermeneutics. Modern hermeneutics has not tried to compensate this loss of methodological efficiency by working out new frameworks. It is rather exclusively occupied with efforts to provide 'foundations'. Thus we get ontological, dialectical, transcendental etc. systems. These may serve as general possibilities for looking at history. They do not, however, advance the (...) solution of the manifold methodological difficulties of concrete research. A functional analysis of fundamentalist hermeneutics can demonstrate more precisely that this type of theory has largely proved fruitless. Certainly we cannot do without fundamentalist concepts like historicity, tradition, consciousness or, for that matter, emancipation. It is equally clear, however, that these concepts cannot merely be defined along the lines prescribed by philosophies of science. The present article therefore pleads for an anthropological extension and specification of 'hermeneutic' frameworks which should allow us to analyse historical life forms, ways of experience, strategies of meaning formation in a more precise and differentiated manner. (shrink)

Modern Philosophy of Science has not yet recognized the significance of physical invariance principles for science and daily life. In this paper we investigate as a simple example, how time independence or time translational invariance of natural laws determines the time scale. We start with informal definitions of the invariance of concepts and laws. We then ask if time independence is an essential feature of natural laws or if time dependent laws are plausible without loss of predictive relevance. In section (...) 3 we investigate the question wether time independence of natural laws is a matter of convention. In sections 5-7 the determination of the time scale by time translational invariance is studied. In section 8 we study the conditions under which this determination is unique. (shrink)

Wenn die Welt kausal geschlossen ist und wenn wir,Kausalität' durch,Naturgesetzlichkeit' näher bestimmen, dann scheint der Mensch als Freiheitswesen zumindest ein Fremdling in der Natur zu sein, im schlimmsten Fall ein Illusionist, der sich beständig über sich selber täuscht. Viele Bücher beginnen dementsprechend mit der Frage: „Wie passt der Geist in eine materielle Welt?" Die Welt erscheint in einer solchen Perspektive als ein bloß stofflicher Zusammenhang, den die Naturwissenschaft adäquat beschreibt. Da sie keinen Begriff des,Geistes' hat, entsteht eben diese Frage, wie (...) wohl der Geist in eine solche,geistlose' Welt hineinpasst, in der jeder materielle Effekt hinreichend durch einen zeitlich vorangehenden bestimmt ist. Die kausale Geschlossenheit der Welt scheint den Begriff des,Geistes' überflüssig zu machen. (shrink)

El presente trabajo tiene como objetivo central realizar aportes a la historia de la filosofía de la ciencia en general, y de la Concepción Estructural en particular, resaltando las contribuciones que desde esta última se han realizado en el campo de la pragmática; como también evaluar dichos logros, y señalar los límites y potencialidades de las propuestas analizadas en marco de la CE. En una primer etapa se comentarán los primeros desarrollos de las ideas pragmáticas en la CE, en integración (...) con la propuesta kuhniana ; para proseguir con los desarrollos posteriores en esta línea de trabajo ; Balzer, Moulines, y Sneed 1987). Finalmente, se evaluará el “intento conciliatorio” entre enfoques socio-históricos y enfoques formales en relación a los aportes a una pragmática de la ciencia dentro de la CE y se cuestionará la visión de la “historia heredada” de la filosofía de la ciencia. (shrink)

In his influential paper "Epistemology Naturalized" Quine argues that Carnap's failure to define disposition predicates and his subsequent preference for reduction sentences naturally lead to an entirely naturalized epistemology. This conclusion is too hasty, I object. Applying the account of dispositional predicates developed in No. 26 I defend Carnap's aprioristic epistemology against Quine's attacks.

