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  1. Wittgenstein on Pseudo-Irrationals, Diagonal Numbers and Decidability.Timm Lampert - 2008 - In Lampert Timm (ed.), The Logica Yearbook 2008. pp. 95-111.
    In his early philosophy as well as in his middle period, Wittgenstein holds a purely syntactic view of logic and mathematics. However, his syntactic foundation of logic and mathematics is opposed to the axiomatic approach of modern mathematical logic. The object of Wittgenstein’s approach is not the representation of mathematical properties within a logical axiomatic system, but their representation by a symbolism that identifies the properties in question by its syntactic features. It rests on his distinction of descriptions and operations; (...)
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  • Wittgenstein on Formulae.Esther Ramharter - 2014 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 89 (1):79-91.
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  • Wittgenstein and the Real Numbers.Daesuk Han - 2010 - History and Philosophy of Logic 31 (3):219-245.
    When it comes to Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics, even sympathetic admirers are cowed into submission by the many criticisms of influential authors in that field. They say something to the effect that Wittgenstein does not know enough about or have enough respect for mathematics, to take him as a serious philosopher of mathematics. They claim to catch Wittgenstein pooh-poohing the modern set-theoretic extensional conception of a real number. This article, however, will show that Wittgenstein's criticism is well grounded. A real (...)
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  • Wittgenstein And Labyrinth Of ‘Actual Infinity’: The Critique Of Transfinite Set Theory.Valérie Lynn Therrien - 2012 - Ithaque 10:43-65.
    In order to explain Wittgenstein’s account of the reality of completed infinity in mathematics, a brief overview of Cantor’s initial injection of the idea into set- theory, its trajectory and the philosophic implications he attributed to it will be presented. Subsequently, we will first expound Wittgenstein’s grammatical critique of the use of the term ‘infinity’ in common parlance and its conversion into a notion of an actually existing infinite ‘set’. Secondly, we will delve into Wittgenstein’s technical critique of the concept (...)
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