This paper explores the relationship borne by the traditional paradoxes of set theory and semantics to formal incompleteness phenomena. A central tool is the application of the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem to systems of second-order arithmetic and set theory in which various “paradoxical notions” for first-order languages can be formalized. I will first discuss the setting in which this result was originally presented by Hilbert & Bernays (1939) and also how it was later adapted by Kreisel (1950) and Wang (1955) in (...) order to obtain formal undecidability results. A generalization of this method will then be presented whereby Russell’s paradox, a variant of Mirimanoff’s paradox, the Liar, and the Grelling–Nelson paradox may be uniformly transformed into incompleteness theorems. Some additional observations are then framed relating these results to the unification of the set theoretic and semantic paradoxes, the intensionality of arithmetization (in the sense of Feferman, 1960), and axiomatic theories of truth. (shrink)

It is often supposed that, unlike typical axioms of mathematics, the Continuum Hypothesis (CH) is indeterminate. This position is normally defended on the ground that the CH is undecidable in a way that typical axioms are not. Call this kind of undecidability “absolute undecidability”. In this paper, I seek to understand what absolute undecidability could be such that one might hope to establish that (a) CH is absolutely undecidable, (b) typical axioms are not absolutely undecidable, and (c) if a mathematical (...) hypothesis is absolutely undecidable, then it is indeterminate. I shall argue that on no understanding of absolute undecidability could one hope to establish all of (a)–(c). However, I will identify one understanding of absolute undecidability on which one might hope to establish both (a) and (c) to the exclusion of (b). This suggests that a new style of mathematical antirealism deserves attention—one that does not depend on familiar epistemological or ontological concerns. The key idea behind this view is that typical mathematical hypotheses are indeterminate because they are relevantly similar to CH. (shrink)

Provability logic is a modal logic for studying properties of provability predicates, and Interpretability logic for studying interpretability between logical theories. Their natural models are GL-models and Veltman models, for which the accessibility relation is well-founded. That’s why the usual counterexample showing the necessity of finite image property in Hennessy-Milner theorem (see [1]) doesn’t exist for them. However, we show that the analogous condition must still hold, by constructing two GL-models with worlds in them that are modally equivalent but not (...) bisimilar, and showing how these GL-models can be converted to Veltman models with the same properties. In the process we develop some useful constructions: games on Veltman models, chains, and general method of transformation from GL-models/frames to Veltman ones. (shrink)

This article is about Avicenna’s account of syllogisms comprising opposite premises. We examine the applications and the truth conditions of these syllogisms. Finally, we discuss the relation between these syllogisms and the principle of non-contradiction.

In this paper, we describe "metaphysical reductions", in which the well-defined terms and predicates of arbitrary mathematical theories are uniquely interpreted within an axiomatic, metaphysical theory of abstract objects. Once certain (constitutive) facts about a mathematical theory T have been added to the metaphysical theory of objects, theorems of the metaphysical theory yield both an analysis of the reference of the terms and predicates of T and an analysis of the truth of the sentences of T. The well-defined terms and (...) predicates of T are analyzed as denoting abstract objects and abstract relations, respectively, in the background metaphysics, and the sentences of T have a reading on which they are true. After the technical details are sketched, the paper concludes with some observations about the approach. One important observation concerns the fact that the proper axioms of the background theory abstract objects can be reformulated in a way that makes them sound more like logical axioms. Some philosophers have argued that we should accept (something like) them as being logical. (shrink)

In this paper we study several translations that map models and formulae of the language of second-order arithmetic to models and formulae of the language of truth. These translations are useful because they allow us to exploit results from the extensive literature on arithmetic to study the notion of truth. Our purpose is to present these connections in a systematic way, generalize some well-known results in this area, and to provide a number of new results. Sections 3 and 4 contain (...) some recursion- and proof-theoretic results about Kripke-style fixed-point theories of truth. Section 5 shows how to derive full second-order arithmetic from principles of truth. Section 6 investigates the proof-theoretic strength of disquotation without an arithmetical base theory. (shrink)