Modern theory of rationality has truly grown into a science of its own. Still, the general topic remained a genuinely philosophical one. This essay is concerned with giving a brief overview. Section 2 explains the fundamental scheme of all rationality assessments. With its help, a schematic order of the main questions concerning the theory of rationality can be given; the questions turn out to be quite unevenly addressed in the literature. Section 3 discusses the fundamental issue that the theory of (...) rationality seems to be both a normative and an empirical theory. Section 4, finally, shows how the unity of the theory of rationality can nevertheless be maintained. (shrink)

In this paper, we aim to explore connections between a Carnapian semantics of theoretical terms and an eliminative structuralist approach in the philosophy of mathematics. Specifically, we will interpret the language of Peano arithmetic by applying the modal semantics of theoretical terms introduced in Andreas (Synthese 174(3):367–383, 2010). We will thereby show that the application to Peano arithmetic yields a formal semantics of universal structuralism, i.e., the view that ordinary mathematical statements in arithmetic express general claims about all admissible interpretations (...) of the Peano axioms. Moreover, we compare this application with the modal structuralism by Hellman (Mathematics without numbers: towards a modal-structural interpretation. Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1989), arguing that it provides us with an easier epistemology of statements in arithmetic. (shrink)

My concern in what follows is to give a comparative report on some important lectures held at the Hegel-Kongreß 1981 in Stuttgart. In discussing the views of Quine, Hacking, Davidson, Putnam and Habermas I want to confront them with some details of Rorty's recent critique of our philosophical tradition. At last I try to give a tentative answer whether there is an end or a turning-point for current analytical philosophy.

Presented here is an overview from the standpoints of sociology, history of science, philosophy of science and “pure science” of the lingering question of whether sociology is a form of scientific pursuit. The conclusion is drawn that sociology barely meets any of the rigid criteria traditionally associated with the natural sciences. Sociology is viewed as having a position of theory and argument which is labeled “inconoclastic scepticism.”.

The concept of measurement is fundamental to a whole range of different disciplines, including not only the natural and engineering sciences, but also laboratory medicine and certain branches of the social sciences. This being the case, the concept of measurement has a particular relevance to the development of top-level ontologies in the area of knowledge engineering. For this reason, the present paper is concerned with ontological aspects of measurement. We are searching for a list of concepts that are apt to (...) characterize measurement methods in a general manner. To establish such means of characterization, we will primarily deal with the semantics of measurement values. (shrink)

Summary Some leading ideas of the constructivist protophysics are discussed on the basis of P. Janich's Protophysik der Zeit. After having reviewed the contents of the second edition Janich's claim that analytical philosophy of science is purely affirmative and not critical towards science in its historical appearence is refuted. In the next section the principles of constructivist methodology of physics are criticised, and the claim is refuted that prescriptions for measurement cannot without circularity be shown to be invalid by experimental (...) results. In the last section we discuss Janich's foundation of time measurement in a mathematical frame similar to that for extensive systems. Thus the relation between Janich's and the ordinary account is cleared up. (shrink)

One of the most famous critiques of the Leibnitian calculus is contained in the essay “The Analyst” written by George Berkeley in 1734. His key argument is those on compensating errors. In this article, we reconstruct Berkeley's argument from a systematical point of view showing that the argument is neither circular nor trivial, as some modern historians think. In spite of this well-founded argument, the critique of Berkeley is with respect to the calculus not a fundamental one. Nevertheless, it highlights (...) central aspects of the calculus that are characteristic of modern scientific theories. (shrink)

In this paper I reconstruct and compare criteria of theoreticity that have been developed by Carnap, Sneed and proponents of the Munich school of structuralist philosophy of science. For this purpose I develop a unified framework in which one can transform model-theoretic theory representations into linguistic ones, and vice versa. This bridges the gap between statement and non-statement view and allows a precise comparison of linguistic and model-theoretic criteria of theoreticity. In the final part I suggest a system of improved (...) definitions of theoreticity and pre-theoreticity. (shrink)

