In a characteristically iconoclastic essay, “Does the State Have a Monopoly to Punish Crime?”, Douglas Husak argues that the state’s moral right to punish crime is all but self-evident while its supposed monopoly on punishment is a fiction. Husak draws this bracing conclusion from a modest, quasi-Lockean premise – that persons and other entities have a right to impose stigmatizing deprivations on those who wrong them. This premise evokes John Locke’s far stronger claim that everyone enjoys a natural right to (...) inflict potentially severe sanctions on any wrongdoer. The quasi-Lockean premise also evokes the familiar idea that all criminal wrongdoing is an attack on the broader community, and that law-breakers consequently owe a debt to society that they can repay through punishment. In this essay, I argue that the inferences Husak draws from the quasi-Lockean premise are unsound, but for reasons that reveal important lessons about the state’s right to punish crime and about the limits of what we can extract from the venerable idea that a central victim of criminal wrongdoing is the community as a whole. In Part II, I argue that the quasi-Lockean premise does not ground the state’s right to punish the kind of wrongs traditionally thought central to the criminal law, namely, wrongs perpetrated on individual human victims. In Part III, I answer Husak’s implicit challenge to describe a kind of stigmatizing deprivation – a kind of punishment – that the state alone has a right to inflict. I suggest that no entity but the state may inflict sanctions that constitute prima facie invasions of moral rights. (shrink)

Contemporary sociology mirrors Western society in its general aversion and sensitivity to pain, and in its view of pain as an unproductive threat to cultures and identities. This highlights the deconstructive capacities of pain, and marginalizes collectively authorized practices that embrace it as constitutive of cultural meanings and social relationships. After exploring the particularity of this Western orientation to pain — by situating it against processes of instrumentalization and medicalization, and within a broader context of other social developments conducive to (...) a heightening of affect control — this article builds on Mauss’s analysis of ‘body techniques’ in suggesting that the cultural, physiological and psychological dimensions of pain can be combined in various ways. In examining this point further, we then compare contrasting religious engagements with pain as a way of detailing how it can be positively productive of cultural meanings and identities, and conclude by using these comparisons to illuminate the relationship between the current Western approach to pain and the Christian traditions that shaped the West historically. (shrink)

Perhaps the most engaging theories in historical sociology have been those pertaining to the rationalization of Western society. In particular, both Max Weber and Michelle Foucault point to the unique nature of societal rationalization in the early modern period, a thorough-going upheaval both in forms of social organization and in individual subjectivity. These correlative changes led to the nature of the modern state and its citizens. One example used by both is the rationalization of warfare. Close attention to the question (...) of rationalization and the history of infantry warfare, however, suggests that far from representing a watershed change from non-rationalized to rationalized war, the early-modern period was more like other rapid expansions of armies based on recruitment of commoners, and had little to do with the distinctive characteristics of the emerging nation-states. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This essay calls attention to two blind spots in Power Without Knowledge. First, the book has little to say about the role that political institutions can play in promoting effective democratic governance. Drawing on the “mixed government” tradition, I argue that properly designed institutions can correct for the epistemic deficits that Friedman describes by creating what I call the “pressure to conflict.” Second and more importantly, the book has nothing to say about the role of responsible leadership in a (...) democratic technocracy. Drawing on Max Weber’s analysis of the ethics of responsibility and the ethics of conviction, I argue that responsible leadership can promote judicious technocracy in a dynamic that I call the “spiral of responsibility.” The responsible leader recognizes that to recuse oneself from the exercise of technocratic power is to empower the unscrupulous and irresponsible. According to Weber, any theory of politics that fails to embrace the ethics of responsibility will therefore occupy an uneasy middle ground between quietism and enthusiasm. This, I fear, is where Power Without Knowledge may leave us. (shrink)

At the end of the 19th century, violent attacks by so-called anarchists gave the anarchist movement an increased amount of publicity. In the meantime, the success of “scientific socialism” promoted rationality to the rank of a new political doctrine. This article analyses the joint criticism of violence and materialism in the discourse of Gustav Landauer (1870-1919). The German philosopher and revolutionary made an original contribution to anarchism in theorising its incompatibility with violent means of action. He also made a crucial (...) move for the theory of ideas in affirming that reason was not the solution, but often the cause of violence. (shrink)

