The present PhD dissertation aims to examine the relation between modality and change in Aristotle’s metaphysics. -/- On the one hand, Aristotle supports his modal realism (i.e., worldly objects have modal properties - potentialities and essences - that ground the ascriptions of possibility and necessity) by arguing that the rejection of modal realism makes change inexplicable, or, worse, banishes it from the realm of reality. On the other hand, the Stagirite analyses processes by means of modal notions (‘change is the (...) actuality of what is virtual insofar as it is virtual’). In other words: to grasp what change is, one has to resort to the modal idiom of potentialities, while the fact that there is change is indicative of the fact that nature is full of modal properties. -/- Aristotle’s modal and kinetic realism finds a negative in the figure of the Megaric Diodorus Kronus. The polemical situation of Greek philosophy has indeed the dialectical advantage of not opposing the Aristotelian position to a sui generis straw man. Both in its reduction of modal judgements to temporal quantifications and in its dissolution of the reality of the state-of-being-in-motion in favour of a cinematographic view of processes, the philosophical figure of reductionist antirealism embodied by Diodorus constitutes an alternative that takes the opposite view of Aristotle’s realism. -/- The present study is structured as a discussion between these two positions. In the face of Diodorus’ antirealist challenges, Aristotle articulates modal and kinetic considerations: the answers he gives to Diodorus’ puzzles thus provide valuable insight into his metaphysics. Moreover, the examination of Aristotle’s and Diodorus’ metaphysics, because of their insight and originality, will not fail to interest the philosopher concerned with the metaphysical foundations of modern physics, insofar as the entanglement between modalities and processes is nowadays at the core of mechanics (phase spaces, path integrals, etc.). (shrink)

La principale source biographique sur Platon, selon le témoignage du néoplatonicien Simplicius, a été écrite par le disciple Xénocrate, mais malheureusement elle ne nous est pas parvenue. La première biographie de Platon à ce jour, De Platone et dogmate eius, est d'un auteur latin du IIe siècle, Apulée. Toutes les autres biographies de Platon ont été écrites plus de cinq cents ans après sa mort. L'historien grec Diogène (IIe et IIIe siècles) est l'auteur d'une série de biographies de philosophes grecs (...) (Les vies des philosophes) dans lesquelles il se réfère à la vie de Platon. Il a également écrit une louange funèbre pour Platon. D'autres premiers biographes de Platon sont Olympiodore le Jeune au VIe siècle et une source anonyme. Une source importante sur la vie de Platon est ses dialogues philosophiques, ses treize lettres (peut-être fausses, à l'exception peut-être des Lettres VII et VIII), les écrits d'Aristote, un extrait de l'épicurien Philodème dede Gadara, l'Histoire des philosophes (Syntaxis ton philosophon), Ier siècle av. J.-C., les écrits anonymes de Prolégomène sur la philosophie platonicienne traditionnellement attribués à Olympiodore, Suda, Xe siècle, et La vie de Dio de Plutarque, Ier-IIe siècle. -/- DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.18219.92969 . (shrink)

Platon s'est inspir? des travaux philosophiques de certains de ses pr?d?cesseurs, en particulier Socrate, mais aussi Parm?nide, H?raclite et Pythagore, pour d?velopper sa propre philosophie, qui explore les domaines les plus importants, notamment la m?taphysique, l'?thique, l'esth?tique et la politique. Avec son professeur Socrate et son ?l?ve Aristote, il pose les bases de la pens?e philosophique occidentale. Platon est consid?r? comme l'un des philosophes les plus importants et les plus influents de l'histoire humaine, ?tant l'un des fondateurs de la religion (...) et de la spiritualit? occidentales. La philosophie qu'il a d?velopp?e, connue sous le nom de platonisme, est bas?e sur la th?orie des Formes connues par la raison pure comme une solution au probl?me des universaux. La philosophie de Platon s'inscrit dans la lign?e des pr?socratiques, des sophistes et des traditions artistiques qui sous-tendent l'?ducation grecque, dans un cadre nouveau, d?fini par la dialectique et la th?orie des Id?es. Pour Platon, la connaissance est une activit? de l'?me, affect?e par des objets sensibles, et par des processus internes. Dans La R?publique de Platon, la forme la plus ?lev?e est consid?r?e comme la Forme du Bien, la source de toutes les autres Formes qui pourraient ?tre connues par la raison. Le th?me central du livre est la justice, argument?e ? l'aide de plusieurs th?ories platoniciennes, dont le mythe all?gorique de la caverne, la doctrine des Id?es, la dialectique, la th?orie de l'?me et la conception d'une cit? id?ale. Sa dialectique est un type de connaissance, ? r?le ontologique et m?taphysique, qui s'atteint par la confrontation de plusieurs positions pour d?passer l'opinion (doxa), un passage du monde des apparences (ou ? sensible ?) ? la connaissance intellectuelle (ou ? intelligible ? ) aux premiers principes. Le mod?le ?ducatif de Platon (paid?ia) diff?rencie le niveau d'?ducation selon les comp?tences des ?l?ves. Selon les principes socratiques, pour faire justice, il faut savoir ce qui est bien, et c'est ce que le philosophe sait le mieux. Platon a d?taill? ce concept en soulignant la distinction entre le philosophe (qui cherche les principes de v?rit? sans pr?tendre les poss?der) et le sophiste (qui se laisse guider par l'opinion comme seul param?tre valable de la connaissance). (shrink)

