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Logico-linguistic papers

Burlington, VT: Ashgate (1974)

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  1. Idealism and the Identity Theory of Truth.Robert Trueman - 2020 - Mind 130 (519):783-807.
    In a recent article, Hofweber presents a new, and surprising, argument for idealism. His argument is surprising because it starts with an apparently innocent premiss from the philosophy of language: that ‘that’-clauses do not refer. I do not think that Hofweber's argument works, and my first aim in this paper is to explain why. However, I agree with Hofweber that what we say about ‘that’-clauses has important metaphysical consequences. My second aim is to argue that, far from leading us into (...)
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  • Social Constructivism of Language and Meaning.Chen Bo - 2015 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 15 (1):87-113.
    To systematically answer two questions “how does language work?” and “where does linguistic meaning come from?” this paper argues for SocialConstructivism of Language and Meaning which consists of six theses: the primary function of language is communication rather than representation, so language is essentially a social phenomenon. Linguistic meaning originates in the causal interaction of humans with the world, and in the social interaction of people with people. Linguistic meaning consists in the correlation of language to the world established by (...)
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  • Nominalizations: The Case of Nominalizations of Modal Predicates.Friederike Moltmann - 2020 - In Lisa Matthewson, Cécile Meier, Hotze Rullman & Thomas Ede Zimmermann (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Semantics. Wiley.
    Nominalizations of modal predicates have received little, if any, attention in the semantic or philosophical literature. This paper will argue that nominalizations of modal predicates require recognizing a novel ontological category of modal objects and it will outline a new semantics of modals based on modal objects.
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  • Correspondence to Reality in Ethics.Mario Brandhorst - 2015 - Philosophical Investigations 38 (3):227-250.
    This paper examines the view of ethical language that Wittgenstein took in later years. It argues that according to this view, ethics falls into place as a part of our natural history, while every sense of the mystical or supernatural that once surrounded it is irrevocably lost. Moreover, Wittgenstein argues that ethical language does not correspond to reality “in the way” in which a physical theory does. I propose an interpretation of this claim that shows how it sets his view (...)
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  • ∈ : Formal concepts in a material world truthmaking and exemplification as types of determination.Philipp Keller - 2007 - Dissertation, University of Geneva
    In the first part ("Determination"), I consider different notions of determination, contrast and compare modal with non-modal accounts and then defend two a-modality theses concerning essence and supervenience. I argue, first, that essence is a a-modal notion, i.e. not usefully analysed in terms of metaphysical modality, and then, contra Kit Fine, that essential properties can be exemplified contingently. I argue, second, that supervenience is also an a-modal notion, and that it should be analysed in terms of constitution relations between properties. (...)
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  • Can First-Order Logical Truth be Defined in Purely Extensional Terms?Gary Ebbs - 2014 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (2):343-367.
    W. V. Quine thinks logical truth can be defined in purely extensional terms, as follows: a logical truth is a true sentence that exemplifies a logical form all of whose instances are true. P. F. Strawson objects that one cannot say what it is for a particular use of a sentence to exemplify a logical form without appealing to intensional notions, and hence that Quine's efforts to define logical truth in purely extensional terms cannot succeed. Quine's reply to this criticism (...)
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  • The relevance of Relevance for fiction.Anne Reboul - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):729.
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  • On Defining Communicative Intentions.François Recanati - 1986 - Mind and Language 1 (3):213-41.
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  • The reference principle: A defence.David Dolby - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):286-296.
    It is often maintained that co-referential terms can be substituted for one another whilst preserving truth-value in extensional contexts, and preserving grammaticality in all contexts. Crispin Wright calls this claim ‘The Reference Principle’ . Since Wright defines extensional contexts as those in which truth-value is determined only by reference, it is the assertion about substitution salva congruitate that is significant. Wright argues that RP is the key to understanding how Frege came to hold, paradoxically, that the concept horse is not (...)
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  • Predication and cartographic representation.Michael Rescorla - 2009 - Synthese 169 (1):175 - 200.
    I argue that maps do not feature predication, as analyzed by Frege and Tarski. I take as my foil (Casati and Varzi, Parts and places, 1999), which attributes predication to maps. I argue that the details of Casati and Varzi’s own semantics militate against this attribution. Casati and Varzi emphasize what I call the Absence Intuition: if a marker representing some property (such as mountainous terrain) appears on a map, then absence of that marker from a map coordinate signifies absence (...)
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  • How knowledge works.John Hyman - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):433-451.