Contemporary arguments about private paramilitary organizations often focus on the threat of physical violence that they pose to the state: if such organizations garner enough physical power, then they can overtake the state via violent coup. Inspired by the legalist scholar Han Feizi’s position, we contend that such organizations also represent a sociopolitical, existential threat to the state. Specifically, their tendency for ideological expansion and subsequent gathering of political influence undermines state institutions, even without the use of overt physical force. (...) Consequently, the sociopolitical enterprise of having a unified, stable state is incompatible with the existence of, and public political support for, private paramilitary organizations, regardless of their actual or potential physical power. This argument succeeds regardless of the moral status of such paramilitary groups. Such groups, when they match the essential components of the description Han Feizi provides, are practically and politically antithetical to the integrity of the state. (shrink)

Multiculturalism is, among other things, an attitude toward values - hence, an ethic of a kind. The question it poses, however, is what kind of ethics are possible when it is assumed that the one world culture that stood behind classical social ethics no longer pertains. The issue binds most strictly when it is further assumed that social ethics entail political commitments to change the worlds. Hence, the practical consideration of whether or not plural worlds of incommensurable values allow for (...) ethical strategies sufficient to change for the better - where ‘better’ is itself open to doubt. (shrink)

The paper seeks to address the lag between, on the one hand, existing ethical and socio-political frameworks and, on the other hand, developments in the realm of techno-science. I argue that the growing power of science and technology has been fed by, and has itself fed, the confrontation of instrumentalism and autonomy defining the modern condition. Conversely, the project of self-management of techno-science by citizens needs to proceed by binding ethical and democratic dimensions of the problem, as well as the (...) public and subjective elements of autonomous existence. Techno-science can only be ‘ethicalized’ if it is enframed in vibrant public spaces, at the same time as its democratization depends upon subjects’ sense of conscience and social responsibility. Key Words: autonomy • democracy • ethics • public sphere • technoscience. (shrink)

Charles Taber and Milton Lodge provide compelling evidence that people's minds may be closed to information that is inconsistent with their prior beliefs. This type of inconsistency has often been termed ?irrational.? However, recent research suggests that being open or closed minded is not an unchanging variable but depends on one's goals, including one's need for closure, which vary from person to person and situation to situation. In this vein, as Taber and Lodge suggest, those who have more political information (...) may, after having been open minded enough to acquire the information, become closed minded by virtue of having acquired it. At the same time, being more open minded to inaccurate information might lead one in the wrong direction; hence, open mindedness does not necessarily enhance the accuracy of one's judgments or the quality of one's decisions. We may need to rethink the concept of an enlightened, well-informed electorate, to the extent that it assumes the unqualified benefits of open mindedness. (shrink)

Theories of global justice have moved from issues relating to crimes against humanity and war crimes or, furthermore, ?negative duties? with respect to non-citizens, towards problems of distributive justice and global inequality. Thomas Nagel's Storrs Lectures from 2005, exemplifying Rawlsian internationalism, argue that liberal requirements concerning duties of distributive justice apply exclusively within a single nation-state, and do not extend to duties of this nature between rich and poor countries. Nagel even argues that the demand for global equality is not (...) a demand of justice at all. In the present article I will try to offer a normative basis for the criticism of such a view. Following Kant and more recently Philip Pettit, I locate this normative basis on political freedom conceived as non-domination. Such a conception opens up the possibility of a political cosmopolitanism, which is based not on an empirical interdependence among people at a global level, but on a normative interdependence. Subsequent cosmopolitan duties extend both to the elimination of domination everywhere in the world and to the equal enjoyment of non-dominated choice. Thus, it will be argued that modern republicanism is falsely identified with a particular, bounded community, but supports a political, not simply a moral, cosmopolitanism. This kind of cosmopolitanism conceives of sovereign states neither as useless constructions, nor as mere instruments for realizing the pre-institutional value of justice among human beings. Instead, their existence is what gives the value of justice its application. Cosmopolitanism is not after all about the abolishment of all boundaries, but about the essential capacity to draw and redraw them infinitely under conditions of global justice. (shrink)

