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  1. added 2017-01-09
    Still a New Problem for Defeasibility: A Rejoinder to Borges.John N. Williams - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (1):83-94.
    I objected that the defeasibility theory of knowledge prohibits you from knowing that you know that p if your knowledge that p is a posteriori. Rodrigo Borges claims that Peter Klein has already satisfactorily answered a version of my objection. He attempts to defend Klein’s reply and argues that my objection fails because a principle on which it is based is false.I will show that my objection is not a version of the old one that Klein attempts (unsuccessfully) to address, (...)
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  2. added 2016-09-10
    A Failed Twist to an Old Problem: A Reply to John N. Williams.Rodrigo Borges - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (1):75 - 81.
    This is a reply to John N. Williams’ paper “Not Knowing You Know: A New Objection to the Defeasibility Theory of Knowledge'” (2015). That paper argues that Peter Klein’s defeasibility theory of knowledge excludes the possibility of one knowing that one has (first-order) a posteriori knowledge. Klein himself answered a version of this objection in his (1971). Williams’ paper adds a new twist to the 1971 objection. I argue that Williams’ objection misses its target because of this new twist.
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  3. added 2016-03-02
    Is Perception Inferential?William Cornwell - 2004 - In Johan Christian Marek & Maria Elisabeth Reicher (eds.), Experience and Analysis: Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium: August 8-14, 2004, Kirchberg am Wechsel, Vol. XII. Niederosterreichkultur. pp. 80-82.
    Applying a theory of psychological modularity, I argue for a theory of defeasibility conditions for the epistemic justification of perceptual beliefs. My theory avoids the extremes of holism (e.g., coherentism and confirmation holism) and of foundationalist theories of non-inferential justification.
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  4. added 2015-04-10
    Defeatism Defeated.Max Baker-Hytch & Matthew A. Benton - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):40-66.
    Many epistemologists are enamored with a defeat condition on knowledge. In this paper we present some implementation problems for defeatism, understood along either internalist or externalist lines. We then propose that one who accepts a knowledge norm of belief, according to which one ought to believe only what one knows, can explain away much of the motivation for defeatism. This is an important result, because on the one hand it respects the plausibility of the intuitions about defeat shared by many (...)
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  5. added 2015-03-26
    A Theory of Presumption for Everyday Argumentation.David M. Godden & Douglas N. Walton - 2007 - Pragmatics and Cognition 15 (2):313-346.
    The paper considers contemporary models of presumption in terms of their ability to contribute to a working theory of presumption for argumentation. Beginning with the Whatelian model, we consider its contemporary developments and alternatives, as proposed by Sidgwick, Kauffeld, Cronkhite, Rescher, Walton, Freeman, Ullmann-Margalit, and Hansen. Based on these accounts, we present a picture of presumptions characterized by their nature, function, foundation and force. On our account, presumption is a modal status that is attached to a claim and has the (...)
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