    I shall be mainly concerned with the question ‘What is personal propositional knowledge?’. This question is obviously quite narrowly focused, in three respects. In the first place, there is impersonal as well as personal knowledge. Second, a distinction is often drawn between propositional knowledge and practical knowledge. And third, as well as asking what knowledge is, it is also possible to ask whether and how knowledge of various kinds can be acquired: causal knowledge, a priori knowledge, moral knowledge, and so (...)
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  • Analyticity, meaning, and education: A critique of a Quinean dogma.R. A. Goodrich - 1996 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 28 (2):27–41.
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  • Speaker meaning.Wayne Davis - 1992 - Linguistics and Philosophy 15 (3):223 - 253.
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  • Mental Files: an Introduction.Michael Murez & François Recanati - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2):265-281.
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  • What's the Point of Elucidation?Phil Hutchinson - 2007 - Metaphilosophy 38 (5):691-713.
    In this article I examine three ways in which one might interpret Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (PI). In a partial response to Hans‐Johann Glock's article in this journal, I suggest that since publication PI has, broadly speaking, been interpreted in three ways: doctrinal; elucidatory; or therapeutic. The doctrinal interpretation is shown to be, at best, difficult to sustain textually. The elucidatory (standard) interpretation, though seemingly closer to the text, is shown both to implicate Wittgenstein in some unfortunate philosophical commitments and to (...)
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  • Meaning- theories and the principle of humanity.Daniel Whiting - 2006 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (4):697-716.
    In this paper, I briefly outline the notion of a truth-conditional meaning-theory and introduce two prominent problems it faces. The“extensionality problem” arises because not all correct specifications of truth-conditions are meaning-giving. The “explanatory problem”concerns the extent to which truth-conditional meaning-theories can contribute to the task of clarifying the nature of linguistic meaning.The “principle of humanity” is supposed to resolve both issues simultaneously. I argue that it fails to do so.
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  • The disunity of truth.Josh Dever - 2008 - In Robert Stainton & Christopher Viger (eds.), Compositionality, Context, and Semantic Values: Essays in Honor of Ernie Lepore. Springer. pp. 174-191.
    §§3-4 of the Begriffsschrift present Frege’s objections to a dominant if murky nineteenth-century semantic picture. I sketch a minimalist variant of the pre-Fregean picture which escapes Frege’s criticisms by positing a thin notion of semantic content which then interacts with a multiplicity of kinds of truth to account for phenomena such as modality. After exploring several ways in which we can understand the existence of multiple truth properties, I discuss the roles of pointwise and setwise truth properties in modal logic. (...)
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  • Toward a perspicuous presentation of "perspicuous presentation".Phil Hutchinson & Rupert Read - 2008 - Philosophical Investigations 31 (2):141–160.
    Gordon Baker in his last decade published a series of papers (now collected in Baker 2004), which are revolutionary in their proposals for understanding of later Wittgenstein. Taking our lead from the first of those papers, on "perspicuous presentations," we offer new criticisms of 'elucidatory' readers of later Wittgenstein, such as Peter Hacker: we argue that their readings fail to connect with the radically therapeutic intent of the 'perspicuous presentation' concept, as an achievement-term, rather than a kind of 'objective' mapping (...)
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  • A theory of legal reasoning and a logic to match.Jaap Hage - 1996 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 4 (3-4):199-273.
    This paper describes a model of legal reasoning and a logic for reasoning with rules, principles and goals that is especially suited to this model of legal reasoning. The paper consists of three parts. The first part describes a model of legal reasoning based on a two-layered view of the law. The first layer consists of principles and goals that express fundamental ideas of a legal system. The second layer contains legal rules which in a sense summarise the outcome of (...)
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  • (1 other version)I—Ian Rumfitt: Truth and Meaning.Ian Rumfitt - 2014 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):21-55.
    Should we explicate truth in terms of meaning, or meaning in terms of truth? Ramsey, Prior and Strawson all favoured the former approach: a statement is true if and only if things are as the speaker, in making the statement, states them to be; similarly, a belief is true if and only if things are as a thinker with that belief thereby believes them to be. I defend this explication of truth against a range of objections.Ramsey formalized this account of (...)
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  • Assertions, joint epistemic actions and social practices.Seumas Miller - 2016 - Synthese 193 (1):71-94.
