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  1. No cause for collapse.Dustin Gooßens & Andrew Tedder - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):1-19.
    We investigate a hitherto under-considered avenue of response for the logical pluralist to collapse worries. In particular, we note that standard forms of the collapse arguments seem to require significant order-theoretic assumptions, namely that the collection of admissible logics for the pluralist should be closed under meets and joins. We consider some reasons for rejecting this assumption, noting some prima facie plausible constraints on the class of admissible logics which would lead a pluralist admitting those logics to resist such closure (...)
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  • Substructural logics, pragmatic enrichment, and the inferential role of logical constants.Pilar Terrés Villalonga - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (6):628-654.
    ABSTRACT My aim in this paper is to present a pluralist thesis about the inferential role of logical constants, which embraces classical, relevant, linear and ordered logic. That is, I defend that a logical constant c has more than one correct inferential role. The thesis depends on a particular interpretation of substructural logics' vocabulary, according to which classical logic captures the literal meaning of logical constants and substructural logics encode a pragmatically enriched sense of those connectives. The paper is divided (...)
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  • Las Lógicas Mixtas como escape al Problema del Colapso y al Desafío de Quine.Joaquín Santiago Toranzo Calderón - 2020 - Análisis Filosófico 40 (2):247-272.
    En este trabajo presentaré una forma de evitar los problemas más recurrentes en cierta versión del pluralismo lógico, aquella que defiende que incluso considerando un lenguaje fijo existen múltiples sistemas lógicos legítimos. Para ello, será necesario considerar los puntos de partida del programa pluralista y explicitar los problemas que de ellos surgen, principalmente el Desafío de Quine y el Problema del Colapso. Luego, propondré una modificación respecto de lo que se entiende por consecuencia lógica, para poder considerar una familia de (...)
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  • Non-Normative Logical Pluralism and the Revenge of the Normativity Objection.Erik Stei - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):162–177.
    Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. Most logical pluralists think that logic is normative in the sense that you make a mistake if you accept the premisses of a valid argument but reject its conclusion. Some authors have argued that this combination is self-undermining: Suppose that L1 and L2 are correct logics that coincide except for the argument from Γ to φ, which is valid in L1 but invalid in L2. If you accept (...)
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  • Disagreement about logic from a pluralist perspective.Erik Stei - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3329-3350.
    Logical pluralism is commonly described as the view that there is more than one correct logic. It has been claimed that, in order for that view to be interesting, there has to be at least a potential for rivalry between the correct logics. This paper offers a detailed assessment of this suggestion. I argue that an interesting version of logical pluralism is hard, if not impossible, to achieve. I first outline an intuitive understanding of the notions of rivalry and correctness. (...)
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  • How to water a thousand flowers. On the logic of logical pluralism.Andrea Sereni & Maria Paola Sforza Fogliani - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-24.
    How many logics do logical pluralists adopt, or are allowed to adopt, or ought to adopt, in arguing for their view? These metatheoretical questions lurk behind much of the discussion on logical pluralism, and have a direct bearing on normative issues concerning the choice of a correct logic and the characterization of valid reasoning. Still, they commonly receive just swift answers – if any. Our aim is to tackle these questions head on, by clarifying the range of possibilities that logical (...)
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  • Logical pluralism, indeterminacy and the normativity of logic.Filippo Ferrari & Sebastiano Moruzzi - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):323-346.
    According to the form of logical pluralism elaborated by Beall and Restall there is more than one relation of logical consequence. Since they take the relation of logical consequence to reside at the very heart of a logical system, different relations of logical consequence yield different logics. In this paper, we are especially interested in understanding what are the consequences of endorsing Beall and Restall’s version of logical pluralism vis-à-vis the normative guidance that logic is taken to provide to reasoners. (...)
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  • The collapse of logical contextualism.Timo Meier - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    The most serious objection to Beall and Restall’s case-based logical pluralism is the so-called collapse argument. According to the collapse argument, logical pluralism is not genuinely pluralistic and collapses into a single privileged relation of logical consequence. In response, Caret offered an account of logical contextualism that supposedly maintains the merits of Beall and Restall’s case-based logical pluralism while circumventing the collapse argument. In this paper, I first point out a gap in the collapse argument in that it does not (...)
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  • Logical pluralism, indeterminacy and the normativity of logic.Filippo Ferrari & Sebastiano Moruzzi - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-24.
    According to the form of logical pluralism elaborated by Beall and Restall there is more than one relation of logical consequence. Since they take the relation of logical consequence to res...
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  • Why logical pluralism?Colin R. Caret - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4947-4968.
    This paper scrutinizes the debate over logical pluralism. I hope to make this debate more tractable by addressing the question of motivating data: what would count as strong evidence in favor of logical pluralism? Any research program should be able to answer this question, but when faced with this task, many logical pluralists fall back on brute intuitions. This sets logical pluralism on a weak foundation and makes it seem as if nothing pressing is at stake in the debate. The (...)
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  • Reasons, basing, and the normative collapse of logical pluralism.Christopher Blake-Turner - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (12):4099-4118.
    Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. A key objection to logical pluralism is that it collapses into monism. The core of the Collapse Objection is that only the pluralist’s strongest logic does any genuine normative work; since a logic must do genuine normative work, this means that the pluralist is really a monist, who is committed to her strongest logic being the one true logic. This paper considers a neglected question in the collapse (...)
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  • Substructural logics, pluralism and collapse.Eduardo Alejandro Barrio, Federico Pailos & Damian Szmuc - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4991-5007.
    When discussing Logical Pluralism several critics argue that such an open-minded position is untenable. The key to this conclusion is that, given a number of widely accepted assumptions, the pluralist view collapses into Logical Monism. In this paper we show that the arguments usually employed to arrive at this conclusion do not work. The main reason for this is the existence of certain substructural logics which have the same set of valid inferences as Classical Logic—although they are, in a clear (...)
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