Filosofia lui Platon se înscrie pe linia presocraticilor, a sofiștilor și a tradițiilor artistice care stau la baza educației grecești, într-un cadru nou, definit de dialectică și teoria ideilor. Cunoașterea este pentru Platon o activitate a sufletului, afectată de obiectele sensibile, și de procesele interne. Platonismul își are originea în filosofia lui Platon, deși nu se confundă cu aceasta. Conform platonismului există obiecte abstracte (noțiune diferită de cea a filosofiei moderne care există într-un al tărâm distinct atât de lumea sensibilă (...) externă, cât și de lumea internă a conștiinței, și este opusul nominalismului). O distincție esențială pentru Platon în filosofia sa este teoria Formelor, distincție dintre realitatea perceptibilă dar neinteligibilă (știința) și realitatea imperceptibilă dar inteligibilă (matematica). Geometria a fost principala motivație a lui Platon, iar aceasta arată și influența lui Pitagora. Formele sunt arhetipuri perfecte ale căror obiecte reale sunt copii imperfecte. -/- DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.33183.43687. (shrink)

I argue that Plato thinks that the soul has location, surface, depth, and extension, and that the Timaeus’ composition of the soul out of eight circles is intended literally. A novel contribution is the development of an account of corporeality that denies the entailment that the soul is corporeal. I conclude by examining Aristotle’s objection to the Timaeus’ psychology and then the intellectual history of this reading of Plato.

This paper reexamines Theophrastus’ Metaphysics 11a18–26, an obscure testimony about Speusippus, the second head of the Platonic Academy. As opposed to the traditional interpretation, which takes this passage as Theophrastus’ polemic against Speusippus’ doctrine of value, I argue that he here dialectically takes advantage of, rather than launches an attack on, the Platonist. Based on this new reading, I further propose a revision and a reassessment of the ‘gloomy metaphysics’ of Speusippus which will shed new light on his ethics.

This book is a quest for the real Plato, forever hiding behind the veil of drama. The quest, as the subtitle indicates, is Cartesian in that it looks for Plato independently of the prevailing paradigms on where we are supposed to find him. The result of the quest is a complete pedagogical platform on Plato. This does not mean that the book leaves nothing out, covering all the dialogues and all the themes, but that it provides the full intellectual apparatus (...) for doing just that. It consists of two parts. The first is a general orientation in three chapters, one each pertaining to the life, thought, and works of Plato. The second is a dialogic companion covering the four dialogues built around the last days of Socrates, with a separate chapter devoted to each: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, and Phaedo. (shrink)

