Hypocrisy and Conditional Requirements

Australasian Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
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Abstract

This paper considers the formulation of the moral requirement against hypocrisy, paying particular attention to the logical scope of ‘requires’ in that formulation. The paper argues (i) that we should prefer a wide-scope formulation to a narrow-scope formulation, and (ii) this result has some advantages for our normative theorizing about hypocrisy – in particular, it allows us to resist several of Daniela Dover’s (2019) recent arguments against the anti-hypocrisy requirement.

Author's Profile

John Brunero
University of Nebraska, Lincoln

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