A Role for Judgment Aggregation in Coauthoring Scientific Papers

Erkenntnis 83 (2):231-252 (2018)
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Abstract
This paper addresses the problem of judgment aggregation in science. How should scientists decide which propositions to assert in a collaborative document? We distinguish the question of what to write in a collaborative document from the question of collective belief. We argue that recent objections to the application of the formal literature on judgment aggregation to the problem of judgment aggregation in science apply to the latter, not the former question. The formal literature has introduced various desiderata for an aggregation procedure. Proposition-wise majority voting emerges as a procedure that satisfies all desiderata which represent norms of science. An interesting consequence is that not all collaborating scientists need to endorse every proposition asserted in a collaborative document.
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2017, 2018
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BRIARF-2
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First archival date: 2017-03-27
Latest version: 2 (2018-03-12)
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2017-03-23

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