Within philosophy, the word “possible” is generally used to speak about either of the following. (1) Possibility: the notion that is expressed by sentences such as “It is possible that there are green cats,” “She may become the best surgeon in the city,” and “Our team can win the race.” Among the features of possibility, three are of particular interest to philosophers: it is closely related with necessity, contingency, and actuality; it is not unified, but comes in multiple varieties; it (...) is intuitively linked to conceivability. (2) The possible: the target of sentences expressing a possibility, i.e., whatever is possible. Philosophical inquiry is notably interested in the existence and the nature of possible things. For those who think possible things exist, the challenge is to say how and where. For those who think possible things do not exist, the challenge is to say how sentences stating a possibility can be true. (shrink)

Von Wright’s philosophy is seldom seen as original when compared to that of his master, Ludwig Wittgenstein. Contrary to that orientation, this work seeks to establish the opposition of von Wright to Wittgenstein in relation to the question of whether ethics is an area where logic can legitimately extend. For Wittgenstein, logic deals with what is necessarily true. On the basis of this characterization of logic, Wittgenstein thinks that logic cannot legitimately help to capture ethics for the reason that the (...) referents of ethical discourse are not in the world. Only the referents of scientific discourse are there. For Wittgenstein, therefore, we must adopt a mystical position in ethics both by giving it the greatest importance but also by applying the greatest silence. Von Wright admits, following Wittgenstein, the varieties of goodness. However, he stresses that the varieties of goodness do not leave room for absolute relativism. Norms have both a prescriptive dimension that can be relative to a culture, and a descriptive dimension that makes them assessable to logical standards. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the possibility of reading the description of promise presented by Reinach in The Apriori Foundations of the Civil Law under the light of Husserl’s Ideas I. In order to present my argument, first, I briefly present the phenomenological method proposed by Husserl in Ideas I highlighting eidetic reduction. Second, I present the Reinachian description of social acts emphasizing the act of promising. Third, and finally, I try to demonstrate that the Reinachian description of the social (...) act of promising is the description of a universal and necessary relation, a synthetic and a priori statement and corresponds to the idea of promise. (shrink)

Special issue: "Reflecting on the Legacy of C.I. Lewis: Contemporary and Historical Perspectives on Modal Logic".

It is well known that systems of action deontic logic emerging from a standard analysis of permission in terms of possibility of doing an action without incurring in a violation of the law are subject to paradoxes. In general, paradoxes are acknowledged as such if we have intuitions telling us that things should be different. The aim of this paper is to introduce a paradox-free deontic action system by (i) identifying the basic intuitions leading to the emergence of the paradoxes (...) and (ii) exploiting these intuitions in order to develop a consistent deontic framework, where it can be shown why some phenomena seem to be paradoxical and why they are not so if interpreted in a correct way. (shrink)

Conditional logics were originally developed for the purpose of modeling intuitively correct modes of reasoning involving conditional—especially counterfactual—expressions in natural language. While the debate over the logic of conditionals is as old as propositional logic, it was the development of worlds semantics for modal logic in the past century that catalyzed the rapid maturation of the field. Moreover, like modal logic, conditional logic has subsequently found a wide array of uses, from the traditional (e.g. counterfactuals) to the exotic (e.g. conditional (...) obligation). Despite the close connections between conditional and modal logic, both the technical development and philosophical exploitation of the latter has outstripped that of the former, with the result that noticeable lacunae exist in the literature on conditional logic. My dissertation addresses a number of these underdeveloped frontiers, producing new technical insights and philosophical applications. -/- I contribute to the solution of a problem posed by Priest of finding sound and complete labeled tableaux for systems of conditional logic from Lewis' V-family. To develop these tableaux, I draw on previous work on labeled tableaux for modal and conditional logic; errors and shortcomings in recent work on this problem are identified and corrected. While modal logic has by now been thoroughly studied in non-classical contexts, e.g. intuitionistic and relevant logic, the literature on conditional logic is still overwhelmingly classical. Another contribution of my dissertation is a thorough analysis of intuitionistic conditional logic, in which I utilize both algebraic and worlds semantics, and investigate how several novel embedding results might shed light on the philosophical interpretation of both intuitionistic logic and conditional logic extensions thereof. -/- My dissertation examines deontic and connexive conditional logic as well as the underappreciated history of connexive notions in the analysis of conditional obligation. The possibility of interpreting deontic modal logics in such systems (via embedding results) serves as an important theoretical guide. A philosophically motivated proscription on impossible obligations is shown to correspond to, and justify, certain (weak) connexive theses. Finally, I contribute to the intensifying debate over counterpossibles, counterfactuals with impossible antecedents, and take—in contrast to Lewis and Williamson—a non-vacuous line. Thus, in my view, a counterpossible like "If there had been a counterexample to the law of the excluded middle, Brouwer would not have been vindicated" is false, not (vacuously) true, although it has an impossible antecedent. I exploit impossible (non-normal) worlds—originally developed to model non-normal modal logics—to provide non-vacuous semantics for counterpossibles. I buttress the case for non-vacuous semantics by making recourse to both novel technical results and theoretical considerations. (shrink)

