My aim in this paper is to demonstrate the relevance of the Aristotelian notion of civic friendship to contemporary political discussion by arguing that it can function as a social good. Contrary to some dominant interpretations of the ancient conception of friendship according to which it can only be understood as an obligatory reciprocity, I argue that friendship between fellow citizens is important because it contributes to the unity of both state and community by transmitting feelings of intimacy and solidarity. (...) In that sense, it can be understood as an important relationship predicated on affection and generosity, virtues lacking from both contemporary politics and society that seem to be merely dominated by Post-Enlightenment ideals. For Aristotle, friendship is important for society because it generates concord, articulating thus a basis for social unity and political agreement. (shrink)

The primary concern of this essay is with the question “What is a political community?” This question is important in its own right. Arguably, the main purpose of political philosophy is to provide an account of the nature of political association and, in so doing, to describe the relations that hold between the individual and the state. The question is also important, however, because of its centrality in contemporary debate about liberalism and community.

Aristotle's treatment of the choice between the political and contemplative lives (in EN I 5 and X 7-8) can seem awkward. To offer one explanation of this, I argue that when he invokes self-sufficience (autarkeia) as a criterion for this choice, he appeals to two different and incompatible specifications of "lacking nothing." On one specification, suitable to a human being living as a political animal and thus seeking to realize his end as an engaged citizen of a polis, a person (...) lacks nothing by possessing a wide range of goods that directly require other people. On the other, more suitable to a god or a beast, a person lacks nothing by having no need of goods that directly require other people. The ambiguity of this criterion renders the choice between the political and contemplative lives difficult. (shrink)

Straipsnyje teigiama, kad ikipolitiškumo ir politiškumo skirtis, išreikšta valstybės ir namų ūkio sąvokomis, yra esminga suvokiant Aristotelio bendruomeninius projektus. Mąstymas šia skirtimi atskleidžia tokių bendruomeninių projektų struktūrą ir principus bei pašalina įtampas, glūdinčias skirtinguose ir dažnai nesuderinamuose Aristotelio teiginiuose. Straipsnyje parodoma, kaip namų ūkį bei valstybę galima apibrėžti kaip skirtingas ir vis dėlto tarpusavyje priklausomas bendruomenes ir kaip jų apibrėžimai paveikia konkrečių konstitucinių bendruomenių suvokimą.

Aristotle’s Politicsis not only famous for its theory of constitutions, but for its statements about human nature. According to the central claim of Aristotle’s political anthropology, man is by nature a political animal (phusei politikon zôon). This famous statement is presented as the conclusion of the first set of arguments that Aristotle develops in the second chapter of book I of the Politics(Pol.,I, 2, 1252a24–1253a3). Aristotle’s statement is inextricably linked with the claim that the polisexists by nature (phusei), which he (...) mentions in the same phrase, as part of his conclusion: “From these considerations it is evident that the polisis one of the things that exist by nature, and that man is by nature a political animal”(Pol.,I, 2, 1253a1–3). Evidently, the claims that the polisexists by nature and that man is by nature a political animal are complementary. This article presents an interpretation of the two complementary claims or theses arguing that in Pol.,I, 2 Aristotle conceives exclusively of human beings as political animals because the whole chapter focuses on theanalysisof the polis,a community peculiar to humans. Italso examines Aristotle’sclaim that the polis“is by nature prior (proteron) to the household and to the individual”(Pol.,I, 2, 1253a18–19). The paperdisagrees withscholars whounderstand this claim as an independent third thesis and theoremand argues that Aristotle’s claim functions as a strong argument for the thesis that man is by nature a political animal. Furthermore, it contends thatAristotle neither defends an organic theory of the polisnor has a “tendency towards totalitarianism”(J. Barnes). -/- . (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction The polis Nature Distributive Justice “The polis of our prayers” Slavery Constitutions The Good Man and the Good Citizen Bibliography.