Principala sursă biografică despre Platon, după mărturia neoplatonicului Simplicius, ar fi fost scrisă de discipolul Xenocrate, dar din păcate nu a ajuns la noi. Cea mai veche biografie a lui Platon care a ajuns până la noi, De Platone et dogmate eius, este a unui autor latin din secolul al II-lea, Apuleius. Toate celelalte biografii ale lui Platon au fost scrise la peste cinci sute de ani de la moartea sa. Istoricul grec Diogene (secolele II și III) este autorul unei (...) serii de biografii ale filosofilor greci (Viețile filosofilor) în care face referire la viața lui Platon. Acesta ar fi scris și un elogiu funerar lui Platon. Alți biografi timpurii ai lui Platon sunt Olimpiodor cel Tânăr în secolul al VI-lea și o sursă anonimă. O sursă importantă despre viața lui Platon sunt chiar dialogurile sale filozofice, treisprezece scrisori (posibil false totuși, cu excepția poate a Scrisorilor VII și VIII), scrierile lui Aristotel, un fragment din Istoria filozofilor (Syntaxis ton philosophon) a epicureanului Philodemus de Gadara din secolul I î.e.n., scrierile anonime Prolegomena despre filozofia platonică atribuite în mod tradițional lui Olimpiodor, Suda, secolul al X-lea și Viața lui Dio a lui Plutarh, secolul I-II. -/- DOI: 10.58679/CS86928. (shrink)

Plato’s nephew Speusippus has been widely accepted as the historical person behind the mask of the anti-hedonists in Phlb. 42b–44c. This hypothesis is supported by, inter alia, the link between Socrates’ char- acterization of them as δυσχερεῖς and the frequent references of δυσχέρεια as ἀπορία to Speusippus in Aristotle’s Metaphysics MN. This study argues against assigning any privileged status to Speusippus in the assimilation of δυσχέρεια with ἀπορία. Instead, based on a comprehensive survey of how δυσχερ- words were used in (...) classical antiquity, the semantic shift of δυσχέρεια can be explained in an alternative way. (shrink)

: Metaphysics B considers two sets of views that hypostatize mathematicals. Aristotle discusses the first in his B.2 treatment of aporia 5, and the second in his B.5 treatment of aporia 12. The former has attracted considerable attention; the latter has not. I show that aporia 12 is more significant than the literature suggests, and specifically that it is directly addressed in M.2 – an indication of its importance. There is an immediate problem: Aristotle spends most of M.2 refuting the (...) view that mathematicals are separate; but the B.5 mathematicals are inherent. I argue that the B.5 inherence is compatible with the M.2 separateness, and further, that aporia 12 is more than just a puzzle about the hypostatization of mathematicals. It is also a puzzle about the ontological status of mathematicals relative to sensibles. (shrink)

John Cook Wilson (1849–1915) was Wykeham Professor of Logic at New College, Oxford and the founder of ‘Oxford Realism’, a philosophical movement that flourished at Oxford during the first decades of the 20th century. Although trained as a classicist and a mathematician, his most important contribution was to the theory of knowledge, where he argued that knowledge is factive and not definable in terms of belief, and he criticized ‘hybrid’ and ‘externalist’ accounts. He also argued for direct realism in perception, (...) criticizing both empiricism and idealism, and argued for a moderate nominalist view of universals as being in rebus and only ‘apprehended’ by their particulars. His influence helped swaying Oxford away from idealism and, through figures such as H. A. Prichard, Gilbert Ryle, or J. L. Austin, his ideas were also to some extent at the origin of ‘moral intuitionism’ and ‘ordinary language philosophy’ which defined much of Oxford philosophy until the second half of the twentieth-century. Nevertheless, his name and legacy were all but forgotten for generations after World War II. Still, his views on knowledge are with us today, being in part at work in the writings of philosophers as diverse as John McDowell, Charles Travis, and Timothy Williamson. (shrink)

RESUMEN Este artículo pretende comprender la filosofía de Platón como un ejercicio esencialmente político. Esto implica, sin embargo, distinguir cómo se ejerce esta filosofía política, su sentido y alcance. Muchos estudiosos han atribuido a Platón el proyecto político que Sócrates desarrolla en la República. Sin embargo, el símil de la caverna da cuenta de la imposibilidad o, al menos, de la interna problematicidad de tal proyecto, por lo cual se sugiere que no es en el diálogo República donde se encontraría (...) la auténtica filosofía política de Platón, sino en los denominados diálogos aporéticos. En estos diálogos no se habla sobre una posible ciudad, sino que se ejercita de manera viva una política desarrollada por la dialéctica terapéutica de Sócrates, cuya tarea es desvelar la virtud mediante el desenmascaramiento de los rostros de la ciudad. ABSTRACT The following paper contends that Plato's philosophy is essentially a political activity. This imply, however, to distinguish how this political philosophy carries out, its meaning and scope. Many scholars have attributed to Plato the political project, which Socrates develops in the dialogue Republic. Nevertheless, the simile of the cave reveals the impossibility of such a project or, at least, the serious problems that lie behind it. So, I suggest, that is not in the dialogue Republic where it finds Plato's authentic political philosophy, but in the so-called aporetic dialogues. In these dialogues it does not discuss about a possible city, but it exercises in a lively way a politics builted by Socrates' dialectic therapy, whose task is unveiling the virtue through the unmasking the faces of the city. (shrink)

