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  1. Aristotle and Confucius on the Socioeconomics of Shame.Thorian R. Harris - 2014 - Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 13 (3):323-342.
    The sociopolitical significance Aristotle and Confucius attribute to possessing a sense of shame serves to emphasize the importance of its development. Aristotle maintains that social class and wealth are prerequisites for its acquisition, while Confucius is optimistic that it can be developed regardless of socioeconomic considerations. The difference between their positions is largely due to competing views of praiseworthy dispositions. While Aristotle conceives of praiseworthy dispositions as “consistent” traits of character, traits that calcifiy as one reaches adulthood, Confucius offers us (...)
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  • Two Conceptions of Voluntary Action in the Nicomachean Ethics.Daniel Wolt - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (2):292-305.
    European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
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  • Aristotle on Self-Sufficiency, External Goods, and Contemplation.Marc Gasser-Wingate - 2020 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 102 (1):1-28.
    Aristotle tells us that contemplation is the most self-sufficient form of virtuous activity: we can contemplate alone, and with minimal resources, while moral virtues like courage require other individuals to be courageous towards, or courageous with. This is hard to square with the rest of his discussion of self-sufficiency in the Ethics: Aristotle doesn't generally seek to minimize the number of resources necessary for a flourishing human life, and seems happy to grant that such a life will be self-sufficient despite (...)
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  • The Doctrine of the Mean in the Eudemian Ethics.Inara Zanuzzi - 2017 - Archai: Revista de Estudos Sobre as Origens Do Pensamento Ocidental 20:255-288.
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  • Ee II 2 1220a39–B6.Paulo Ferreira - 2017 - Archai: Revista de Estudos Sobre as Origens Do Pensamento Ocidental 20:123-140.
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  • Choice and Moral Responsibility in Nicomachean Ethics III 1-5.Susanne Bobzien - 2014 - In R. Polansky (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. New York, USA: Cambridge University Press. pp. 81-109.
    ABSTRACT: This paper serves two purposes: (i) it can be used by students as an introduction to chapters 1-5 of book iii of the NE; (ii) it suggests an answer to the unresolved question what overall objective this section of the NE has. The paper focuses primarily on Aristotle’s theory of what makes us responsible for our actions and character. After some preliminary observations about praise, blame and responsibility (Section 2), it sets out in detail how all the key notions (...)
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  • Aristotle Against Delos: Pleasure in Nicomachean Ethics X.Joachim Aufderheide - 2016 - Phronesis 61 (3):284-306.
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  • Indução e Ciência em Aristóteles.Tomás Roberto Troster - 2015 - Dissertation, University of São Paulo, Brazil
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  • Précision et relativité dans la notion aristotélicienne de vertu en tant que juste mesure.Maja Hudoletnjak Grgić - 2010 - Synthesis Philosophica 25 (1):131-148.
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  • Right Reason in Plato and Aristotle: On the Meaning of Logos.Jessica Moss - 2014 - Phronesis 59 (3):181-230.
    Something Aristotle calls ‘right logos’ plays a crucial role in his theory of virtue. But the meaning of ‘logos’ in this context is notoriously contested. I argue against the standard translation ‘reason’, and—drawing on parallels with Plato’s work, especially the Laws—in favor of its being used to denote what transforms an inferior epistemic state into a superior one: an explanatory account. Thus Aristotelian phronēsis, like his and Plato’s technē and epistēmē, is a matter of grasping explanatory accounts: in this case, (...)
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  • Colloquium 2: Force and Compulsion in Aristotle’s Ethics1.Kevin Flannery - 2007 - Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 22 (1):41-67.
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  • Two Ways of Being for an End.Jessica Gelber - 2018 - Phronesis 63 (1):64-86.
    _ Source: _Volume 63, Issue 1, pp 64 - 86 Five times in the extant corpus, Aristotle refers to a distinction between two ways of being a ‘that for the sake of which’ that he sometimes marks by using genitive and dative pronouns. Commentators almost universally say that this is the distinction between an aim and beneficiary. I propose that Aristotle had a quite different distinction in mind, namely: that which holds between something and the aim or objective it is (...)
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  • Hylomorphic Virtue: Cosmology, Embryology, and Moral Development in Aristotle.Jennifer Whiting - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (2):222-242.
    Aristotle is traditionally read as dividing animal souls into three parts, while dividing human souls into four parts (a rational part, with theoretical and pr...
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  • Good Luck, Nature, and God: Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics 8.2.Filip Grgić - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (4):471-493.
    In this paper I argue that the basic form of good luck that Aristotle identifies in his Eudemian Ethics 8.2 is the divine good luck, which is not also natural good luck, as is commonly assumed by interpreters. The property of being lucky is neither a primitive nor a natural property, nor such that it is based on some natural property, but a property bestowed by god. Hence, the only satisfactory explanation of good luck must be theological. Furthermore, I argue (...)
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  • Ἀρχη Πραξεων Ιν Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics II 6, 1223a9–16.Daniel Wolt - 2018 - Classical Quarterly 68 (1):330-332.
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  • Preciznost i relativnost u Aristotelovom poimanju vrline kao prave mjere.Maja Hudoletnjak Grgić - 2010 - Synthesis Philosophica 25 (1):131-148.
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