Though questions of political obligation have long been central to liberal political theory, discussion has generally focused on voluntaristic aspects of the individual's relationship to the state, as opposed to other factors through which the state is able to ground compliance with its laws. The individual has been conceptualized as naturally without political ties, whether or not formally in a state of nature, and questions of political obligation have centered on accounting for political bonds.Footnotes* For helpful comments on and discussion (...) of earlier drafts of this paper, I am grateful to the other contributors to this volume, the editors of Social Philosophy and Policy, Colin Bird, Richard Dagger, Joshua Dienstag, Charles Kromkowski, David Mapel, Debra Morris, John Simmons, Vivian Thomson, and Steven Wall. (shrink)

The practical failure to understand in conflicts, where participants routinely challenge each other’s attribution of meaning, undermines the key assumption of the Weberian interpretive project: that the subject acts meaningfully. This article revisits Weber’s concept of meaning as an object of understanding for a social scientist. Ascertaining the empirical fact of subjective attribution, as Weber advised, may not be sufficient when it comes to understanding action whose meaning is disputed. The article uses the example of E.P. Thompson’s interpretation of eighteenth-century (...) English food riots to show that the disputed empirical meaning is a product of rational understanding, which Weber would classify as dogmatic meaning. The social scientist fails to understand what the critic claims to: a failure to act meaningfully in cultural terms. Furthermore, because the subject acts meaningfully without fail, we close off the option of explaining conflict as a rational disagreement. (shrink)

Intellectual knowledge is omnipresent in human lives and decisions. We are constantly trying to make good and correct decisions. However, responsible decision-making is characterised by rather difficult epistemic conditions. It applies all the more during the pandemic when decisions require not only specialised knowledge in a number of disciplines, scientific consensus, and participants from different fields, but also responsibility and respect for moral principles in order to ensure that the human rights of all groups are observed. Pandemic measures are created (...) by politicians, healthcare policy-makers, and epidemiologists. However, what is the role of ethics as a moral philosophy and experts in ethics? Experts in ethics and philosophy are carefully scrutinising political decisions. Levy and Savulescu have claimed that Ethicists and philosophers are not epistemically arrogant if they question policy responses. They played an important role in the creation of a reliable consensus. This study analyses epistemic and moral responsibility, their similarities, analogies, and differences. Are they interconnected? What is their relationship and how can they be filled with actual content during the pandemic? (shrink)

Despite his strong commitment to the ideal of _wuwei_ statecraft, Mencius advanced a distinct yet cohesive theory of Confucian _youwei_ statecraft that can serve the ideal of _wuwei_, first by means of the principled application of individual and social responsibility under unfavorable socioeconomic conditions, and second by offering a concrete public policy (i.e. the well-field system) that contributes to a decent socioeconomic condition on which the society can be self-governing and where individuals (and families) can fully exercise their individual moral (...) and socioeconomic responsibility. My central claim is that Confucian _wuwei_ statecraft has a practical and social background, namely, a socioeoconomically and morally self-governing civil society. (shrink)

The first book-length treatment of Paul Ricoeur's conception of philosophy as critical theory.

This paper provides a critical interpretation of the theme, point, and methodological status of Adorno’s so-called negative dialectic. The theme at issue, ‘non-identity’, comes in several varieties; and the point of Adorno’s dialectic, namely reconciliation, is multifaceted. Exploration of those topics shows that negative dialectic seques into substantive doctrines, including a version of transcendentalism and a claim about deformation. The peculiar methodological status of negative dialectic explains that adumbration. In the appraisive register, my principal contentions include these: Adorno’s transcendentalism makes (...) some sense of the aforementioned deformation claim; and negative dialectic qua method avoids mystery and metaphysical excess. (shrink)