We critically reconsider an old hypothesis of the role of the dekad in Pythagorean philosophy. Unlike Zhmud, we claim that: 1) the dekad did play a role in Philolaus’ astronomical system, and 2) Aristotle did not project Plato’s theory of the ten eidetic numbers onto the Pythagoreans. We claim that the dekad, as the τέλειος ἀριθμός, should be understood in Philolaus’ philosophy as completeness and the basis of counting in Greek – as in most other languages – in a decimal (...) system. Additionally, we argue that the number ten is not even a candidate for the τέλειος ἀριθμός in Plato’s philosophy. As a final result of our discussion, we compare and contrast Philolaus’, Plato’s, and Speusippus’ accounts of completeness in relation to numbers. (shrink)

I argue here that a properly Platonic theory of the nature of number is still viable today. By properly Platonic, I mean one consistent with Plato's own theory, with appropriate extensions to take into account subsequent developments in mathematics. At Parmenides 143a-4a the existence of numbers is proven from our capacity to count, whereby I establish as Plato's the theory that numbers are originally ordinal, a sequence of forms differentiated by position. I defend and interpret Aristotle's report of a Platonic (...) distinction between form and mathematical numbers, arguing that mathematical numbers alone are cardinals, by reference to certain non-technical features of a set-theoretical approach and other considerations in philosophy of mathematics. Finally I respond to the objections that such a conception of number was unavailable in antiquity and that this theory is contradicted by Aristotle's report in Metaph . XIII that Platonic numbers are collections of units. I argue that Aristotle reveals his own misinterpretation of the terms in which Plato's theory was expressed. (shrink)

This paper analyzes and explains certain parts of Syrianus’s Commentary on book M of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, which details Syrianus’s response to Aristotle’s attack against the Platonic position of the separate existence of numbers. Syrianus defends the separate existence not only of eidetic but also of mathematical numbers, following a line of argumentation which involves a hylomorphic approach to the latter. He proceeds with an analysis of the mathematical number into matter and form, but his interpretation entails that form is the (...) constituent of number, which has the status and role of a Platonic Form. This solution allows him not only to explain and justify the unity of number, but also to apply the Platonic thesis of the separate existence of numbers, to the mathematical or monadic numbers themselves. It also betrays its tendency to combine theses of the Platonic Ontology with fundamental Aristotelian doctrines. (shrink)

Ontological separation plays a key role in Aristotle’s metaphysical project: substances alone are ontologically χωριστόν. The standard view identifies Aristotelian ontological separation with ontological independence, so that ontological separation is a non-symmetric relation. I argue that there is strong textual evidence that Aristotle employs an asymmetric notion of separation in the Metaphysics—one that involves the dependence of other entities on the independent entity. I argue that this notion allows Aristotle to prevent the proliferation of substance-kinds and thus to secure the (...) unity of his metaphysical system. (shrink)

Summary The First Sacred War was hotly debated in the 4th century. The crimes committed by the Crisaeans in this war were later equated to those committed by the Phocians during the Third Sacred War, or those committed by the Locrians of Amphissa during the Fourth Sacred War. This paper shows how the parallels drawn between the First and Third Sacred Wars (SW1–SW3) and between the First and Fourth Sacred Wars (SW1–SW4) were respectively shaped and used as an argument in (...) two different milieus: in pro-Macedonian intellectual circles in Athens, and in the Athenian forensic and deliberative arena. The main aim of this paper is to understand why ‘SW1–SW3’ is not used as an argument in the latter. In fact, Athens’ most prominent politicians had to cope with the Athenian support for the Phocians in the so-called Third Sacred War. Thus, the Phocians were depicted as guilty, but not to the point that they were compared to the Crisaeans. The legacy of the latter was ambivalent and lent itself to this shift in meaning. (shrink)