Aristotle on Self-Sufficiency, External Goods, and Contemplation

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Aristotle tells us that contemplation is the most self-sufficient form of virtuous activity: we can contemplate alone, and with minimal resources, while moral virtues like courage require other individuals to be courageous towards, or courageous with. This is hard to square with the rest of his discussion of self-sufficiency in the Ethics: Aristotle doesn’t generally seek to minimize the number of resources necessary for a flourishing human life, and seems happy to grant that such a life will be self-sufficient despite requiring a lot of external goods. In this paper I develop an interpretation of self-sufficiency as a form of independence from external contributors to our activity, and argue that this interpretation accounts both for Aristotle’s views on contemplation and for the role self-sufficiency plays in his broader account of human happiness.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
GASAOS
Revision history
Archival date: 2017-12-08
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics.Rowe, Christopher & Broadie, Sarah

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2017-12-08

Total views
129 ( #24,001 of 43,739 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
33 ( #21,151 of 43,739 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.