Knowledge and truth: A skeptical challenge

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (1):93-101 (2019)
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Abstract

It is widely accepted in epistemology that knowledge is factive, meaning that only truths can be known. We argue that this theory creates a skeptical challenge: because many of our beliefs are only approximately true, and therefore false, they do not count as knowledge. We consider several responses to this challenge and propose a new one. We propose easing the truth requirement on knowledge to allow approximately true, practically adequate representations to count as knowledge. In addition to addressing the skeptical challenge, this view also coheres with several previous theoretical proposals in epistemology.

Author Profiles

John Turri
University of Waterloo
Wesley Buckwalter
George Mason University

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