Measuring perceived similarity is an important issue in visual perception of faces, since a measure of the perceived similarity between faces may be used to investigate fundamental tasks like face categorization and recognition. Despite its fundamental role, measuring perceived similarity between faces is not trivial from both a theoretical and methodological point of view. In this paper we present theoretical arguments that undermine the method currently most used to measure perceived similarity between faces in visual perception, and we propose an (...) alternative method. We finally compare the two methods and find some empirical evidence that the proposed method can provide a more reliable evaluation of the perceived similarity between faces. (shrink)

According to a widely held view epistemic justification is a normative notion. According to another widely held assumption, epistemic justification comes in degrees. Given that gradability requires a context-sensitivity that normativity seems to lack, these two assumptions stand in tension. Giving up the assumption of gradability of justification represents a lesser theoretical cost.

While extremes tend to capture attention, the ordinary is often most of the story. So it may be with the structure-mapping process. The structure-mapping process can account for such pinnacles of thinking as analogy and metaphor, which can lead to overlooking the mundane, incremental use of structure mapping. Consequently, the current discussion shifts focus to the value of close comparisons between literally similar items for the development of knowledge. The intent is to foster greater integration between process and content as (...) well as between individuals and collectives. The payoff is identifying some undue simplifications and some promising new directions. (shrink)

We present a theory of sequential information processing in persuasion. It extends assumptions of the heuristic-systematic model, in particular the idea that information encountered early in a persuasion situation may affect the processing of subsequent information. SIP also builds on the abstraction from content-related dichotomies in accord with the parametric unimodel of social judgment. SIP features one constitutional axiom and three main postulates: Persuasion is the sequential processing of information that is relevant to judgment formation. Inferences drawn from initial information (...) may bias the processing of subsequent information if they are either activated rules or valence expectations that are relevant to the subsequent information. Inferences drawn from initial information are resistant to change. Thus, the interpretation of subsequent information is assimilated to inferences drawn from the initial information. Or, if assimilation is impossible, contrast effects occur. The overall effect of a persuasion attempt corresponds to the recipient’s judgment at the moment the processing of information is terminated. We illustrate how our predictions for assimilation and contrast effects may be tested by presenting results from an experiment in which we presented exactly the same arguments but varied the processing sequence. We discuss theoretical and applied implications of sequence effects for persuasion phenomena, as well as challenges for further research developing and testing the theory. (shrink)

Making decisions, as Peter Drucker put it, ‘is the specific executive task’.2 But the situations in which managers decide can differ sharply. Some involve risk, uncertainty or lack of predictability while others lack clear structure and present decision-makers with ambiguity in some form. And yet, in spite of much research, we still have no unified account to explain how managers make decisions let alone to help them decide effectively. Different research streams specialise in different aspects of judgement and decisionmaking (JDM) (...) and produce results which apply in different contexts. Some focus on decisions under risk, some on cases of uncertainty, some on different aspects of ambiguity. Some are objectivist and others interpretive, basing themselves on paradigms which are mutually exclusive. As a result, managers relying on any one of them when making decisions can get only partial help because no one paradigm covers every aspect of the issues on which they decide. This paper addresses the lack of a unified account. It offers a framework for comparing the different research approaches to JDM and their incommensurable paradigms. It describes the central role of metaphors, stories and formal models when managers make decisions. It adopts a neo-pragmatic perspective which treats all three as special forms of model rather than representatives of opposing paradigms. This in turn makes possible a unified account in which specific functions are assigned to each form of model in specific stages of decision-making; metaphors and stories represent the interpretive paradigm and formal models the objectivist paradigm. Finally, to shape future research, the paper derives five propositions about the use and impacts of metaphors, stories and formal models from an account of how they are actually used by managers making decisions. (shrink)

Making decisions, as Peter Drucker put it, ‘is the specific executive task’.2 But the situations in which managers decide can differ sharply. Some involve risk, uncertainty or lack of predictability while others lack clear structure and present decision-makers with ambiguity in some form. And yet, in spite of much research, we still have no unified account to explain how managers make decisions let alone to help them decide effectively. Different research streams specialise in different aspects of judgement and decisionmaking (JDM) (...) and produce results which apply in different contexts. Some focus on decisions under risk, some on cases of uncertainty, some on different aspects of ambiguity. Some are objectivist and others interpretive, basing themselves on paradigms which are mutually exclusive. As a result, managers relying on any one of them when making decisions can get only partial help because no one paradigm covers every aspect of the issues on which they decide. This paper addresses the lack of a unified account. It offers a framework for comparing the different research approaches to JDM and their incommensurable paradigms. It describes the central role of metaphors, stories and formal models when managers make decisions. It adopts a neo-pragmatic perspective which treats all three as special forms of model rather than representatives of opposing paradigms. This in turn makes possible a unified account in which specific functions are assigned to each form of model in specific stages of decision-making; metaphors and stories represent the interpretive paradigm and formal models the objectivist paradigm. Finally, to shape future research, the paper derives five propositions about the use and impacts of metaphors, stories and formal models from an account of how they are actually used by managers making decisions. (shrink)