The article introduces the concept of ‘argumentational integrity’ as the basis for developing ethical criteria by which contributions to argumentative discussions can be evaluated; the focus is on the derivation, definition, and specification of the concept. The derivation of the concept starts out from a prescriptive use of ‘argumentation’, entailing in particular the goal of a rational as well as a cooperative solution. In order to make this goal attainable, contributions to argumentative discussions must meet certain conditions. It is assumed (...) that participants are not only intuitively aware of these conditions, but in fact expect of themselves and others that they will not consciously violate the conditions. This assumption leads to the most general definition of the norm of argumentational integrity: Speakers must not knowingly violate the argumentative conditions. On the basis of an empirical study drawing upon classifications of unethical strategies in popular rhetorical texts, the general norm is then specified in the form of 11 ‘standards of fair argumentation’. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to demonstrate the epistemic position of psychiatry between the science of general laws in relation to frequently encountered generality and the science of specific events which is directed towards the particular. In this respect the development of the dichotomy of nomothetic and idiographic methodology from its generally forgotten neo-Kantian origins is delineated within the context of a historical-philosophical analysis and then its incorporation into psychology and psychopathology is reconstructed. In the course of this analysis (...) and also in the discussion of the currently accepted theories of analytical philosophy and critical rationalism it becomes clear that, in spite of widespread current opinions to the contrary, individualizing concept formation is an indispensable element in the methodological inventory of psychiatric science. (shrink)

This article presents a reconstruction of the so-called classical, formal or Mendelian genetics, which is intended to be more complete and adequate than existing reconstructions. This reconstruction has been carried out with the instruments, duly modified and extended with respect to the case under consideration, of the structuralist conception of theories. The so-called Mendel’s Laws, as well as linkage genetics and gene mapping are formulated in a precise manner while the global structure of genetics is represented as a theory-net. These (...) results are of methodological, philosophical and didactical relevance. (shrink)

This paper describes the development of theories of scientific explanation since Hempel's earliest models in the 1940ies. It focuses on deductive and probabilistic whyexplanations and their main problems: lawlikeness, explanation-prediction asymmetries, causality, deductive and probabilistic relevance, maximal specifity and homogenity, the height of the probability value. For all of these topic the paper explains the most important approaches as well as their criticism, including the author's own accounts. Three main theses of this paper are: (1) Both deductive and probabilistic explanations (...) are important in science, not reducible to each other. (2) One must distinguish between (cause giving) explanations and (reason giving) justifications and predictions. (3) The adequacy of deductive as well as probabilistic explanations is relative to a pragmatically given background knowledge-which does not exclude, however, the possibility of purely semantic models. (shrink)

Normic Laws and the Significance of Nonmonotonic Reasoning for Philosophy of Science. Normic laws have the form ‘if A then normally B’. They have been discovered in the explanation debate, but were considered as empirically vacuous (§1). I argue that the prototypical (or ideal) normality of normic laws implies statistical normality (§2), whence normic laws have empirical content. In §3–4 I explain why reasoning from normic laws is nonmonotonic, and why the understanding of the individual case is so important here. (...) After sketching some foundations of nonmonotonic reasoning as developed by AI-researchers (§5), Iargue that normic laws are also the best way to understand ceteris paribus laws (§6). §7 deals with the difference between physical and non-physical disciplines and §9 with the difference between normicity and approximation. In §8 it is shown how nonmonotonic reasoning provides a new understanding of the protection of theories against falsification by auxiliary hypotheses. §10, finally, gives a system- and evolution-theoretical explanation of the deeper reason for the omnipresence of normic laws in practice and science, and forthe connection between ideal and statistical normality. (shrink)

In this paper the structuralist approach of theory reconstruction is applied to International Trade Theory. In the basic element the universal laws of the theory are stated and the general concepts are defined in terms of three sets and seven functions. Ricardo’s Theory of Comparative Advantage and the Factor Proportions Theory by Heckscher and Ohlin are reconstructed as specialisations of the basic element. Two intratheoretical constraints are formulated in order to ensure the consistency of the theory. A number of empirical (...) studies are shown to be paradigmatic, successful or questionable applications of International Trade Theory. The reconstruction allows the assessment of the theory from a metatheoretical angle and illuminates the logical interdependencies of its components. (shrink)

