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  1. How Might I Have Been?Rachel Cooper - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (4-5):495-514.
    What would my life have been like if I had been born more intelligent? Or taller? Or a member of the opposite sex? Or a non-biological being? It is plausible that some of these questions make sense, while others stretch the limits of sense making. In addressing questions of how I might have been, genetic essentialism is popular, but this article argues that genetic essentialism, and other versions of origin essentialism for organisms, must be rejected. It considers the prospects for (...)
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  • Advantageous Interventions: Will Someone Be Healed?Noam Zohar - 2012 - American Journal of Bioethics 12 (8):32 - 33.
    The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 8, Page 32-33, August 2012.
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  • Rewriting the genetic bond: Gene editing and our understanding of genetic parenthood.Shelly Simana & Vardit Ravitsky - 2022 - Bioethics 37 (3):265-274.
    One of the most prominent justifications for the use of germline gene editing (GGE) is that it would allow parents to have a “genetically related child” while preventing the transmission of genetic disorders. However, we argue that since future uses of GGE may involve large-scale genetic modifications, they may affect the genetic relatedness between parents and offspring in a meaningful way: Due to certain genetic modifications, children may inherit much less than 50% of their DNA from each parent. We show (...)
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  • Can reproductive genetic manipulation save lives?G. Owen Schaefer - 2020 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy (3):381-386.
    It has recently been argued that reproductive genetic manipulation technologies like mitochondrial replacement and germline CRISPR modifications cannot be said to save anyone’s life because, counterfactually, no one would suffer more or die sooner absent the intervention. The present article argues that, on the contrary, reproductive genetic manipulations may be life-saving (and, from this, have therapeutic value) under an appropriate population health perspective. As such, popular reports of reproductive genetic manipulations potentially saving lives or preventing disease are not necessarily mistaken, (...)
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  • Genetic Therapy, Identity and the Person‐Regarding Reasons.Ingmar Persson - 1995 - Bioethics 9 (1):16-31.
    It has been argued that there can be no person‐regarding reasons for practising genetic therapy, since it affects identity and causes to exist an individual who would not otherwise have existed. And there can be no such reasons for causing somebody to exist because existing cannot be better for an individual than never existing. In the present paper, both of these claims are denied. It is contended, first, that in practically all significant cases genetic therapy will not affect the identity (...)
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  • Who Benefits?— Why personal identity does not matter in a moral evaluation of germ‐line gene therapy.Nils Holtug & Peter Sandøe - 1996 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 13 (2):157-166.
    Recently it has been argued that some instances of germ‐line gene therapy will change the identity of the person who receives the benefit of therapy, and that in these instances there is no good moral reason to conduct germ‐line gene therapy. Against this we argue that even if gene therapy should have an effect on the identity of the resulting person, this would not diminish the urgency of the therapy. Not only would impersonal moral reasons speak in favour of such (...)
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  • The use of genetic test information in insurance: The argument from indistinguishability reconsidered. [REVIEW]Dr V. Launis - 2000 - Science and Engineering Ethics 6 (3):299-310.
    In the bioethical literature, discrimination in insurance on the basis of genetic risk factors detected by genetic testing has been defended and opposed on various ethical grounds. One important argument in favour of the practice is offered by those who believe that it is not possible to distinguish between genetic and non-genetic information, at least not for practical policy purposes such as insurance decision-making. According to the argument from indistinguishability, the use of genetic test information for insurance purposes should be (...)
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  • A whole new... you? ‘Personal identity’, emerging technologies and the law.Colin Gavaghan - 2010 - Identity in the Information Society 3 (3):423-434.
    In this article, I argue that lawmakers must abandon their previous reluctance to engage with questions of personal identity (PI). While frequently seen as an esoteric subject, of limited interest outside of academic philosophy departments, I attempt to show that, in fact, assumptions about PI—and its durability in the face of certain psychological or genetic changes—underpin many current legal rules. This is most perhaps obviously exemplified with regard to reproductive technologies. Yet the Parfitian challenge to identify a victim of ‘bad’ (...)
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  • Harming as causing harm.Elizabeth Harman - 2009 - In M. A. Roberts & D. T. Wasserman (eds.), Harming Future Persons. Springer Verlag. pp. 137--154.
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  • Genes, identity, and the expressivist critique.Robert Sparrow - 2008 - In Loane Skene and Janna Thompson (ed.), The Sorting Society. Cambridge University Press. pp. 111-132..
    In this paper, I explore the “expressivist critique” of the use of prenatal testing to select against the birth of persons with impairments. I begin by setting out the expressivist critique and then highlighting, through an investigation of an influential objection to this critique, the ways in which both critics and proponents of the use of technologies of genetic selection negotiate a difficult set of dilemmas surrounding the relationship between genes and identity. I suggest that we may be able to (...)
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