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On “seeing” the truth of the Gödel sentence.George Boolos - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):655-656.details
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The intentional stance reexamined.Radu J. Bogdan - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):759-760.details
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Representational redescription: A question of sequence.Margaret A. Boden - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):708-708.details
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A Fodorian guide to Switzerland: Jung and Piaget combined?Péter Bodor & Csaba Pléh - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):709-710.details
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The real problem with constructivism.Paul Bloom & Karen Wynn - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):707-708.details
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Evidence against epiphenomenalism.Ned Block - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):670-672.details
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Revisionary physicalism.John Bickle - 1992 - Biology and Philosophy 7 (4):411-30.details
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Precis of Jonathan Berg, Direct Belief: An Essay on the Semantics, Pragmatics, and Metaphysics of Belief: Mouton Series in Pragmatics, 13. Berlin & Boston: De Gruyter Mouton, 2012.Jonathan Berg - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (1):7-17.details
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Comments on Dennett from a cautious ally.Jonathan Bennett - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):381-385.details
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Aristotle, final cause, and the intentional stance.Aaron Ben-Zeev - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):758-759.details
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Two constructive themes.Richard K. Belew - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):25-26.details
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Why we can’t say what animals think.Jacob Beck - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (4):520–546.details
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Should we tolerate people who split?Simon Beck - 1992 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):1-17.details
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Realism, instrumentalism, and the intentional stance.William Bechtel - 1985 - Cognitive Science 9 (4):265-92.details
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Decomposing intentionality: Perspectives on intentionality drawn from language research with two species of chimpanzees. [REVIEW]William Bechtel - 1993 - Biology and Philosophy 8 (1):1-32.details
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Connectionism and interlevel relations.William Bechtel - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):24-25.details
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Whither internalism? How internalists should respond to the extended mind hypothesis.Gary Bartlett - 2008 - Metaphilosophy 39 (2):163–184.details
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The pleonasticity of talk about concepts.Alex Barber - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 89 (1):53-86.details
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The concept of intentionality: Invented or innate?Simon Baron-Cohen - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):29-30.details
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Imputations and Explications: Representational Problems in Treatments of Prepositional Attitudes.John A. Barnden - 1986 - Cognitive Science 10 (3):319-364.details
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First-Person Authority: Dualism, Constitutivism, and Neo-Expressivism.Dorit Bar-On - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (1):53-71.details
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Are false beliefs representative mental states?Karen Bartsch & David Estes - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):30-31.details
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Is meaning cognized?David Balcarras - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (5):1276-1295.details
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A curious coincidence? Consciousness as an object of scientific scrutiny fits our personal experience remarkably well.Bernard J. Baars - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):669-670.details
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On the type/token relation of mental representations.Murat Aydede - 2000 - Facta Philosophica 2 (1):23-50.details
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Has Fodor Really Changed His Mind on Narrow Content?Murat Aydede - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (3-4):422-458.details
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Computation and intentional psychology.Murat Aydede - 2000 - Dialogue 39 (2):365-379.details
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Transcendental Arguments and Practical Reason in Indian Philosophy.Dan Arnold - 2008 - Argumentation 22 (1):135-147.details
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Causes are perceived and introspected.D. M. Armstrong - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):29-29.details
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The causal relevance of the mental.Louise Antony - 1991 - Mind and Language 6 (4):295-327.details
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On the proper treatment of the connection between connectionism and symbolism.Louise Antony & Joseph Levine - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):23-24.details
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Is Psychological Individualism a Piece of Ideology?Louise M. Antony - 1995 - Hypatia 10 (3):157 - 174.details
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A pieced quilt: A critical discussion of Stephen Schiffer'sRemnants of Meaning.Louise Antony - 1991 - Philosophical Psychology 4 (1):119-137.details
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Attributions of intentional action.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 51 (3):311 - 323.details
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Logical adaptationism.Ron Amundson - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):505.details
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Mental content.Colin Allen - 1992 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43 (4):537-553.details
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Mental content and evolutionary explanation.Colin Allen - 1992 - Biology and Philosophy 7 (1):1-12.details
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Intentionality, social play, and definition.Colin Allen & Marc Bekoff - 1994 - Biology and Philosophy 9 (1):63-74.details
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Intentionality and Economics.Allin Cottrell - 1995 - Economics and Philosophy 11 (1):159.details
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Cognitive ethology and the intentionality of animal behavior.Colin Allen & Marc Bekoff - 1995 - Mind and Language 10 (4):313-328.details
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A Dilemma or a Challenge? Assessing the All-star Team in a Wider Context.Nikolai Alksnis - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):669-685.details
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The Anthropology of Misfortune and Cognitive Science. Examples from the Ivory Coast Senufo.Nicole Alice Sindzingre - 1995 - Science in Context 8 (3):509-529.details
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Behavioural Explanation in the Realm of Non-mental Computing Agents.Bernardo Aguilera - 2015 - Minds and Machines 25 (1):37-56.details
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What's in a (n empty) name?Fred Adams & Laura A. Dietrich - 2004 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (2):125-148.details
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Narrow content: Fodor's folly.Fred Adams, David Drebushenko, Gary Fuller & Robert Stecker - 1990 - Mind and Language 5 (3):213-29.details
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Folk Psychology, Eliminativism, and the Present State of Connectionism.Vanja Subotić - 2021 - Theoria: Beograd 1 (64):173-196.details
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Representation in Cognitive Science.Nicholas Shea - 2018 - Oxford University Press.details
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What we talk about when we talk about mental states.Zoe Drayson - 2022 - In Tamás Demeter, T. Parent & Adam Toon (eds.), Mental Fictionalism: Philosophical Explorations. New York & London: Routledge. pp. 147-159.details
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Philosophical Naturalism and Empirical Approaches to Philosophy.Jonathan Y. Tsou - forthcoming - In Marcus Rossberg (ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of Analytic Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.details
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