The paper consists of three parts. The aim of the first part is to depict the concept of science in the analytic philosophy of science to point out its characteristic defects. The second part shows how the constructive philosophy of science is able to avoid these defects by honouring not special modes of research but speicial modes of foundation of results in research with its criteria for science. The third part finally refutes the main counter-arguments of analytic philosophy of science (...) against the constructive. (shrink)

The symbolic paraphrase of 'because' sentences suggested by Frege, which is still widely accepted, will be gradually developed into a more adequate, though much more complicated, form. Out of the different types of such sentences, the 'for the only reason that' type will be given especial consideration. Furthermore, it will be expounded that contrary-to-fact conditionals may function either as 'for the only reason that' explanations, or as 'for at least the reason that' explanations, or as arguments, the difference being dependent (...) partly on certain temporal characteristics of their constituents and partly on the pragmatic features of the speech act situation. Consequently, counterfactuals have no definite logical structure, which is a reason, hitherto unnoticed, why they cannot be used in defining dispositional predicates. It will be shown, however, that 'for the only reason that' explanations can serve this purpose quite properly. (shrink)

Arguing that our attachment to Aristotelian modes of discourse makes a revision of their conceptual foundations long overdue, the author proposes the consideration of unacknowledged factors that play a central role in argument itself. These are in particular the subjective imprint and the dynamics of argumentation. Their inclusion in a four-dimensional framework and the focus on thesis validity allow for a more realistic view of our discourse practice. Exhaustive analyses of fascinating historical and contemporary arguments are provided. These range from (...) Columbus’s advocacy of the Western Passage to India, over the trial of King Louis XVI during the French Revolution, to today’s highly charged controversies surrounding euthanasia and embryo research. Excavating foundational issues such as the purpose of argument itself and the contested role of argument as a generator of knowledge, the book culminates in a discussion of the relationship between rationality and reasonableness and criticizes the restrictions of ‘rational’ argument relying on fixed logical, economic or cultural criteria that in reality are mutable. Here, a true, open argument requires the infusion of Paul Lorenzen’s principle of ‘transsubjectivity’, which recognizes but transcends the partiality of the individual and which can be seen in the pragmatic and expanding consensus that humanity can control itself to safeguard the future of a fragile, damaged world. (shrink)

The present paper aims at a synthesis of belief revision theory with the Sneed formalism known as the structuralist theory of science. This synthesis is brought about by a dynamisation of classical structuralism, with an abductive inference rule and base generated revisions in the style of Rott (2001). The formalism of prioritised default logic (PDL) serves as the medium of the synthesis. Why seek to integrate the Sneed formalism into belief revision theory? With the hybrid system of the present investigation, (...) a substantial simplification of the ranking information that is necessary to define revisions and contractions uniquely is achieved. This system is, furthermore, expressive enough to capture complex and non-trivial scientific examples. It is thus closely related to a novel research area within belief revision theory which addresses the dynamics of scientific knowledge. (shrink)

Simulation in the Social Sciences. Computer simulation—hereafter just called 'simulation'—more and more is getting an important tool in scientific research and development. Simulations provide powerful means for quite different scientific disciplines, for instance for cosmology as well as for economics, and it seems that they can help to extend the borderline of science. However, from a methodological point of view, besides their benefits one can identify several theoretical problems which can occur in the process of scientific research. Some of these (...) problems shall be discussed and consequences of these problems for the use of simulations shall be outlined. (shrink)

