A Failed Twist to an Old Problem: A Reply to John N. Williams

Logos and Episteme 7 (1):75-81 (2016)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
John N. Williams argued that Peter Klein's defeasibility theory of knowledge excludes the possibility of one knowing that one has a posteriori knowledge. He does that by way of adding a new twist to an objection Klein himself answered more than forty years ago. In this paper I argue that Williams' objection misses its target because of this new twist.
ISBN(s)
2069-0533
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BORAFT-2
Upload history
Archival date: 2017-01-08
View other versions
Added to PP index
2016-09-10

Total views
123 ( #33,220 of 54,546 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
25 ( #28,000 of 54,546 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.