Part 1 of this paper1 used the notions of equivocality and uncertainty to distinguish the situations in which managers make judgements and decisions and described in general how managers use models in these different contexts. This final second part describes in detail the three types of models managers use: formal models, stories and metaphors. It offers five propositions about how managers use the three types of model, propositions which can usefully form the basis of future empirical research.

Learning programs that generalize from real‐world examples will have to deal with many different kinds of data. Continuous numeric data can cause problems for algorithms that search for examples with identical property values. These problems can be surmounted by categorizing the numeric data. However, this process has problems of its own. In this paper, we look at the need for categorizing numeric data and several methods for doing so. We concentrate on the use of generalization‐based memory, a memory organization where (...) actual examples are stored along with generalizations, which leads to a generalization‐based categorization algorithm. We also consider how to use a number heuristic, looking for gaps. These methods have been implemented in the UNIMEM computer system. Examples are presented of these algorithms categorizing data about the states of the United States. (shrink)

The ability to make informative comparisons is central to human cognition. Comparison involves aligning two representations and placing their elements into correspondence. Detecting correspondences is a necessary component of analogical inference, recognition, categorization, schema formation, and similarity judgment. Connectionist Analogy Builder (CAB) determines correspondences through a simple iterative computation that matches elements in one representation with elements playing compatible roles in the other representation while simultaneously enforcing structural constraints. CAB shows promise as a process model of comparison as its performance (...) can be related to human performance (e.g., solution trajectory, error patterns, time‐on‐task). Furthermore, CAB's bounded working memory allows it to account for the inherent capacity limitations of human processing. CAB's strengths are its parsimony, transparency of operations, and ability to generate performance predictions. In this paper, CAB is evaluated against benchmark phenomena from the analogy literature. (shrink)

Epistemic absolutism holds that knowledge‐that is ungradable, while epistemic gradualism argues the opposite. This paper purports to remodel the gradualism/absolutism debate. The current model initiated by Stephen Hetherington fails to capture the genuine divergence between the two views, which makes the debate equivocal, and the gradualist side lacks appeal. I propose that the remodeled debate should focus on whether knowledge‐that is a ‘threshold concept’ or a ‘spectrum concept’. That is, whether there is a threshold distinguishing knowledge from non‐knowledge. The reconstructed (...) model enjoys significant advantages as it enables the debate to be more balanced and philosophically interesting. (shrink)

Some empirical evidence in the artificial language acquisition literature has been taken to suggest that statistical learning mechanisms are insufficient for extracting structural information from an artificial language. According to the more than one mechanism (MOM) hypothesis, at least two mechanisms are required in order to acquire language from speech: (a) a statistical mechanism for speech segmentation; and (b) an additional rule-following mechanism in order to induce grammatical regularities. In this article, we present a set of neural network studies demonstrating (...) that a single statistical mechanism can mimic the apparent discovery of structural regularities, beyond the segmentation of speech. We argue that our results undermine one argument for the MOM hypothesis. (shrink)

The fundamental relations that underlie cognitive comparisons—“same” and “different”—can be defined at multiple levels of abstraction, which vary in relational complexity. We compared response times to decide whether or not two sequentially‐presented patterns, each composed of two pairs of colored squares, were the same at three levels of abstraction: perceptual, relational, and system (higher order relations). For both 150 ms and 5 s inter‐stimulus intervals (ISIs), both with and without a masking stimulus, decision time increased with level of abstraction. Sameness (...) at lower complexity levels contributed to decisions based on the higher levels. The pattern of comparison times across levelswas not predictable solely from encoding times. The results indicated that relations at multiple levels of complexity can be abstracted and compared in working memory, with higher complexity levels requiring more processing time. We simulated the impact of relational complexity on response time using Learning and Inference with Schemas and Analogies (LISA), a computational model of relational comparisons based on dynamic binding of elements into roles in a relational working memory. (shrink)