This article starts with a critical reflection on John Westlake’s reading of the history of empire and the English/British East India Company – for him, essentially, the proper concern of ‘constitutional history’ rather than international law. For Westlake, approaching this history through the prism of nineteenth-century positivist doctrine, the Company’s exercise of war powers could only result from state delegation. Against his warnings to international lawyers not to stray from the proper boundaries of international legal inquiry, the article proceeds to (...) recover Hugo Grotius’s theory of corporate belligerency in his early treatise De iure praedae. For Grotius, corporations could wage public war on behalf of the state yet, at the same time, were in law capable of waging private war in their own right. The article proceeds to reflect on the practice of corporate belligerency in the centuries separating Westlake and Grotius; it concludes with observations on the implications of Grotius’s theory of corporate belligerency today. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the relations between a liberal group of sex reformers, consisting of writers and literary critics, and physicians from the Polish Eugenics Society in interwar Poland. It illustrates the paradoxes of the mutual co-operation between these two groups during the 1930s and analyses the reason why compulsory sterilisation was rejected by politicians. From the early 1930s two movements began to forge an alliance in Poland: the sexual reform movement which advocated freedom of the individual, and eugenics, which (...) called for limiting the freedom of the individual for the collective good. This paper draws attention to several issues which emerged as part of this collaboration: population politics, the relationship between reformers, eugenicists and state institutions, and the question of how both movements—eugenics and sexual reform—perceived the question of sexuality, birth control and abortion. It will also focus on those aspects of their thinking that led to mutual co-operation. (shrink)

Liberal political theory is all too familiar with the divide between classical and welfare-state liberals. Classical liberals, as we all know, insist on the importance of small government, negative liberty, and private property. Welfare-state liberals, on the other hand, although they too stress civil rights, tend to be sympathetic to “positive liberty,” are for a much more expansive government, and are often ambivalent about private property. Although I do not go so far as to entirely deny the usefulness of this (...) familiar distinction, I think in many ways it is misleading. In an important sense, most free-market liberals are also “welfare-state” liberals. I say this because the overwhelming number of liberals, of both the pro-market and the pro-government variety, entertain a welfarist conception of political economy. On this dominant welfarist view, the ultimate justification of the politico-economic order is that it promotes human welfare. Traditional “welfare-state liberals” such as Robert E. Goodin manifestly adopt this welfarist conception. But it is certainly not only interventionists such as Goodin who insist that advancing welfare is the overriding goal of normative political economy. J. R. McCulloch, one of the great nineteenth-century laissez-faire political economists, was adamant that “freedom is not, as some appear to think, the end of government: the advancement of public prosperity and happiness is its end.” To be sure, McCulloch would have disagreed with Goodin about the optimal welfare-maximizing economic policy: the welfarist ideal, he and his fellow classical political economists believed, would best be advanced by provision of a legal and institutional framework — most importantly, the laws of property, contract, and the criminal code — that allows individuals to pursue their own interests in the market and, by so doing, promote public welfare. In general, what might be called the “classical-liberal welfare state” claims to advance welfare by providing the framework for individuals to seek wealth for themselves, while welfarists such as Goodin insist that a market order is seriously flawed as a mechanism for advancing human welfare and, in addition, that government has the competency to “correct market failures” in the provision of welfare. (shrink)

Weber's theory of value spheres outlines a project of institutional polytheism, each ordered around a ‘god’. This suggests not only that social theory can build a religious sociology, but that a theory of institutions must be an exercise in comparative religions. Weber's comparative sociology of religions, however, does not align with his theory of value spheres in terms of his distinction between polytheism and monotheism, transcendence and immanence, salvation and mysticism, being possessed and possessing. A theory of institutional logics points (...) beyond Weber's separation of value and instrumental rationality, faith and practice, and hence the ways in which he partitioned the institutions of modernity. (shrink)

ABSTRACTNormative political epistemologists, such as epistemic democrats, study whether political decision makers can, in principle, be expected to know what they need to know if they are to make wise public policy. Empirical political epistemologists study the content and sources of real-world political actors' knowledge and interpretations of knowledge. In recent years, empirical political epistemologists have taken up the study of the ideas of political actors other than voters, such as bureaucrats and politicians. Normative political epistemologists could follow this lead (...) if they were to focus on the technocratic orientation of nearly all political actors in the West: that is, on their desire to solve social and economic problems. Since most technocratic policy is made by political elites, the reliability of elites' knowledge of the causes of and cures for social and economic problems is a natural topic for normative political epistemology. (shrink)