The notion of an ideal reasoner has several uses in epistemology. Often, ideal reasoners are used as a parameter of (maximum) rationality for finite reasoners (e.g. humans). However, the notion of an ideal reasoner is normally construed in such a high degree of idealization (e.g. infinite/unbounded memory) that this use is unadvised. In this dissertation, I investigate the conditions under which an ideal reasoner may be used as a parameter of rationality for finite reasoners. In addition, I present and justify (...) the research program of computational epistemology, which investigates the parameter of maximum rationality for finite reasoners using computer simulations. (shrink)

A dynamic semantics for iffy oughts offers an attractive alternative to the folklore that Chisholm's paradox enforces an unhappy choice between the intuitive inference rules of factual and deontic detachment. The first part of the story told here shows how a dynamic theory about ifs and oughts gives rise to a nonmonotonic perspective on deontic discourse and reasoning that elegantly removes the air of paradox from Chisholm's puzzle without sacrificing any of the two detachment principles. The second part of the (...) story showcases two bonus applications of the framework suggested here: it offers a response to Forrester's gentle murder paradox and avoids Kolodny and MacFarlane's miners paradox about deontic reasoning under epistemic uncertainty. A comparison between the dynamic semantic proposal made in this paper and a more conservative approach combining a static semantics with a dynamic pragmatics is provided. (shrink)

Vít Gvoždiak published a reconciliatory analysis of Searle’s social ontology with semiotics in Gvoždiak (2012). Without prior knowledge of his paper, an analysis of the same subject appeared in Msimang (2014). Even though Searle’s social ontology is a common point of reference in the formulation of semiotics in these papers, it also serves as a point of departure in their understanding of semiotics and its development. The semiotic theory expressed in Gvoždiak (2012) is an inherently linguistic (speech act centred) theory, (...) whereas the semiotic theory presented in Msimang (2014) tends more towards a general theory of communicative systems in which social ontology, which follows from speech act theory, is an interesting part. It is my purpose in this note to contrast the two positions of semiotic theory as they appear in the aforementioned papers in reference to their appropriation of Searle’s social ontology. (shrink)

Este texto tem como objetivo apresentar a principal motivação filosófica para se defender uma teoria causal da memória, que é explicar como pode um evento que se deu no passado estar relacionado a uma experiência mnêmica que se dá no presente. Para tanto, iniciaremos apresentando a noção de memória de maneira informal e geral, para depois apresentar elementos mais detalhados. Finalizamos apresentando uma teoria causal da memória que se beneficia da noção de veritação (truthmaking).

This article strives to provide an original conceptual frame- work that should open a way to clarification of general philosophical debates on rules and norms. It makes a clear distinction between rules understood as social facts grounded on specific relation- ships between social subjects and rules understood as linguistic entities. Norms are taken as specific social rules and divided into three different types: social constitutive norms, particular constitutive norms, and institutional norms. Attention is also devoted to relation between normality and (...) normativity, to the role of permissions and to specific features of technological ‘rules’. In the last part of the article the outlined conceptual apparatus is employed for analysis of two passages from Wittgenstein’s Investigations. (shrink)

I was quite excited when I first read Restall and Russell’s (2010) paper. For two reasons. First, because the paper provides rigorous formulations and formal proofs of implication barrier the- ses, namely “theses [which] deny that one can derive sentences of one type from sentences of another”. Second (and primarily), because the paper proves a general theorem, the Barrier Con- struction Theorem, which unifies implication barrier theses concerning four topics: generality, necessity, time, and normativity. After thinking about the paper, I (...) am satisfied with its treatment of the first three topics, namely generality, necessity, and time. But I am not satisfied with its treatment of normativity, so my comments are exclusively on that topic. (shrink)

