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Computation and intentional psychology.Murat Aydede - 2000 - Dialogue 39 (2):365-379.details
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On the relationship between naturalistic semantics and individuation criteria for terms in a language of thought.Robert D. Rupert - 1998 - Synthese 117 (1):95-131.details
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Quining qualia Quine's way.Don Ross - 1993 - Dialogue 32 (3):439-59.details
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The Ethics of Conceptualization: Tailoring Thought and Language to Need.Matthieu Queloz - forthcoming - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Metafizika lica.Miljana Milojevic - 2018details
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Morgan’s Quaker gun and the species of belief.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):119-144.details
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Eliminativism and Reading One's Own Mind.T. Parent - manuscriptdetails
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The semantic view of computation and the argument from the cognitive science practice.Alfredo Paternoster & Fabrizio Calzavarini - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-24.details
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Pluralistická odpověď na otázku obsahu lidové psychologie.Matěj Dražil - 2021 - Pro-Fil 22 (1):1.details
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Triviality Arguments Reconsidered.Paul Schweizer - 2019 - Minds and Machines 29 (2):287-308.details
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Causal Explanation in Psychiatry.Tuomas K. Pernu - 2019 - In Şerife Tekin & Robyn Bluhm (eds.), The Bloomsbury Companion to Philosophy of Psychiatry. London: Bloomsbury.details
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Pictures, Plants, and Propositions.Alex Morgan - 2019 - Minds and Machines 29 (2):309-329.details
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Mental Concepts: Theoretical, Observational or Dispositional Approach?Marek Pokropski - 2017 - Hybris. Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny 38:58-73.details
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Subjective Externalism.Sarah Sawyer - 2018 - Theoria 84 (1):4-22.details
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Unreasonable Cartesian Doubt.David Alexander - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (2):503-522.details
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Folk Psychology and the Bayesian Brain.Joe Dewhurst - 2017 - In Metzinger Thomas & Wiese Wanja (eds.), Philosophy and Predictive Processing. MIND Group.details
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III. Basic Emotions, Complex Emotions, Machiavellian Emotions.Paul E. Griffiths - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 52:39-67.details
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The Mind as Neural Software? Understanding Functionalism, Computationalism, and Computational Functionalism.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):269-311.details
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A Computational Learning Semantics for Inductive Empirical Knowledge.Kevin T. Kelly - 2014 - In Alexandru Baltag & Sonja Smets (eds.), Johan van Benthem on Logic and Information Dynamics. Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing. pp. 289-337.details
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Elme és evolúció.Bence Nanay - 2000 - Kávé..details
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Extensive enactivism: why keep it all in?Daniel D. Hutto, Michael D. Kirchhoff & Erik Myin - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8 (706):102178.details
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Précis of Doing without Concepts.Edouard Machery - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):195-206.details
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First-Person Authority: Dualism, Constitutivism, and Neo-Expressivism.Dorit Bar-On - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (1):53-71.details
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Social Construction and Achieving Reference.Ron Mallon - 2017 - Noûs 51 (1):113-131.details
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Repeated Independent Discovery and ‘Objective Evidence’ in Science: An Example from Geology.A. M. C. Sengor - 2006 - Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 244:113.details
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The Philosophy of Neuroscience.Bickle John, Mandik Peter & Anthony Landreth - 2012 - In Ed Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Précis de Doing without Concepts.Édouard Machery - 2011 - Dialogue 50 (1):141-152.details
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