The fundamental relations that underlie cognitive comparisons—“same” and “different”—can be defined at multiple levels of abstraction, which vary in relational complexity. We compared response times to decide whether or not two sequentially‐presented patterns, each composed of two pairs of colored squares, were the same at three levels of abstraction: perceptual, relational, and system (higher order relations). For both 150 ms and 5 s inter‐stimulus intervals (ISIs), both with and without a masking stimulus, decision time increased with level of abstraction. Sameness (...) at lower complexity levels contributed to decisions based on the higher levels. The pattern of comparison times across levelswas not predictable solely from encoding times. The results indicated that relations at multiple levels of complexity can be abstracted and compared in working memory, with higher complexity levels requiring more processing time. We simulated the impact of relational complexity on response time using Learning and Inference with Schemas and Analogies (LISA), a computational model of relational comparisons based on dynamic binding of elements into roles in a relational working memory. (shrink)

Having encountered landmines in offering a critique of philosophy based on my experience as the mother of a cognitively disabled daughter, I ask, “Should I continue?” I defend the idea that pursuing this project is of a piece with the invisible care labor that is done by people with disabilities and their families. The value of attempting to influence philosophical conceptions of cognitive disability by virtue of this experience is justified by an inextricable relationship between the personal, the political, and (...) the philosophical. If one grants that the “special relationship” between mother and child requires moral recognition, then I need first to make vivid the case that this relationship in the case of a child who lacks some “normal capacities” is indistinguishable from any mother‐child relationship. If this is so, then I believe I can make a case that has as its conclusion that the moral personhood of even the severely cognitively disabled must be granted. Moreover, such recognition, I argue, necessitates the recognition of others who bear no special relationships to the child. (shrink)

Prior work shows that children selectively learn from credible speakers. Yet little is known how they treat information from non-credible speakers. This research examined to what extent and under what conditions children may or may not learn from problematic sources. In three studies, we found that children displayed trust toward previously inaccurate speakers. Children were equally likely to extend labels from previously accurate and inaccurate speakers to novel objects. Moreover, they expected third parties to share labels provided by previously inaccurate (...) speakers. Only when there was clear evidence that the speakers' information was wrong, did young children reject the label. Together, the findings provide evidence that young children do not completely ignore the labels supplied by non-credible speakers unless there is strong reason to do so. (shrink)

Using a survey of 393 employees who were natives and residents of China, Japan, and South Korea, we examined the extent to which employees from different countries within East Asia experience distributive justice when they perceived that their work outcomes relative to a referent other were equally poor, equally favorable, more poor, or more favorable. As predicted, we found that when employees perceived themselves relative to a referent other to be recipients of more favorable outcomes, Chinese and Korean employees were (...) less likely than Japanese employees to experience distributive injustice. We also found that these differences were partially mediated by employees’ level of materialism. Theoretical and practical implications of our findings are discussed. (shrink)

Perceptual judgments result from a dynamic process, but little is known about the dynamics of number‐line estimation. A recent study proposed a computational model that combined a model of trial‐to‐trial changes with a model for the internal scaling of discrete numbers. Here, we tested a surprising prediction of the model—a situation in which children's estimates of numerosity would be better than those of adults. Consistent with the model simulations, task contexts led to a clear developmental reversal: children made more adult‐like, (...) linear estimates when to‐be‐estimated numbers were descending over trials (i.e., backward condition), whereas adults became more like children with logarithmic estimates when numbers were ascending (i.e., forward condition). In addition, adults’ estimates were subject to inter‐trial differences regardless of stimulus order. In contrast, children were not able to use the trial‐to‐trial dynamics unless stimuli varied systematically, indicating the limited cognitive capacity for dynamic updates. Together, the model adequately predicts both developmental and trial‐to‐trial changes in number‐line tasks. (shrink)

In Simulation and Similarity, Michael Weisberg offers a similarity-based account of the model–world relation, which is the relation in virtue of which successful models are successful. Weisberg’s main idea is that models are similar to targets in virtue of sharing features. An important concern about Weisberg’s account is that it remains silent on what it means for models and targets to share features, and consequently on how feature-sharing contributes to models’ epistemic success. I consider three potential ways of concretizing the (...) concept of shared features: as identical, quantitatively sufficiently close, and sufficiently similar features. I argue that each of these concretizations faces significant challenges, leaving unclear how Weisberg’s account substantially contributes to elucidating the relation in virtue of which successful models are successful. Against this background, I outline a pluralistic revision and argue that this revision may not only help Weisberg's account evade several of the problems that I raise, but also offers a novel perspective on the model–world relation more generally. 1Introduction 2Weisberg’s Feature-Sharing Account 3What Is a Shared Feature? 3.1Identity 3.2Sufficient closeness 3.3Sufficient similarity 4Turning Weisberg’s Account ‘Upside Down’ 5Conclusion. (shrink)