To determine whether fish welfare matters morally, we need to know what characteristics or capacities beings need to have in order to be morally considerable, and whether fish have such characteristics. In this paper I discuss a group of theories, Kantian practical reasoning theories, in which agency (or practical rationality) is traditionally thought to be a necessary condition for moral considerability. An individual must have quite sophisticated capacities to be a (moral) agent in such theories: she must be able to (...) act on rational principles. It seems unlikely that nonhuman animals such as fish have such capacities. I argue, however, that on the basis of certain Kantian arguments, moral agents have reason to accept duties to nonrational animals if they are agents in a much less demanding sense: if they are motivated to pursue the objects of their desires. If fish have this capacity, their welfare matters morally. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) argued that moral requirements are based on a standard of rationality he dubbed the “Categorical Imperative” (CI). Immorality thus involves a violation of the CI and is thereby irrational. Other philosophers, such as Locke and Hobbes, had also argued that moral requirements are based on standards of rationality. However, these standards were either desirebased instrumental principles of rationality or based on sui generis rational intuitions. Kant agreed with many of his predecessors that an analysis of practical reason (...) will reveal only the requirement that rational agents must conform to instrumental principles. Yet he argued that conformity to the CI (a non-instrumental principle) and hence to moral requirements themselves, can nevertheless be shown to be essential to rational agency. This argument was based on his striking doctrine that a rational will must be regarded as autonomous, or free in the sense of being the author of the law that binds it. The fundamental principle of morality — the CI — is none other than the law of an autonomous will. Thus, at the heart of Kant's moral philosophy is a conception of reason whose reach in practical affairs goes well beyond that of a Humean ‘slave’ to the passions. Moreover, it is the presence of this self-governing reason in each person that Kant thought offered decisive grounds for viewing each as possessed of equal worth and deserving of equal respect. (shrink)

Open access-introduction into moral philosophy in German language that contains chapters on the concept of morality, on the development and the main positions of normative ethics, on meta-ethics, and on the various fields of applied ethics. One of its distinctive features is that it explicitly reflects on the role of morality and ethics in modern society and that it analyses the import of alternative conceptual and normative positions for determining this role. The book can be freely downloaded from the publisher's (...) website via the URL below. (shrink)

Für die Medizinethik liegt ein großes Potential sozialempirischer Forschung in der Erhöhung der Kontextsensitivität, dem Sichtbarmachen von sozialen und institutionellen Rollen und dem Einbringen von Stimmen, die bislang zu wenig gehört worden sind. Diese Möglichkeiten bergen jedoch auch das Risiko, dass Deliberation und Argumentation durch Umfragen und Meinungserhebungen ersetzt werden. Der in den Sozialwissenschaften einsetzende participatory turn gibt Anlass, Anliegen und Methoden klassischer sozialempirischer Vorgehensweisen aus normativer Sicht zu hinterfragen. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Konzeptionen von Betroffenheit, Öffentlichkeit und Expertise ist nicht (...) nur aus methodologischen, sondern gerade auch aus normativen Gründen wichtig. Für die ethische Relevanz sind dabei die Idee der Argumentation und demokratietheoretische Überlegungen besonders erörterungswürdig. Wenn Bioethik Teil eines auch öffentlich verankerten Diskurses sein soll, ist die Frage nach der angemessenen Form der Berücksichtigung bestimmter Perspektiven ebenso im Kern bioethischer Reflexion zu verorten wie die Rechtfertigung spezieller ethischer Normen. (shrink)