Este artigo contribui para o debate sobre a relação da filosofia prática e teórica de Aristóteles. Ele argumenta que sua filosofia prática depende em grande parte de sua concepção teleológica da natureza. Esta tese é dirigida principalmente contra os estudiosos que sustentam que Aristóteles não deriva de relações políticas e humanas de condições naturais ou cósmicas. O artigo defende a interpretação antropocêntrica de David Sedley da teleologia natural de Aristóteles e mostra como Aristóteles aplica explicações teleológicas às relações de poder (...) entre os seres humanos - entre homens e mulheres e entre homens livres e escravos naturais - e seus propósitos e objetivos. O artigo enfoca o argumento da “função” (ergonomia) humana de Aristóteles, que é um argumento teleológico no centro de sua filosofia prática. Argumenta que este argumento, que Aristóteles apresenta para definir ‘florescimento humano’ ou ‘felicidade’ (eudaimonia), depende de sua definição de homem como o único ‘ser vivo que tem linguagem e razão’ (zôon logon echon). Alega ainda que a disputa sobre se Aristóteles identifica eudaimonia apenas com uma vida de contemplação ou se eudaimonia inclui uma vida política pode ser esclarecida referindo-se ao propósito natural dos logotipos. (shrink)

What are the contents, limits, and possibilities of Aristotle’s works for critical thinking about money? Recent scholarship has (re)turned to Aristotle as an authority for two key political approaches to money. The first aims to democratize the governance of monetary institutions in order to realize more just economic outcomes. The second seeks to prevent money, or its inherently deleterious excesses, from corrupting political actors and political life. Arguing that these two approaches are insightful, important, and incomplete, I reengage Aristotle’s account (...) of money across the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics to theorize money as a vital but underexplored means of political subject formation. I illuminate how the use of money produces collective and constitutive relations that emerge by way of people’s engagements and entanglements with the things they produce, acquire, desire, and exchange. Bringing this to light also makes visible, I argue, how Aristotle understands money as something capable of being used to both bring about social justice and to pervasively corrupt the foundations of shared democratic life. Taking stock of this dual capacity of money, I show how money’s relationship to subjectivity simultaneously makes money the site of a seemingly intractable problem for politics under capitalism and the means to revive it and reconnect it to democratic life. (shrink)

In this paper, I wish to defend Aristotle’s naturalness thesis. First, I argue against the claim that the city fails to meet the criteria (e.g. separability, continuity, etc.) Aristotle sets for substantiality in the Metaphysics. Second, I examine the problem of the Principle of Transitivity of End in Aristotle’s telic argument for the naturalness of the city. I argue that the city exists for its own end. Finally, I discuss the problem of the legislator in the genesis of the city. (...) I argue that the legislator is only responsible for the actualization of the potential form that Nature has set forward. (shrink)

Contemporary appeals for a deepening of civic friendship in liberal democracies often draw on Aristotle. This paper warns against a certain kind of attempt to use Aristotle in our own theorising, namely accounts of civic friendship that characterise it as similar in some way to Aristotelian virtue friendship. The most prominent of these attempts have focused on disinterested mutual regard as a basic ingredient in all Aristotelian forms of friendship. The argument against this is that it inadequately accounts for the (...) idea of a virtue friend as another self, which we find in Aristotle’s thought. When we attend closely to that, we see that civic friendship is different in a fundamental way from virtue friendship because virtue friends are keenly committed to the moral improvement of one another. It is argued that Aristotle does not see civic friendship in the same way. However, if this argument about the differences between the forms of friendship cannot be accepted, the paper argues that we should not draw on Aristotle for an understanding of civic friendship because any similarity it might have to virtue friendship would license illiberal interventions in the lives of citizens in service of some idea of moral improvement. A seeming connection between Aristotelian civic friendship and thick conceptions of citizenship is replaced with a connection between it and thinner conceptions. (shrink)

Abstract The idea of a purely civic nationalism has attracted Western scholars, most of whom rightly disdain the myths that sustain ethnonationalist theories of political community. Civic nationalism is particularly attractive to many Americans, whose peculiar national heritage encourages the delusion that their mutual association is based solely on consciously chosen principles. But this idea misrepresents political reality as surely as the ethnonationalist myths it is designed to combat. And propagating a new political myth is an especially inappropriate way of (...) defending the legacy of Enlightenment liberalism from the dangers posed by the growth of nationalist political passions. (shrink)