El objeto principal de este trabajo consiste en discutir una propuesta de C. Alchourrón y A. Martino para hacer frente al problema de la fundamentación de la lógica deóntica, planteado por el dilema de Jørgensen. La propuesta criticada se basa en la idea de que no existe obstáculo alguno en compatibilizar la idea de que las normas carecen de valor de verdad con la idea de que poseen una lógica, una vez que se renuncia al "prejuicio filosófico" de que es (...) indispensable caracterizar semánticamente las relaciones y propiedades lógicas y se explica la lógica a partir de la noción abstracta de consecuencia, desligándola de las nociones de verdad y falsedad. Sostienen que el significado de los operadores deónticos, al igual que el de los términos lógicos en la deducción natural, puede quedar totalmente expresado una vez que se explicita su uso mediante reglas de introducción y eliminación. Para ilustrar su propuesta, pretenden ofrecer una fundamentación puramente sintáctica de la lógica deóntica standard. Mis críticas se centran en tres puntos: a) no utilizan auténticas reglas de introducción para los operadores deónticos; b) no derivan la lógica deóntica standard como pretenden haber hecho, y c) no se establecen criterios para relacionar las fórmulas del cálculo con el lenguaje normativo ordinario, con lo que no existen razones para considerar que se trata de una lógica deóntica. Defiendo la idea de que, a los fines de fundamentar semánticamente la lógica deóntica, sólo es necesario que existan interpretaciones admisibles que atribuyan valores de verdad a las normas, y que este requisito es cumplido por la semántica usual de la lógica deóntica standard, con lo que el dilema de Jørgensen resulta ser un seudoproblema. In this paper I discuss a proposal from C. Alchourrón and A. Martino with which they try to face the problem posed to the foundation of deontic logic by Jørgensen' s dilemma. Their proposal is based on the idea that there is no problem at all in compatibilizing the fact that norms lack truth values with their possession of a logic, once it is denied that it is absolutely necessary to offer a semantic characterization of logical properties and relations, and the abstract notion of consequence is taken as primitive. They claim that the meaning of deontic operators, like that of logical terms in natural deduction, is completely expressed through their use, which is explained by means of rules of introduction and elimination. As an illustration, they present a calculus with which they intend to offer a foundation for standard deontic logic. I make three objections: a) They don' t use real rules of introduction for deontic operators; b) They don' t have derived standard deontic logic as they claim; c) There are no criteria for relating the formulas with ordinary normative discourse; so there are no reasons for considering their calculus as a deontic logic. I claim that, in order to give a semantical foundation to deontic logic it is only necessary that there are admissible interpretations that assign truth values to norms, and that this requisite is satisfied by the usual semantic of standard deontic logic. I conclude that Jørgensen' s dilemma is a pseudoproblem. (shrink)

Kulicki and Trypuz (2016) introduced three systems of multivalued deontic action logic to handle normative conflicts. The first system suggests a pessimistic view on normative conflicts, according to which any conflicting option represents something forbidden; the second system suggests an optimistic view, according to which any conflicting option represents something obligatory; finally, the third system suggests a neutral view, according to which any conflicting option represents something that is neither obligatory nor forbidden. The aim of the present paper is to (...) propose a fourth system in this family, which comes with a realistic view on normative conflicts: a normative conflict remains unsolved unless it is generated by two or more normative sources that can be compared. In accordance with this, we will provide a more refined formal framework for the family of systems at issue, which allows for explicit reference to sources of norms. Conflict resolution is thus a consequence of a codified hierarchy of normative sources. (shrink)

Desires matter. How are we to understand the intentionality of desire? According to the two classical views, desire is either a positive evaluation or a disposition to act: to desire a state is to positively evaluate it or to be disposed to act to realize it. This Ph.D. Dissertation examines these conceptions of desire and proposes a deontic alternative inspired by Meinong. On this view, desiring is representing a state of affairs as what ought to be or, if one prefers, (...) as what should be. Desire involves a deontic manner of representing: a norm of the ought-to-be type features in desire’s intentional mode, as opposed to content. The dissertation is structured in three parts. In order to defend this conception, I formulate three main desiderata for a promising theory of the intentionality of desire in the introduction (§0). The first concerns desire’s direction of fit, i.e. the intuition that the world should conform to our desires. The second concerns the death of desire principle, i.e. the intuition that one cannot desire what one represents as actual. The last pertains to desire’s role in psychological explanations, i.e. the intuition that desires can explain some mental states and be explained by other mental states. The first part examines the main conceptions of desire in light of these desiderata. I argue that the classical pictures of desire do not adequately meet our desiderata. The first chapter is devoted to the evaluative conception (§1), while the second examines the motivational approach (§2). Following these criticisms, I then present the deontic view of desire (§3). In the second part, I defend this conception with the help of three arguments. The main idea is that appealing to norms of the ought-to-be type can satisfy our chief desiderata: the world should conform to norms (world-to-mind direction of fit, §4), norms are grounded on values and in turn ground obligations (explanation, §5), and norms are about non-actual states of affairs (death of desire principle, §6). In the last part, I develop the deontic view to draw a cartography of the various types of desire. Some desires are correct, while others are inappropriate. This distinction is explained by the deontic conception, as it matches that between states of affairs that ought to obtain and states that should not obtain (§7). Two study cases are examined: caprice and the impermissibility of desire aggregation. Intuitively, hopes, wishes, or urges are types of desire. The next chapter presents a typology inspired by the deontic view and the type of norms there are (§8). The last chapter discusses the main objections to the deontic approach (§9). In conclusion, I show the relevance of the deontic view for several debates in philosophy of mind and ethics. Desires are crucial because they are the ‘eye’ of what should be. (shrink)

STIT logic is a prominent framework for the analysis of multi-agent choice-making. In the available deontic extensions of STIT, the principle of Ought-implies-Can (OiC) fulfills a central role. However, in the philosophical literature a variety of alternative OiC interpretations have been proposed and discussed. This paper provides a modular framework for deontic STIT that accounts for a multitude of OiC readings. In particular, we discuss, compare, and formalize ten such readings. We provide sound and complete sequent-style calculi for all of (...) the various STIT logics accommodating these OiC principles. We formally analyze the resulting logics and discuss how the different OiC principles are logically related. In particular, we propose an endorsement principle describing which OiC readings logically commit one to other OiC readings. (shrink)