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  1. Pain in the Past and Pleasure in the Future: The Development of Past–Future Preferences for Hedonic Goods.Ruth Lee, Christoph Hoerl, Patrick Burns, Alison Sutton Fernandes, Patrick A. O'Connor & Teresa McCormack - 2020 - Cognitive Science 44 (9):e12887.
    It seems self-evident that people prefer painful experiences to be in the past and pleasurable experiences to lie in the future. Indeed, it has been claimed that, for hedonic goods, this preference is absolute (Sullivan, 2018). Yet very little is known about the extent to which people demonstrate explicit preferences regarding the temporal location of hedonic experiences, about the developmental trajectory of such preferences, and about whether such preferences are impervious to differences in the quantity of envisaged past and future (...)
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  • Future bias in action: does the past matter more when you can affect it?Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller, James Norton & Christian Tarsney - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11327-11349.
    Philosophers have long noted, and empirical psychology has lately confirmed, that most people are “biased toward the future”: we prefer to have positive experiences in the future, and negative experiences in the past. At least two explanations have been offered for this bias: belief in temporal passage and the practical irrelevance of the past resulting from our inability to influence past events. We set out to test the latter explanation. In a large survey, we find that participants exhibit significantly less (...)
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  • Does the Temporal Asymmetry of Value Support a Tensed Metaphysics?Alison Fernandes - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):3999-4016.
    There are temporal asymmetries in our attitudes towards the past and future. For example, we judge that a given amount of work is worth twice as much if it is described as taking place in the future, compared to the past :796–801, 2008). Does this temporal value asymmetry support a tensed metaphysics? By getting clear on the asymmetry’s features, I’ll argue that it doesn’t. To support a tensed metaphysics, the value asymmetry would need to not vary with temporal distance, apply (...)
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  • The Development of Asymmetries in Past and Future Thinking.Patrick Burns, Teresa McCormack, Agnieszka Jaroslawska, Áine Fitzpatrick, Jemma McGourty & Eugene M. Caruso - 2019 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 148 (2):272-288.
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