- Perspectivism and the Argument from Guidance.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (2):361-374.details
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If you justifiably believe that you ought to Φ, you ought to Φ.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1873-1895.details
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A puzzle about enkratic reasoning.Jonathan Way - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3177-3196.details
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Rule‐Following and Rule‐Breaking: Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein.Daniel Watts - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy (4):1159-1185.details
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Vagueness and the Laws of Metaphysics.Ryan Wasserman - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (1):66-89.details
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Epistemology versus Non-Causal Realism.Jared Warren - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5).details
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Knowledge first, stability and value.Barnaby Walker - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3833-3854.details
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Information, Epistemic Luck and Generality.Abel Wajnerman Paz - 2017 - Eidos: Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad Del Norte 26:326-354.details
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Knowing in the “Executive Way”: Knowing How, Rules, Methods, Principles and Criteria.N. Waights Hickman - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):311-335.details
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(Implicit) Knowledge, reasons, and semantic understanding.Natalia Waights Hickman - 2021 - Mind and Language 36 (5):707-728.details
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Contextualismo integrativo: una manera de ordenar las distintas nociones de justificación epistémica.Ricardo Vázquez & Jonatan García - 2013 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 28 (1):27-44.details
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Fallibilism and the Certainty Norm of Assertion.Jacques-Henri Vollet - 2023 - Topoi 42 (1):133-139.details
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Epistemic excuses and the feeling of certainty.Jacques-Henri Vollet - 2022 - Analysis (4):663-672.details
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Certainty and Assertion.Jacques-Henri Vollet - 2022 - Dialectica 999 (1).details
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Zhuangzi as externalist: Reconciling two interpretations of the Happy Fish debate.Ranie B. Villaver - 2023 - Asian Philosophy 33 (4):363-376.details
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Understanding the selective realist defence against the PMI.Peter Vickers - 2017 - Synthese 194 (9):3221-3232.details
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Non-sceptical Infallibilism.Nuno Venturinha - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):186-195.details
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Empathy, Motivating Reasons, and Morally Worthy Action.Elizabeth Ventham - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-13.details
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Caught in the Language-Game.Nuno Venturinha - 2022 - Topoi 41 (5):1043-1055.details
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Book symposium: Nuno venturinha. Description of situations: An essay in contextualist epistemology.Nuno Venturinha, Marcelo Carvalho, Marcos Silva, João V. G. Cuter & Darlei Dall’Agnol - 2020 - Manuscrito 43 (3):164-258.details
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On the epistemic status of borderline cases.Zoltán Vecsey - 2012 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 16 (1):179-184.details
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A different kind of dream-based skepticism.Michael Veber - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1827-1839.details
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I Know I am Not Gettiered.Michael Veber - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):401-420.details
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Knowledge with and Without Belief.Michael Veber - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (1):120-132.details
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The doxastic profile of the compulsive re-checker.Juliette Vazard - 2022 - Philosophical Explorations 26 (1):45-60.details
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(Un)reasonable doubt as affective experience: obsessive–compulsive disorder, epistemic anxiety and the feeling of uncertainty.Juliette Vazard - 2019 - Synthese 198 (7):6917-6934.details
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On the roles of false belief and recalcitrant fear in anorexia nervosa.Somogy Varga & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2023 - Mind and Language (5):1296-1313.details
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The assertion-candidate and the meaning of mood.Maria van der Schaar - 2007 - Synthese 159 (1):61-82.details
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Some Problems with the Anti‐Luminosity‐Argument.Wim Vanrie - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (3):538-559.details
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Predictive coding and religious belief.Hans Van Eyghen - 2018 - Filosofia Unisinos 19 (3).details
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Hedged testimony.Peter van Elswyk - 2023 - Noûs 57 (2):341-369.details
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Epistemic logic and epistemology: The state of their affairs.Johan van Benthem - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (1):49 - 76.details
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Assertion remains strong.Peter van Elswyk & Matthew A. Benton - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (1):27-50.details
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Asking expresses a desire to know.Peter van Elswyk - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.details
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A Causal Safety Criterion for Knowledge.Jonathan Vandenburgh - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.details
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Normality, safety and knowledge.Markos Valaris - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (2):394-401.details
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Knowledge Out of Control.Markos Valaris - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (3):733-753.details
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Empirical Conceptual Analysis: An Exposition.Hristo Valchev - 2021 - Philosophia 50 (2):757-776.details
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Varieties of Pragmatic Encroachment.Hamid Vahid - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (1):25-41.details
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A Reverse Interpretation Model of Testimony.Hamid Vahid - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (1):85-102.details
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Inference and Epistemic Transparency.Gabriele Usberti - 2019 - Topoi 38 (3):517-530.details
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Collecting truths: A paradox in two guises.Eric Updike - 2022 - Analytic Philosophy 63 (3):156-173.details
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Skeptical Appeal: The Source-Content Bias.John Turri - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (2):307-324.details
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Knowledge and suberogatory assertion.John Turri - 2013 - Philosophical Studies (3):1-11.details
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Abilism, Ableism, and Reliabilism’s Achievement Gap: A Normative Argument for A New Paradigm in Epistemology.John Turri - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (3):1495-1501.details
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On what inferentially justifies what: the vices of reliabilism and proper functionalism.Chris Tucker - 2014 - Synthese 191 (14):3311-3328.details
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If Dogmatists Have a Problem with Cognitive Penetration, You Do Too.Chris Tucker - 2014 - Dialectica 68 (1):35-62.details
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Wondering about the future.Stephan Torre - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (8):2449-2473.details
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Accessibility, implicit bias, and epistemic justification.Josefa Toribio - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1529-1547.details
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Realism, reliability, and epistemic possibility: on modally interpreting the Benacerraf–Field challenge.Brett Topey - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):4415-4436.details
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