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  1. Le Nominalisme de Spinoza.Lee C. Rice - 1994 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):19 - 32.
    Spinoza semble adopter une position pleinement nominaliste lorsqu'il discue des notions universelles dans l'Ethique, mais on y trouve aussi plusieurs arguments où, semble-t-il, des universaux sont présupposés. La solution avancé par plusieurs commentateurs, y compris Haserot, est que le système spinoziste est d'inspiration platoniste, et qu'il faut réinterpréter les passages d'apparence nominaliste pour les accorder avec le platonisme ou l'essentialisme. J'argumente qu'un tel procédé n'est justifié ni par le texte ni par la structure du système de Spinoza. L'interprétation du spinozisme (...)
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  • La causalité adéquate chez Spinoza.Lee C. Rice - 1992 - Philosophiques 19 (1):45-49.
    L’objectif de cet article est de proposer une analyse de deux conceptions distinctes de la causalité chez Spinoza. Selon la première la nature-dieu serait la cause directe de toute action qui a lieu au niveau des choses finies; tandis que, selon la seconde toute action finie ferait partie d’une chaîne infinie de causes qui est répandue dans la durée. Je montre que cette causalité-ci n’est ni illusoire ni simplement derivative, contre les suggestions de plusieurs travaux récents sur Spinoza. En deuxième (...)
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  • A Third Version of Constructivism: Rethinking Spinoza’s Metaethics.Peter D. Zuk - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2565-2574.
    In this essay, I claim that certain passages in Book IV of Benedict de Spinoza’s Ethics suggest a novel version of what is known as metaethical constructivism. The constructivist interpretation emerges in the course of attempting to resolve a tension between Spinoza’s apparent ethical egoism and some remarks he makes about the efficacy of collaborating with the right partners when attempting to promote our individual self-interest . Though Spinoza maintains that individuals necessarily aim to promote their self-interest, I argue that (...)
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  • ‘Use Them At Our Pleasure.John Grey - 2013 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 30 (4):367-388.
    Although Spinoza disagrees with Descartes's claim that animals are mindless, he holds that we may nevertheless treat them as we please because their natures are different from human nature. Margaret Wilson has questioned the validity of Spinoza's argument, since it is not clear why differences in nature should imply differences in ethical status. In this paper, I propose a new interpretation of Spinoza's argument that responds to Wilson's challenge. We have ethical commitments to other humans only because we share the (...)
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  • Imitation, Representation, and Humanity in Spinoza's Ethics.Justin Steinberg - 2013 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 51 (3):383-407.
    In IVP50S, Spinoza claims that “one who is moved to aid others neither by reason nor by pity is rightly called inhuman. For (by IIIP27) he seems to be unlike a man” (IVP50S). At first blush, the claim seems implausible, as it relies on the dubious assumption that beings will necessarily imitate the affects of conspecifics. In the first two sections of this paper, I explain why Spinoza accepts this thesis and show how this claim can be made compatible with (...)
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  • Imitation of Affects and Mirror Neurons: Exploring Empathy in Spinoza’s Theory and Contemporary Neuroscience.Αnna Boukouvala - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (3):1007-1017.
    In Spinoza’s philosophy affects illustrate the way human beings interact with each other and the world, where the necessary meetings with other particular things define their being and its expressions. Most human beings don’t know themselves, are not conscious of their affects and, even less, do they know what the affects of others are. Although, they are by their definition as particular things obliged to exist in society and create a minimum of consensus. According to Spinoza, this consensus is built (...)
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