The idea of interpretability logics arose in Visser [Vis90]. He introduced the logics as extensions of the provability logic GLwith a binary modality. The arithmetic realization of A B in a theory T will be that T plus the realization of B is interpretable in T plus the realization of A. More precisely, there exists a function f on the formulas of the language of T such that T + B C implies T + A f.The interpretability logics were considered (...) in several papers. An arithmetic completeness of the interpretability logic ILM, obtained by adding Montagna ''s axiom to the smallest interpretability logic IL, was proved in Berarducci [Ber90] and Shavrukov [Sha88]. [Vis90] proved that the interpretability logic ILP, an extension of IL, is also complete for another arithmetic interpretation. The completeness with respect to Kripke semantics due to Veltman was, for IL, ILMand ILP, proved in de Jongh and Veltman [JV90]. The fixed point theorem of GLcan be extended to ILand hence ILMand ILP. The unary pendant "T interprets T + A" is much less expressive and was studied in de Rijke [Rij92]. For an overview of interpretability logic, see Visser [Vis97], and Japaridze and de Jongh [JJ98]. (shrink)

We introduce a nonstandard arithmetic $NQA^-$ based on the theory developed by R. Chuaqui and P. Suppes in [2] (we will denote it by $NQA^+$ ), with a weakened external open minimization schema. A finitary consistency proof for $NQA^-$ formalizable in PRA is presented. We also show interesting facts about the strength of the theories $NQA^-$ and $NQA^+$ ; $NQA^-$ is mutually interpretable with $I\Delta_0 + EXP$ , and on the other hand, $NQA^+$ interprets the theories IΣ1 and $WKL_0$.

This paper is an investigation into what could be a goodexplication of ``theory S is reducible to theory T''''. Ipresent an axiomatic approach to reducibility, which is developedmetamathematically and used to evaluate most of the definitionsof ``reducible'''' found in the relevant literature. Among these,relative interpretability turns out to be most convincing as ageneral reducibility concept, proof-theoreticalreducibility being its only serious competitor left. Thisrelation is analyzed in some detail, both from the point of viewof the reducibility axioms and of modal logic.

In this paper we investigate strong logics of first and second order that have certain absoluteness properties. We begin with an investigation of first order logic and the strong logics ω-logic and β-logic, isolating two facets of absoluteness, namely, generic invariance and faithfulness. It turns out that absoluteness is relative in the sense that stronger background assumptions secure greater degrees of absoluteness. Our aim is to investigate the hierarchies of strong logics of first and second order that are generically invariant (...) and faithful against the backdrop of the strongest large cardinal hypotheses. We show that there is a close correspondence between the two hierarchies and we characterize the strongest logic in each hierarchy. On the first-order side, this leads to a new presentation of Woodin's Ω-logic. On the second-order side, we compare the strongest logic with full second-order logic and argue that the comparison lends support to Quine's claim that second-order logic is really set theory in sheep's clothing. (shrink)

Interpretability logic is a modal formalization of relative interpretability between first‐order arithmetical theories. Verbrugge semantics is a generalization of Veltman semantics, the basic semantics for interpretability logic. Bisimulation is the basic equivalence between models for modal logic. We study various notions of bisimulation between Verbrugge models and develop a new one, which we call w‐bisimulation. We show that the new notion, while keeping the basic property that bisimilarity implies modal equivalence, is weak enough to allow the converse to hold in (...) the finitary case. To do this, we develop and use an appropriate notion of bisimulation games between Verbrugge models. (shrink)

This paper is the first in a series of three related papers on modal methods in interpretability logics and applications. In this first paper the fundaments are laid for later results. These fundaments consist of a thorough treatment of a construction method to obtain modal models. This construction method is used to reprove some known results in the area of interpretability like the modal completeness of the logic IL. Next, the method is applied to obtain new results: the modal completeness (...) of the logic ILMo, and modal completeness of ILW*. (shrink)

The symmetries between points and lines in planar projective geometry and between points and planes in solid projective geometry are striking features of these geometries that were extensively discussed during the nineteenth century under the labels “duality” or “reciprocity.” The aims of this article are, first, to provide a systematic analysis of duality from a modern point of view, and, second, based on this, to give a historical overview of how discussions about duality evolved during the nineteenth century. Specifically, we (...) want to see in which ways geometers’ preoccupation with duality was shaped by developments that lead to modern logic towards the end of the nineteenth century, and how these developments in turn might have been influenced by reflections on duality. (shrink)

This paper contains a completeness proof for the system ILW, a rather bewildering axiom system belonging to the family of interpretability logics. We have treasured this little proof for a considerable time, keeping it just for ourselves. Johan’s ftieth birthday appears to be the right occasion to get it out of our wine cellar.