    In this paper I provide a theory of the speech act of assertion according to which assertion is a species of joint action. In doing so I rely on a theory of joint action developed in more detail elsewhere. Here we need to distinguish between the genus, joint action, and an important species of joint action, namely, what I call joint epistemic action. In the case of the latter, but not necessarily the former, participating agents have epistemic goals, e.g., the (...)
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  • Contextualism and anti-contextualism in the philosophy of language.François Recanati - 1994 - In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), Foundations of Speech Act Theory: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives. Routledge. pp. 156-166.
    A historical overview, with an attempt to rebut Grice's argument against Contextualism.
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  • What's the point of elucidation?Anthony Philip A. Hutchinson - 2007 - Metaphilosophy 38 (5):691-713.
    A. P. A. Hutchinson. What's the Point of Elucidation? Metaphilosophy, 2007, vol. 38, no. 5, pages 691-713. Published by and copyright Wiley-Blackwell Publishing. The definitive version of this article is available from http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/.
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  • Cognisance and cognitive science. Part one: The generality constraint.James Russell - 1988 - Philosophical Psychology 1 (2):235 – 258.
    I distinguish between being cognisant and being able to perform intelligent operations. The former, but not the latter, minimally involves the capacity to make adequate judgements about one's relation to objects in the environment. The referential nature of cognisance entails that the mental states of cognisant systems must be inter-related holistically, such that an individual thought becomes possible because of its relation to a system of potential thoughts. I use Gareth Evans' 'Generality Constraint' as a means of describing how the (...)
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  • Indexicals and the theory of reference.Stephen Schiffer - 1981 - Synthese 49 (1):43--100.
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  • What are negative existence statements about?Jay David Atlas - 1988 - Linguistics and Philosophy 11 (4):373 - 394.
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  • Ordinary Language, Conventionalism and a priori Knowledge.Henry Jackman - 2001 - Dialectica 55 (4):315-325.
    This paper examines popular‘conventionalist’explanations of why philosophers need not back up their claims about how‘we’use our words with empirical studies of actual usage. It argues that such explanations are incompatible with a number of currently popular and plausible assumptions about language's ‘social’character. Alternate explanations of the philosopher's purported entitlement to make a priori claims about‘our’usage are then suggested. While these alternate explanations would, unlike the conventionalist ones, be compatible with the more social picture of language, they are each shown to (...)
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  • What Should a Correspondence Theory Be and Do?Patricia Marino - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (3):415-457.
    Correspondence theories are frequently either too vaguely expressed – “true statements correspond to the way things are in the world,” or implausible – “true statements mirror raw, mind-independent reality.” I address this problem by developing features and roles that ought to characterize what I call ldquo;modest” correspondence theories. Of special importance is the role of correspondence in directing our responses to cases of suspected non-factuality; lack of straightforward correspondence shows the need for, and guides us in our choice of, various (...)
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  • (1 other version)Singular Thought: In Defense of Acquaintance.François Recanati - 2010 - In Robin Jeshion (ed.), New Essays on Singular Thought. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 141.
    This paper is about the Descriptivism/Singularism debate, which has loomed large in 20-century philosophy of language and mind. My aim is to defend Singularism by showing, first, that it is a better and more promising view than even the most sophisticated versions of Descriptivism, and second, that the recent objections to Singularism (based on a dismissal of the acquaintance constraint on singular thought) miss their target.
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  • Presumptions of relevance.Dan Sperber & Deirdre Wilson - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):736.
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  • On Referring to Oneself.Maximilian de Gaynesford - 2004 - Theoria 70 (2-3):121-161.
    According to John McDowell, in its central uses, ‘I’ is immune to error through misidentification and thus to be accounted strongly identification‐free (I–II). Neither doctrine is obviously well founded (III); indeed, given that deixis is a proper part of ‘I’ (IV–VIII), it appears that uses of ‘I’ are identification‐dependent (IX–X).
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  • (1 other version)Truth or meaning? A question of priority.John Collins - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):497-536.
    There is an incompatibility between the deflationist approach to truth, which makes truth transparent on the basis of an antecedent grasp of meaning, and the traditional endeavour, exemplified by Davidson, to explicate meaning through of truth. I suggest that both parties are in the explanatory red: deflationist lack a non-truth-involving theory of meaning and Davidsonians lack a non-deflationary account of truth. My focus is on the attempts of the latter party to resolve their problem. I look in detail at Davidson's (...)
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  • Singular Terms Revisited.Robert Schwartzkopff - 2016 - Synthese 193 (3).