Deontological (as opposed to consequentialist) liberals treat freedom of action as an end in itself, not a means to other ends. Yet logically, when one makes a deliberate choice, one treats freedom of action as if it were not an end in itself, for one uses this freedom as a means to the ends one hopes to achieve through one's action. The tension between deontology and the logic of choice is reflected in the paradoxical nature of the ?right to do (...) wrong?; and in Rawls's unsuccessful attempts to justify to acting agents their interest in such a right, embodied in his conception of agents as ?self-validating sources of claims.? A self-validating source of claims is akin to God as envisioned by voluntarist theologians such as Ockham. Leibniz's critique of voluntarism, then, is applicable to the Rawlsian subject: like the voluntarist God, she would be unable to act if it were indeed the case that her action validated itself. (shrink)

The Tulis thesis becomes even more powerful when the constitutional revolution he describes is put in its Progressive‐Era context. The public had long demanded social reforms designed to curb or replace laissez‐faire capitalism, which was seen as antithetical to the interests of ordinary working people. But popular demands for social reform went largely unmet until the 1910s. Democratizing political reforms, such as the rhetorical presidency, were designed to facilitate “change” by finally giving the public the power to enact social reforms. (...) The resulting political order has created systemic pressure for policy demagoguery in place of rational deliberation. Mass political mobilization seems to be better achieved by contests of grand principle that pit the well‐meaning supporters of obviously needed reforms against “villains and conspirators,” than by technical discussions of the possibly counterproductive effects of those reforms. (shrink)

This paper argues that the reason why political leadership often involves dirty hands is because of its relationship with violence. To make the case, it maintains that violent means create and assert a form of dominating power that is in tension with the proper ends of political action. This power casts a wide shadow, frequently dominating large numbers of non-targets and empowering unscrupulous agents. On the other side of the balance, characteristically political justifications for violence are ‘supra-moral,’ meaning that they (...) are motivated by the value of a conception of morality taken as a whole (or, indeed, morality as such) rather than by any particular moral value. The weight that ought to be given to such ends is indeterminate in a way that makes uncancelled remainders arising from the evil of violence likely in many cases. (shrink)

Weber’s conception of politics has long been interpreted in relativistic and “agonistic” terms. Such interpretations neglect Weber’s notion of “objectivity” as well as the complex links between politics as “community,” on the one hand, and as “value sphere,” on the other. Seen against this backdrop, Berufpolitik becomes a balancing act in which the pursuit of subjective values is objectively constrained not only by the ethic of responsibility, but more generally by the political imperative to safeguard the preconditions for communal order (...) and, in late modernity, of liberal freedoms. Without them, neither the objective “clarity” generated by science nor the subjective political commitments based on “clear vision” would be possible. (shrink)

Climate activists have recently engaged in widely publicized acts of politically motivated lawbreaking. This article identifies and critically analyzes two seemingly overlapping but in fact divergi...

In his famous lecture on ‘Politics as a Vocation’, Max Weber coined and elaborated on the antithesis between the ethics of conviction and the ethics of responsibility, which has had a far-reaching impact on the ethics discussions, particularly in German-speaking countries. The article explores what Weber himself meant with this distinction and what implications result from it. As an interesting historical observation, Weber's interpretation of ‘Do not resist an evildoer’ in the New Testament is contrasted with Mahatma Gandhi's diametrically opposed (...) interpretation. After criticizing Weber's position, the article outlines how today's business ethics can be based on a new and different foundation that overcomes the ‘profound antithesis’ between the ethics of conviction and the ethics of responsibility without disregarding the tensions between internal attitudes and external action results. (shrink)

