The obscure content of hallucination

Sofia 8 (1):30-53 (2019)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Michael Tye proposed a way of understanding the content of hallucinatory experiences. Somewhat independently, Mark Johnston provided us with elements to think about the content of hallucination. In this paper, their views are compared and evaluated. Both their theories present intricate combinations of conjunctivist and disjunctivist strategies to account for perceptual content. An alternative view, which develops a radically disjunctivist account, is considered and rejected. Finally, the paper raises some metaphysical difficulties that seem to threaten any conjunctivist theory and to lead the debate to a dilemma: strong disjunctivists cannot explain the subjective indistinguishability between veridical and hallucinatory experiences, whereas conjunctivists cannot explain what veridical and hallucinatory experiences have in common. This dilemma is left here as an open challenge.
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2019-11-14
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
42 ( #44,671 of 51,422 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
21 ( #26,662 of 51,422 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.