Comparing Aristotle's and Confucius' ethics, where each represents an ethics of virtue, I show that they are not susceptible to some of the frequent charges against them when compared to non-virtue ethical theories like utilitarianism and deontology. These charges are that virtue ethics: (1) lack universal laws; they cannot (a) provide content for actions, and (b) they do not consider actions in the evaluation of morality. (2) Virtue ethics cannot provide the resources for dealing with social justice and human rights (...) practices. Contrary to these charges, I show how these thinkers' ethics can account for the first generation civil and political rights, and the second generation economic, social and cultural rights. (shrink)

Should democracts value the freedom to choose? Do people value facing distinct choices when they make collective decisions? ‘Autonomy’ – the ability to participate in the making of collective decisions – is a paltry notion of freedom. True, democrats must be prepared that their preferences may not be realized as the outcome of the collective choice. Yet democracy is impoverished when many people cannot even vote for what they most want. ‘The point is not to be free, but to act (...) freely.’ Rosa Luxemburg Footnotes I am grateful to Jess Benhabib and Bernard Manin for several heated discussions and to Joanne Fox-Przeworski, Dimitri Landa, Avishai Margalit, and Ignacio Sanchez-Cuenca for comments. Special thanks are due to the editor of this journal, Geoffrey Brennan, for pushing me further than I was prepared to go. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper reconsiders the arguments of my book, The Longing for Total Revolution, in response to the thoughtful analyses collected in this symposium. It restates the book’s main genealogical and critical arguments about the philosophical sources of uniquely modern forms of social discontent, while distinguishing those arguments from recent attempts to uncover the deeper, theological sources of discontent. It focuses, in particular, on the role played in modern social discontent by the group of thinkers I describe as the “Kantian (...) left”: a long line of social critics who sought to “realize” Kant’s understanding of human autonomy in society, thereby gaining what Marx called “control and conscious mastery” over our social world, not just over our wills. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article offers the first comprehensive reconstruction of Hannah Arendt's contribution to the venerable chapter of modern intellectual history known as ‘the Idea of the university.’ Arendt first jotted down her thoughts on this topic in a 1946 letter to Karl Jaspers, in response to the manuscript of his then forthcoming book Die Idee der Universität. She later revisited the topic in three different moments. We trace these three sequels back to three contemporary political crises to which she bore (...) witness: (i) the problem of Arab-Jewish relations following the founding of Israel, (ii) the suppression of freedom of speech during the McCarthy era, and (iii) the American student protest movement of the 1960s. At the heart of Arendt's idea of the university is a tension that she never managed to resolve: namely, that between the image of the university as a nonconformist community ethically committed to the transformation of the social world, on the one hand, and the image of the university as a secluded sanctuary of contemplative freedom dedicated to the disinterested pursuit of truth, on the other. Whereas the first puts her at odds with Jaspers and is predominant in the early reflections, the second pulls her closer to him and becomes prominent in the later ones. More broadly, the article contends that the history of Arendt's reflections on the university bears on our understanding of the evolution of her political thought. (shrink)

This article considers what St. Augustine has to say about administration in The City of God, as well as in The Rule of St. Augustine and in Of the Work of Monks. Rather than focusin...