This article explores the possibility of resistance under conditions of extreme state power in liberal democracies. It examines the strategies of migrants without legal status who, when threatened with one of the most awesome powers of the liberal state—expulsion—shed their legal identity in order to escape the state’s reach. Remarkably, in doing so, they often succeed in preventing the state from exercising its sovereign powers. The article argues that liberal states are uniquely constrained in their dealing with undocumented migrants. Not (...) only are they forced to operate within the constraints of the international legal order—making repatriation contingent on the possession of identity documents—but the liberal state is also constitutionally limited in its exercise of coercion against the individual. The article concludes that it is those individuals who have the weakest claims against the liberal state that are most able to constrain its exercise of sovereignty. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to provide a normative model for the assessment of the exercise of power by Big Pharma. By drawing on the work of Steven Lukes, it will be argued that while Big Pharma is overtly highly regulated, so that its power is indeed restricted in the interests of patients and the general public, the industry is still able to exercise what Lukes describes as a third dimension of power. This entails concealing the conflicts of interest (...) and grievances that Big Pharma may have with the health care system, physicians and patients, crucially through rhetorical engagements with Patient Advocacy Groups that seek to shape public opinion, and also by marginalising certain groups, excluding them from debates over health care resource allocation. Three issues will be examined: the construction of a conception of the patient as expert patient or consumer; the phenomenon of disease mongering; the suppression or distortion of debates over resource allocation. (shrink)

In The Ethics of War and the Force of Law, Uwe Steinhoff argues “[t]he legitimate authority criterion should be abandoned.” (33) His position explicitly rejects the views of those defending legitimate authority as both indispensable and prior to the other criteria of the just war theory. In a subtle rejoined to these views, Steinhoff contends these accounts misrepresent the tradition and can provide no effective justification for retaining the criterion. Indeed, the criterion proves redundant. Much of Steinhoff’s analysis is compelling. (...) I shall argue, however, that despite correctly representing the tradition as more “pluralist” regarding possible authorization of war beyond the state, Steinhoff’s rejection of legitimate authority fails to account for its primary justification, namely, as identifying the proper agent through which to gauge the moral action involved in this particular use of force. My essay will advance this view by vindicating Steinhoff’s insight about the plurality of possible actors for whom “war” is appropriate necessitates the criterion of legitimate authority rather than making it redundant. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to consider how the dominant moral theories can be applied to the discourse of disaster situations. In specific times, specific values take priority. Therefore, this article will consider how moral theory deals with time. Kant’s moral philosophy has influenced ethics enormously, but rejects the idea of a temporal dimension in ethics; consequently, modern ethics has not devoted sufficient attention to the temporal dimension. Nonetheless, Kantian ethics established the basic principles of respect for human beings (...) as ends in themselves, and for autonomy of rational beings; thus it cannot be ignored. In political decision-making, simply having good intentions does not suffice; they must be accompanied by responsibility. Both the ethics of consequentialism and virtue ethics (the virtue of wisdom) deal with responsibility for the future. Hans Jonas developed a concept of responsibility concerned particularly with the risks associated with new technologies and the ethical requirement to avoid disasters. “Uncertainty may be our permanent fate - which has moral consequences” (Jonas). Public policy should be precautionary. The ethics of disaster preparation planning is distinct from the ethics of disaster response planning. (shrink)

The author conducts a comparative analysis of the Russian Revolution developed by two prominent social-political thinkers of Germany and Russia in the early twentieth century—Max Weber and Peter Struve. The article focuses on their respective interpretations of the causes, course, and consequences of the Revolution as determined by their political ideals, i.e. a specific combination of nationalism and liberalism. The author pays special attention to Weber’s and Struve’s perception of the Russian Revolution, which, albeit for different reasons, was rejected by (...) both thinkers. (shrink)

Diggins brings Reinhold Niebuhr into the post-structuralist dialogue, and demonstates that his writings are the more constructive about the human predicament. "[I]n Niebuhr power and morality meet in one, with a suspicious glance at the disavowal of power and the pretensions of morality.".

This paper argues that ‘dirty hands’ (DH) scenarios, where an agent is forced to do wrong in order to do right, are conceptually coherent. The charge of incoherence is a widespread and common criticism made by deontologists and consequentialists alike. They argue that DH theorists erroneously assume the existence of real moral dilemmas and then compound this error by claiming that it is possible to engage in justified moral wrongdoing. However, such critics argue that there are only _prima facie_ moral (...) dilemmas and hence it is not only irrational and obtuse to argue for DH scenarios, but also undermines our search for sound moral judgments in very difficult situations. Given the gravity of these charges, surprisingly little has been written in defence of DH as a coherent and necessary part of our moral vocabulary. If there can be no successful defence of the possibility of DH, then all talk of such scenarios become futile. This paper responds to two influential and what initially appear to be strongly plausible arguments used by critics of DH. I call these the ‘Arguments from Deontic Logic’ and the ‘All-Things-Considered Argument’. I present three responses which seek to raise serious doubts about their efficacy. I then support the possibility of DH by exploring what we can learn about our moral reality from the moral emotion of ‘tragic remorse’. This approach endorses the role of emotions in determining moral knowledge. It also rejects the view that ethical theories ought to dismiss DH experiences as incoherent in favour of questionable theoretical a priori assumptions, which seek a reductionist account of our moral reality. (shrink)

