On the Right to Justification and Discursive Respect

Dialogue 54 (4):703-726 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Rainer Forst’s constructivism argues that a right to justification provides a reasonably non-rejectable foundation of justice. With an exemplary focus on his attempt to ground human rights, I argue that this right cannot provide such a foundation. To accord to others such a right is to include them in the scope of discursive respect. But it is reasonably contested whether we should accord to others equal discursive respect. It follows that Forst’s constructivism cannot ground human rights, or justice, categorically. At best, it can ground them hypothetically. This opens the door wide for ethical foundations of human rights.

Author's Profile

Thomas M. Besch
Wuhan University

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-07-14

Downloads
755 (#20,810)

6 months
118 (#37,949)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?