The concept of leisure found in Aristotle’s corpus is both elusive and challenging. It eludes categorization into our current understandings of work and play while at the same time challenging those very conceptions. Here, I attempt to come to grips with Aristotelian leisure by demonstrating its centrality in Aristotle’s thought, explaining leisure as primarily a ‘way of being’ rather than merely the absence of occupation or one of several preconditions to the virtues, and exploring what leisure might mean to liberal (...) democracy. As a ‘way of being’, Aristotelian leisure is more than an absence of work, but is a positive comportment that itself requires virtues, material means, and an education. (shrink)

The profusion of senses of justice in NE V.1–7 has left many readers with a general impression of chaos, but also gives rise to pressing questions about Aristotle’s conception of justice. Specifically, why does Aristotle claim that there are two parts to justice as equality, but go on to discuss three types of equality in the subsequent chapters? What is the relationship between political justice and the distinction between general justice and particular justice? I argue in this essay that the (...) notion of reciprocity, central to the first question, can also help us address the second. Specifically, I show that reciprocity is not a third species of particular justice, but rather a prior condition for political community and for political justice. Political justice is best understood as a redescription of particular justice that highlights how distributive and corrective justice maintain equality among citizens in an existing political community. In addition to explaining the unity of Aristotle’s thought in these chapters of NE V, I demonstrate a number of philosophical consequences for understanding Aristotle’s conception of justice. (shrink)

Sheldon S. Wolin’s ‘fugitive democracy’ is arguably his most provocative contribution to political theory. Breaking with the understanding of democracy as a constitutional form whose origins he locates in the work of Aristotle, Wolin claims democracy is better understood not as a constitution, but as a ‘rebellious moment,’ making democracy dependent on cultural rather than institutional characteristics. This formulation poses a problem for democracy as a political phenomenon, as political power today tends to be concentrated within institutions. Without institutional expression, (...) democracy is alienated from political power and hence a contradiction in terms. I reconstruct an understanding of Wolin’s fugitive democracy that can avoid such problems, while also being adequate to the current political juncture. I argue that Aristotle’s conception of the practice of justice, read through the lens of Wolin’s ‘fugitive democracy,’ becomes ‘fugitive justice,’ the cultivation of a democratic ethos that might support and sustain fortuitous democratic moments, connecting democratic culture to political institutions. In this way, Aristotle’s work is split: not simply the founder of constitutionalism, through ‘fugitive justice’ Aristotle becomes a resource for radical democrats, and a complement to Wolin’s concept of democracy. (shrink)

The ambition of this article is threefold. First, it is to offer a realist reading of Aristotle’s regime theory as it is laid out mostly in Books IV–VI of his Politics. The author argues that Arist...

This article shows how the public inscriptions of Hellenistic poleis, especially decrees in honor of leading citizens, illuminate Greek ethical thinking, including wider debates about questions of central importance for Greek ethical philosophers. It does so by comparing decrees' rhetoric with the ethical language and doctrines of different ancient philosophical schools. Whereas some scholars identify ethical views comparable to Stoic ideas in Hellenistic decrees, this article argues that there are more significant overlaps, especially in decrees from Asia Minor dating to (...) after 150 BC, with fourth-century BC ethical philosophy, especially Aristotle's, and its Hellenistic continuators. The overlaps between decrees and philosophers' approaches had complex, diverse causes, probably sometimes including philosophical education and influence. Comparison of philosophy and epigraphy shows that, in the same way as the polis continued to flourish after Chaironeia, critical reflection about the ethical foundations of civic life also remained vibrant, among both philosophers and citizens. (shrink)

This dissertation provides a thorough examination of the role of aeschynē (as distinct from aidōs) in Aristotle’s conception of human nature by illuminating the political and ethical implications of shame and shamelessness and the effect of these implications in his treatises. It is crucial, both to one’s own personhood and eudaimonia as well as to the existence of a just and balanced state, that aeschynē be understood and respected because of the self-evaluating ability that it maintains. The aim of this (...) work is to show that a recognition and appreciation of aeschynē as understood in Aristotle’s conception of human nature simultaneously leads to eudaimonia and away from the dangerous state of anaeschyntia (shamelessness). Aeschynē is required in order to create a better existence both on the personal level and on the larger level of social community. The function and responsibility of aeschynē in Aristotle’s work is recognized in its full potential as a civic virtue: specifically, metriopatheia. Metriopatheia, which is aeschynē properly energized through phronesis, acts as a tool allowing one to moderate her passions. It is essential to recognize Aristotle’s use of aeschynē as metriopatheia because it sheds new light on Aristotle’s conception of human nature. The rational human soul, according to Aristotle, is always striving for full actuality. The goal of human life, like all life for Aristotle, is proper function with excellence. Aeschynē as metriopatheia is responsible for the moderation of one’s passions thus promoting aretē. Aeschynē offers insight into the opinions of those who are ethical and thus produces right reason in actions. One who is anaeschyntia cannot reach her full potentiality nor can she be a contributing member of the political community, the koinōnia. (shrink)