Few would disagree that contemporary society is characterized by ‘pluralism’, but what this means is widely disputed. Among the many senses of pluralism current in contemporary political theory, ‘value pluralism’ is one of the most keenly contested. The classic account is found in Isaiah Berlin, who sees basic human values as irreducibly multiple, often conflicting, and sometimes incommensurable with one another.Berlin’s pluralist views are scattered throughout his work, but major statements include the Introduction and last section of ‘Two Concepts of (...) Liberty’ in Berlin (2002), Berlin (1990), and Berlin (2000). Other accounts of pluralism influenced by Berlin include Raz (1986); Hampshire (1989); Stocker (1990); Nussbaum (1992) chapter 2; Kekes (1993); Gray (1995a, b); Chang (1997); Crowder (2002, 2004); Galston (2002, 2005). In the Continental tradition the concept of value pluralism is often traced to Max Weber (1948). Berlin seems in general to have believed that the pluralist outl .. (shrink)

Review of: Kevin Sharpe and Steven N. Zwicker ; Refiguring Revolutions: Aesthetics and Politics from the English Revolution to the Romantic Revolution, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, 1998; Kevin Sharpe, Re-Mapping Early Modern England, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000; Kevin Sharpe, Reading Revolutions: The Politics of Reading in Early Modern England, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2000.

Argues that truth, moral right, political right, and aesthetic value may be understood as arising out of a naturalist account of humanity, if naturalism is rightly conceived.

Liberal political thought is underwritten by an enduring fear of civil and state violence. It is assumed within liberal thought that self?interest characterises relations between individuals in civil society, resulting in violence. In absolutist doctrines, such as Hobbes?, the pacification of private persons depended on the Sovereign's command of a monopoly of violence. Liberals, by contrast, sought to claim that the state itself must be pacified, its capacity for cruelty (e.g., torture) removed, its capacity for violence (e.g., war) reduced and (...) controlled. A core tension within liberal thought thus arises between containing civil violence by empowering the state and containing state violence by constraining the state. One result of this tension is the highly selective conception of ?pacification? within liberalism, which, historically, has accommodated indifference to endemic violence, both within civil society, and beyond civil society ? as in (past) arguments licensing imperialism and in (present) arguments for disciplining ?rogue? states. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 25, Issue 1, pp 72 - 94 Politics has never been considered Martin Buber’s forte. This paper considers the range of Buber’s reception as a political thinker by considering it in the form of three “moments,” each from a different point in his career, and each through the eyes of a different figure who either read or worked with Buber politically: Theodor Herzl, Gustav Landauer, and Hans Kohn. The three moments are structured around a discussion of the (...) classic criticism that Buber’s politics are naïve or utopian; the paper seeks to respond, as Buber did, in a way that raises questions about the borders of politics itself. (shrink)

This paper suggests that pragmatism makes a distinctive contribution to the theory and practice of radical democracy. It investigates the relation ship between the renewal of interest in pragmatism and the recent attempts to develop radical democratic alternatives to political liberalism. With particular reference to the contemporary critical social theory of Habermas and Honneth, the paper outlines key dimensions of the civic republican, deliberative democratic and reflexive cooperative reconstructions of John Dewey's conception of democracy. These reconstructions are shown to have (...) explicated important pragmatist insights concerning public participation in civic associations, the discursive practices of deliberation, and the cooperative organization of the division of labour. However, it is argued that each of these reconstructions pre suppose some facet of the additional pragmatist understanding of the creativity of action and that the most distinctive contributions of pragmatism to radical democratic theory and practice derive from a notion of democracy as instituted and emergent meaning. (shrink)