Nuestro objetivo es analizar críticamente el enfoque de la noción de modelo de Alfred Tarski que Patrick Suppes integra en su concepción semanticista de las teorías científicas. En efecto, mostraremos cómo esta noción se configura en Suppes (1969; 1970) desde una revisión formal de la noción de modelo en Tarski (1936), focalizando nuestro análisis en tres ejes principales: i) una crítica a la perspectiva estática del semanticismo; ii) un análisis de las condiciones restrictivas y el lenguaje para la axiomatización de (...) teorías; y iii) la revisión de las nociones de ‘sistema axiomático’, ‘sistema formal’ y ‘método axiomático’. (shrink)

The Term 'Practical Progress' in Biomedical Sciences. A Structuralistic Approach to the Reconstruction of Epistemological Terms in Medicine. An attempt is made to elucidate the structure of the term 'practical progress' and to reconstruct it logically. The importance of discovery and confirmation of new regularities as well as of practical rules arising from them depends on their contribution to the solution of practical problems. The application of this structuralistic definition of 'practical progress' is demonstrated with an example from cardiac surgery (...) concerning the solution of the practical medical problem of myocardial protection during open heart surgery. (shrink)

SummaryThe present paper is devoted to the problem of teleology in modern biology. Teleology is restricted to the phenomenon of goal‐directedness, whereas goal‐intended actions are denied. Thus, only the aspect of seemingly material teleology or teleonomy is required which paraphrases functions of certain value for the self maintenance of a system and is explainable without reference to vitalistic premises.Some aspects of evolution and selection are discussed and subsumed under a systems‐theoretically oriented view. Furthermore it is stressed that teleological explanations are (...) compatible with causal ones. The result of these assertions is the possibility of the reconciliation of seemingly irreconcilable positions. This, last not least, means a plea for the re‐assessment of an old and venerable problem.RésuméCet article est consacré au problèm de la finalité dans la biologie moderne, » finalite «étant pris ici dans un sens restreint de »comportement dirigé vers un but«, écartant toute notion d'intention consciente.La finalité matérielle apparente ou téléonomie, qui dénote simplement des fonctions ayant pour effet la conservation de systèmes, suffit donc, sans qu'un recours à des prémisses vitalistes soit nécessaire.Quelques aspects de l'evolution et de la sélection sont discutés dans le cadre de la théorie des systèmes. L'auteur montre aussi que les explications téléologiques n'entrent pas en contradiction avec des explications causales , d'où une synthèse possible de positions apparemment incompatibles. Enfin il plaide pour une réévaluation de ce problème ancien et vénérable.ZusammenfassungVorliegende Arbeit ist dem Problem der Teleologie in der modernen Biologie gewidmet. Die Teleologie wird dabei auf zielgerichtetes Verhalten eingeschränkt, während zielintendiertes Ver‐halten geleugnet wird. Daher genügt der Aspekt der scheinbaren materialen Teleologie oder Teleonomie, die lediglich Funktionen von systemerhaltendem Wert umschreibt und ohne Rückgriff auf vitalistische Pramissen erklart werden kann.Es werden einige Aspekte der Evolution und Selektion diskutiert und unter eine systemtheo‐retisch orientierte Betrachtungsweise subsumiert. Ferner wird hervorgehoben, dass teleologische Erklärungen nicht im Widerspruch zu kausalen Erklärungen stehen, was in einer moglichen Synthese von scheinbar inkompatiblen Positionen resultiert. Dies bedeuted nicht zuletzt ein Plädoyer für die Wieder‐bewertung eines altehrwürdigen Problems. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to discuss how far physics differs frommathematics, and if a philosophy of science which uses mathematics or logicsas a model for physics would be unable to be aware of many importantfeatures of that natural science.Many functions in physics differ from those of mathematics in beingfunctional dependecies and in having a lawlike character.Physical quantities have the character of "`determinables"'', sets ofspecial entities which are presupposed by physical theories.One may suspect that physics also could not be (...) formulated in anextensional language. This cannot be true, however, since every language canbe translated into an extensional version. Neverthless the existence ofdeterminables in physics shows that physics does not only talk aboutconcrete entities like space, time, spacetime, and particles, but also aboutvalues of abstract sets like determinables, and that it thus acknowledgestheir existence. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungEine Analyse empirisch ausgerichteter Beiträge zu sportsoziologischen Themen und Fragestellungen in der vorliegenden Zeitschrift zeigt, dass gängige sozialwissenschaftliche Erklärungsmodelle bzw. Erklärungsansätze selten zum Einsatz gelangen. Es dominiert meist eine beschreibende und verstehende Methodologie. Dies führt u. a. zu einem Defizit von Erklärungswissen und in Folge wohl auch zu einer verlangsamten Theoriefundierung innerhalb der Sportsoziologie. Um die „erklärende Soziologie“ zu forcieren, werden die aktuell in der Soziologie detailreich und auch kontrovers diskutierten methodischen Erklärungsmodelle und Ansätze einschließlich ihrer Voraussetzungsbedingungen skizzierend dargestellt. Dies (...) geschieht in der Hoffnung, die methodologische Anwendungslücke zu minimieren, da eine auf Erkenntniszuwächse ausgerichtete Sportsoziologie nicht auf eine kriterienorientierte Methodologie verzichten sollte. (shrink)