Doubts about the enterprise of cultural recognition have helped to fuel a backlash against the politics of multiculturalism in Europe during the last decade. Such doubts are well-founded. Charles Taylor's seminal discussion of the politics of recognition neglects serious difficulties that arise for the activity of recognition when the objective and subjective dimensions of cultural identity diverge. Narratives of cultural ?passing? help to highlight these difficulties and demonstrate that recognition can sometimes contribute to identity-based oppression. However, this conclusion does not (...) commit us to a politics of cultural indifference or assimilation: the rejection of recognition does not entail the rejection of perception in general. Iris Murdoch's notion of ?attention? provides a corrective to our understanding of recognition and thereby supplies a potentially superior ethical and perceptual basis for European multiculturalism in the twenty-first century. (shrink)

Ogren advances a hermeneutic interpretation of Aristotle that brings to light several important and overlooked points about Aristotle, emotion, and cognition. In my article, I argue that his interpretation is on certain points correct, particularly in stressing that the distinctively human, irrational, emotional and desiring part of the soul is rational to a certain extent, and through its own forms of cognition, revelatory of being. His interpretation errs, however, by construing the fully rational part of the soul in a fundamentally (...) un-Aristotelian way, as merely a faculty informed by the rules of formal logic. After indicating Ogren’s interpretation’s strong points, then its central errors, I present an alternate exegetically grounded Aristotelian interpretation of these matters. Specifically, I show that Aristotle’s division of the parts of the soul is more complicated and ambiguous than Ogren’s interpretation. Then, I show that, for Aristotle, the fully rational part of the soul is, contra Ogren, concerned with practical matters and life, and possesses substantive modes of cognition of the world. I finish by exploring one of these, specifically perception of moral qualities, and discuss some recent Aristotle scholarship engaging this issue. (shrink)

This essay identifies ‘oligarchic harm’ as a dire threat confronting contemporary democracies. I provide a formal standard for classifying oligarchs: those who use personal access to concentrated wealth to pursue harmful forms of discretionary influence. I then use Aristotle to think through both the moral and the epistemic dilemmas of oligarchic harm, highlighting Aristotle’s concerns about the difficulties of using wealth as a ‘proxy’ for virtue. While Aristotle’s thought provides great resources for diagnosing oligarchic threats, it proves less useful as (...) a guide to democratic institutional design. Aristotle raises a deep-seated objection to democratic forms of ‘rule by the poor.’ A successful response to oligarchy must move beyond Aristotle’s objection and affirm the demos’ tripartite status as many, free, and poor. I briefly outline the terms of this ‘new’ mixed regime: one that seeks to tame oligarchy through a mixture of aggregative, deliberative, and plebeian institutions. (shrink)

Aristotle says that only humans can speak and the speech capability is a proper criterion of humanity. Speech is also designated by Aristotle to indicate the right and the wrong. He finishes by saying that it is partnership in these things that makes a city. Ultimately a human being who is not in a polis, would not really be a human being at all? Would this human being then be no more human than a statue with a human form?