    Neo-Fregeans take their argument for arithmetical realism to depend on the availability of certain, so-called broadly syntactic tests for whether a given expression functions as a singular term. The broadly syntactic tests proposed in the neo-Fregean tradition are the so-called inferential test and the Aristotelian test. If these tests are to subserve the neo-Fregean argument, they must be at least adequate, in the sense of correctly classifying paradigm cases of singular terms and non-singular terms. In this paper, I pursue two (...)
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  • How relevant?Pieter A. M. Seuren - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):731.
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  • Relevance must be to someone.Yorick Wilks - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):735.
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  • Leave Truth Alone: On Deflationism and Contextualism.Daniel Whiting - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):607-624.
    Abstract: According to deflationism, grasp of the concept of truth consists in nothing more than a disposition to accept a priori (non-paradoxical) instances of the schema:(DS) It is true that p if and only if p.According to contextualism, the same expression with the same meaning might, on different occasions of use, express different propositions bearing different truth-conditions (where this does not result from indexicality and the like). On this view, what is expressed in an utterance depends in a non-negligible way (...)
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  • Frege on the Individuation of Thoughts.Leora Weitzman - 1997 - Dialogue 36 (3):563-574.
    It is easy to think of Frege as having offered two unintentionally discordant criteria for the identity of senses—one tied to the truth conditions of sentences, and one meant to capture relations of cognitive discriminability. This reading, however, is doubly mistaken; the discord between these two ways of thinking of senses has a Fregean resolution, but neither the resolution nor either of the original two pictures affords a genuine criterion for the identity of senses.
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  • The conventionality of illocutionary force.S. R. Miller - 1983 - Philosophical Papers 12 (1):44-51.
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  • The information needed for inference.Carlota S. Smith - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):733.
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  • On interpreting “interpretive use”.N. V. Smith - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):734.
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  • Rationality as an explanation of language?Stuart J. Russell - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):730.
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  • Literalness and other pragmatic principles.François Recanati - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):729-730.
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  • Toward a Universal Criticism of Reason-the Comparative Perspective in Phenomenology.Kenneth Liberman - 1986 - Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 17 (2):113-127.
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  • Inference and information.Philip Pettit - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):727.
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  • On the pragmatics of mood.Shalom Lappin - 1980 - Linguistics and Philosophy 4 (4):559 - 578.
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  • The representation of gappy sentences in four-valued semantics.Genoveva Martí & José Martínez-Fernández - 2021 - Semiotica 2021 (240):145-163.
    Three-valued logics are standardly used to formalize gappy languages, i.e., interpreted languages in which sentences can be true, false or neither. A three-valued logic that assigns the same truth value to all gappy sentences is, in our view, insufficient to capture important semantic differences between them. In this paper we will argue that there are two different kinds of pathologies that should be treated separately and we defend the usefulness of a four-valued logic to represent adequately these two types of (...)
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  • Files, Indexicals and Descriptivism.Krista Lawlor - 2013 - Disputatio 5 (36):147-158.
    Lawlor-Krista_Files-indexicals-and-descriptivism.
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  • Nouvelles catégories pour l'analyse du sens du locuteur.Daniel Laurier - 1986 - Dialectica 40 (2):87-106.
    RésuméLe sens intentionnel ?une énonciation comprend selon Grice un acte illocutoire principal et des actes illocutoires secondaires, qui peuvent être soit des implicatures conventionnelles soit des implkatures non‐conventionnelles. Je montre que cette analyse, sous ľnterprétation visée par Grice, est défectueuse en ceci que i) elle exclut que ľacte illocutoire principal puisse être non littéral, ii) elle ne rend pas compte de ce que les implicatures conventionnelles sont annulables et iii) elle confond sous ľappellation ?implicature non conventionnelle deux types de phénomènes (...)
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  • Kung-Sun Lung’s Chih Wu Lun and Semantics of Reference and Predication.Kao Kung-yi & Diane B. Obenchain - 1975 - Journal of Chinese Philosophy 2 (3):285-324.
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  • “The king of France is bald” reconsidered: a case against Yablo.Andrej Jandrić - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):173-181.
    Stephen Yablo has argued for metaontological antirealism: he believes that the sentences claiming or denying the existence of numbers (or other abstract entities or mereological sums) are inapt for truth valuation, because the reference failure of a numerical singular term (or a singular term for an abstract entity or a mereological sum) would not produce a truth value gap in any sentence containing that term. At the same time, Yablo believes that nothing similar applies to singular terms that aim to (...)
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