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I discuss Yablo’s approach to truthmaker semantics and compare it with my own, with special focus on the idea of a proposition being true of or being restricted to some subjectmatter, the idea of propositional containment, and the development of an ‘incremental’ semantics for the conditional. I conclude with some remarks on the relationship between truthmaker approach and the standard possible worlds approach to semantics. 

ABSTRACTIfthenism is a strategy of paraphrasing seemingly obvious claims in order to avoid their problematic commitments. The success of this strategy, says Yablo, depends on the possibility of reading everyday language conditionals incrementally. The incremental reading is to exclude that the supposition of the antecedent might interfere with the truth of the consequent, as in the standard or ‘interference’ reading. I argue that Yablo's main arguments for the incremental reading are questionbegging. 

ABSTRACTAn undemanding claim ϕ sometimes implies, or seems to, a more demanding one ψ. Some have posited, to explain this, a confusion between ϕ and ϕ*, an analogue of ϕ that does not imply ψ. Ifthenists take ϕ* to be If ψ then ϕ. Incrementalism is the form of ifthenism that construes If ψ then ϕ as the surplus content of ϕ over ψ. The paper argues that it is the only form of ifthenism that stands a chance of being (...) 

This article introduces, studies, and applies a new system of logic which is called ‘HYPE’. In HYPE, formulas are evaluated at states that may exhibit truth value gaps and truth value gluts. Simple and natural semantic rules for negation and the conditional operator are formulated based on an incompatibility relation and a partial fusion operation on states. The semantics is worked out in formal and philosophical detail, and a sound and complete axiomatization is provided both for the propositional and the (...) 

A reply to Fine’s critique of Aboutness. Fine contrasts two notions of truthmaker, and more generally two notions of “state.” One is algebraic; states are sui generis entities grasped primarily through the conditions they satisfy. The other uses set theory; states are sets of worlds, or, perhaps, collections of such sets. I try to defend the second notion and question some seeming advantages of the first. 