Gender greatly impacts access to opportunities, potential, and success in corporate leadership roles. We begin with a general presentation of why such discussion is necessary for basic considerations of justice and fairness in gender equality and how the issues we raise must impact any ethical perspective on gender in the corporate workplace. We continue with a breakdown of the central categories affecting the success of women in corporate leadership roles. The first of these includes gender-influenced behavioral factors, such as the (...) requirements and expectations of gendered verbal and nonverbal communication styles as well as appearance. We move on to address the impact of family on corporate leadership opportunities and success, discussing the asymmetrical evaluation of an individual’s potential, authority, and competence based on gender stereotypes of familial obligations and expectations. Finally, we address how gender impacts access to networking and sponsorship opportunities and the long-term effects of systematic limitations on women’s inclusion in the upper echelons of corporate leadership. We conclude with a summary of the questions and issues raised by our discussion and direct individuals to consider how different ethical systems and moral requirements might influence their interpretations of gender and leadership in the corporate workplace. (shrink)

Friendship plays a central role in Augustine's thought. It also played a crucial role in structuring the political and social world of the ancient Greeks. Augustine's treatment of friendship, especially in his Confessions, retains some of the terminology that was central to the Greek account, but it simultaneously transforms friendship, and with it the relationship between individual and community. Augustine's formulation of the inner life is reflected in his transformation of friendship, which loses its inherently social character and political dimension (...) even as it sets the stage for the introduction of political thinking based on the primacy of the individual. (shrink)

That there is some connection between politics and human nature is a commonplace, but why and in what way they are conjoined is disputed. Aristotle's practice of comparing humans with other animals, and not conceptually divorcing them, is fruitful. By adopting a similar practice an indirect linkage (rather than Aristotle's direct one) between human nature and politics is identified. The strategy is to locate at least one universal aspect of human nature which is non‐political that, nonetheless, carries with it a (...) requirement that universally calls forth a political response. The aspect is reproductive sex and the need to ensure that offspring survive. In humans, the natural fact of paternal uncertainty is dealt with by conventions, but, because of this, these vary (for example, as between matrilineal and patrilineal kinship systems). But what is necessitated amid this variety is a need to establish an authoritative allocation of responsibility for nurture. Politics is the exercise of that authority. However, because of its roots in conventions called forth by human nature, the link is indirect. The conclusion is that contemporary attempts to re‐establish a direct link are bound to be inconclusive. (shrink)

_Examines the implications of Aristotle’s political thought for contemporary political theory._.

En la filosofía política aristotélica, la definición biológica del hombre como “animal político” funciona como justificación para la creación de la polis. Aristóteles clasifica al hombre como un animal caracterizado por su habilidad racional y comunicativa, capacidades que lo determinan a formar comunidades con miras a la “vida buena”. Esta definición de la naturaleza humana supone la creación de la polis; el único espacio donde el hombre puede desarrollar sus virtudes y vivir una vida plena y feliz. Dentro de esta (...) polis, Aristóteles le otorga participación política solo a los individuos que cum-plen con esta descripción. A partir de esto surge la pregunta: ¿Quiénes quedan al margen de la polis? Fuera de este espacio político quedan todos los que hacen posible la vida en la polis: las mujeres, los trabajadores y los esclavos. Más allá de estas redes económicas y sociales queda el propósito de este artículo, la “bestia”: los seres humanos caracterizados por su carencia de disposición política tanto en instancias desarrolladas como la polis y las más primitivas como la aldea o el hogar. De esta manera, los hombres bestiales son inútiles para la vida en comunidad ya que no cumplen con su función como animales políticos y sus acciones no están guiadas por un bien común. Se argumentará que a partir de esto que la bestia padece una triple exclusión: la política, al negársele la posibilidad de ciudadanía; la social, al prohibirle la partici-pación en la comunidad que sustenta económicamente a la polis y, por último, la biológica al ser excluido del conjunto conceptual de los hombres. (shrink)

Aristotle says little about moral badness [kakia], but his four central claims about it su????ce to entail a rich and plausible account. Badness is the disposition opposed to virtue, and so symmetrical with it in various ways; it is acquired by habituation; it is unlike akrasia in that the bad person’s reason endorses his wrong actions; and this endorsement involves the exercise of a corrupted reason. The activity of corrupted reason must be a kind of (as we now say) motivated (...) reasoning—rationalization, denial and the like—which serves to conceal the correct ends of action from the corrupt person and to sustain their habitual bad behaviour. Although badness is located in the non-rational soul, it is this corruption of reason which turns it into a stable disposition. (shrink)