Nagel ist es nicht geglückt, die Möglichkeit des Verzichts auf teleologische Formulierungen und Erklärungen plausibel zu begründen. Bei seinem Versuch, die Äquivalenz teleologischer und nichtteleologischer Erklärungen nachzuweisen und den Bedeutungsüberschuß teleologischer Sprache hinwegzuformulieren, ist er immer schon an die Voraussetzung dieses Bedeutungsüberschusses gebunden, dessen er sich nicht, wie seine Beschreibung zielgerichteter Systeme beweist, entledigen kann. Unser Ergebnis dispensiert jedoch nicht von der Frage, ob der Anspruch 'der in teleologischen Wendungen geltend gemacht wird, auch zu Recht besteht. Denn die semantische Unmöglichkeit (...) der Reduktion von Relevanzrelationen auf Bedingungsrelationen verbürgt ja noch nicht, daß die teleologische Sprache den Gegenstandsbereich der Biologie auch adäquat trifft. Eine über unsere Studie hinausgehende Untersuchung müßte daher die hier aufgeworfene Frage in den größeren Zusammenhang der als klassisch geltenden Stellungnahmen einbetten und unter Einbeziehung der Resultate der kybernetischen Wissenschaften dem Problem nachgehen, ob Teleologie nur heuristischer Leitfaden der Reflexion ist, der aus forschungsstrategischen Gründen der Organisation des Gegenstandes an diesen von außen herangetragen wird, oder darüberhinaus eine Struktureigenschaft von Objekten selbst bezeichnet. Ist Teleologie also nur eine "Sache der Formulierung" oder eine "Formulierung der Sache"? (shrink)

The article deals with problems of incommensurability and meaning change in thecontext of scientific dynamics. Its main topic is a proposal made by Putnam basedon his version of the principle of charity. It is shown that this proposal does not workas a general principle for the understanding of theory change, for it leads in some cases to an unconvincing interpretation of now discarded theories and is even uncharitable. So it could be polemically described as a kind of defamation ('üle Nachrede') (...) of these theories. This will be demonstrated in two case studies. The first one sketches the development of economic value theory, while the second deals with the development of the concept of probability. (shrink)

By means of a survey of the papers given at the XIX Symposium of theSociety for History of Sciences on the „Idea of Purposiveness in the History of the Sciences“, Mai 28–30, 1981 in Bamberg, West Germany, it is demonstrated that in the course of the history of science teleological thinking in its traditional form is increasingly eliminated from the sciences. This process culminates in the attempt to rehabilitate teleological thinking by means of a reconstruction of Aristotelian philosophy using the (...) tools of modern natural science. The question arises whether this signifies the end of teleological thinking or a new direction of genuinely teleological thought. (shrink)