Cet article est une contribution à l’étude de l’expression de la généralité et de l’abstraction en mathématique. Il propose dans cette perspective une analyse des conditions de possibilité de la réflexivité. Certaines de ces conditions sont d’abord dégagées à partir d’exemples élémentaires. Une brève analyse des Disquistiones arithmeticae de Gauss permet ensuite de proposer un critère de démarcation sémiotique pour les mathématiques ensemblistes. L’application de ce critère permet ensuite d’expliquer que la réflexivité s’exprime dans ces mathématiques par des hiérarchies.

Employing the theory of Birkhoff polarities as a model of model theory yields an inductively defined dual structure which is a formalization of semantics and which allows for simple proofs of some new results for model theory.

This article is an attempt to present Gödel's discussion on concepts, from 1944 to the late 1970s, in particular relation to the thought of Frege and Russell. The discussion takes its point of departure from Gödel's claim in notes on Bernay's review of ?Russell's mathematical logic?. It then retraces the historical background of the notion of intension which both Russell and Gödel use, and offers some grounds for claiming that Gödel consistently considered logic as a free-type theory of concepts, called (...) intensions, considered as the denotations of predicate names. (shrink)

We discuss the work of Paul Cohen in set theory and its influence, especially the background, discovery, development of forcing.

This paper propounds a systematic examination of the link between the Knower Paradox and provability interpretations of modal logic. The aim of the paper is threefold: to give a streamlined presentation of the Knower Paradox and related results; to clarify the notion of a syntactical treatment of modalities; finally, to discuss the kind of solution that modal provability logic provides to the Paradox. I discuss the respective strength of different versions of the Knower Paradox, both in the framework of first-order (...) arithmetic and in that of modal logic with fixed point operators. It is shown that the notion of a syntactical treatment of modalities is ambiguous between a self-referential treatment and a metalinguistic treatment of modalities, and that these two notions are independent. I survey and compare the provability interpretations of modality respectively given by Skyrms, B. (1978, The Journal of Philosophy 75: 368–387) Anderson, C.A. (1983, The Journal of Philosophy 80: 338–355) and Solovay, R. (1976, Israel Journal of Mathematics 25: 287–304). I examine how these interpretations enable us to bypass the limitations imposed by the Knower Paradox while preserving the laws of classical logic, each time by appeal to a distinct form of hierarchy. (shrink)

This paper aims to outline an analysis and interpretation of the process that led to First-Order Logic and its consolidation as a core system of modern logic. We begin with an historical overview of landmarks along the road to modern logic, and proceed to a philosophical discussion casting doubt on the possibility of a purely rational justification of the actual delimitation of First-Order-Logic. On this basis, we advance the thesis that a certain historical tradition was essential to the emergence of (...) modern logic; this traditional context is analyzed as consisting in some guiding principles and, particularly, a set of exemplares (i.e., paradigmatic instances). Then, we proceed to interpret the historical course of development reviewed in section 1, which can broadly be described as a two-phased movement of expansion and then restriction of the scope of logical theory. We shall try to pinpoint ambivalencies in the process, and the main motives for subsequent changes. Among the latter, one may emphasize the spirit of modern axiomatics, the situation of foundational insecurity in the 1920s, the resulting desire to find systems well-behaved from a proof-theoretical point of view, and the metatheoretical results of the 1930s. Not surprisingly, the mathematical and, more specifically, the foundational context in which Firs-Order-Logic matured will be seen to have played a primary role in its shaping. (shrink)

This paper is divided into two parts. Part I provides a resumé of the evolution of the notion of predicativity. Part II describes our own work on the subject.Part I§1. Conceptions of sets.Statements about sets lie at the heart of most modern attempts to systematize all (or, at least, all known) mathematics. Technical and philosophical discussions concerning such systematizations and the underlying conceptions have thus occupied a considerable portion of the literature on the foundations of mathematics.

This paper builds on the system of David Lewis’s “Parts of Classes” to provide a foundation for mathematics that arguably requires not only no distinctively mathematical ideological commitments (in the sense of Quine), but also no distinctively mathematical ontological commitments. Provided only that there are enough individual atoms, the devices of plural quantification and mereology can be employed to simulate quantification over classes, while at the same time allowing all of the atoms (and most of their fusions with which we (...) are concerned) to be individuals (that is, urelements of classes). The final section of the paper canvasses some reasons to be committed to the required ontology for other than mathematical reasons. (shrink)

This paper investigates the conditions under which diagonal sentences can be taken to constitute paradigmatic cases of self-reference. We put forward well-motivated constraints on the diagonal operator and the coding apparatus which separate paradigmatic self-referential sentences, for instance obtained via Gödel’s diagonalization method, from accidental diagonal sentences. In particular, we show that these constraints successfully exclude refutable Henkin sentences, as constructed by Kreisel.

In the year 1900, the German mathematician David Hilbert gave a dramatic address in Paris, at the meeting of the 2nd International Congress of Mathematicians—an address which was to have lasting fame and importance. Hilbert was at that point a rapidly rising star, if not superstar, in mathematics, and before long he was to be ranked with Henri Poincar´.

We extend work of H. Friedman, L. Harrington and P. Welch to the third level of the projective hierarchy. Our main theorems say that (under appropriate background assumptions) the possibility to select definable elements of non-empty sets of reals at the third level of the projective hierarchy is equivalent to the disjunction of determinacy of games at the second level of the projective hierarchy and the existence of a core model (corresponding to this fragment of determinacy) which must then contain (...) all real numbers. The proofs use Sacks forcing with perfect trees and core model techniques. (shrink)

We discuss the work of Paul Bernays in set theory, mainly his axiomatization and his use of classes but also his higher-order reflection principles.