Abstract

This chapter shows that Augustine’s “divine illumination theory of knowledge” is merely his belief that the human mind is capable of intellectual cognition because it naturally “participates” in the Divine Mind, as its image. Consequently, Bonaventure's and Gilson's claim that Augustine thought the human mind must be enlightened by special divine assistance in ordinary (non-mystical) intellectual cognition is erroneous. That is true of the whole of Augustine's writing career: earlier works such as On the Teacher and the Confessions agree with his presentation in On the Trinity 12. This resolution of a long-standing debate about how to interpret Augustine becomes possible when we pay careful attention to the ancient philosophical problems “illumination” is meant to resolve, and when we use Plotinus and the early Christian Neoplatonist Marius Victorinus to interpret his vocabulary and claims. The recovery of this late antique context greatly clarifies Augustine’s epistemological theory and reveals its explanatory power. For the Plotinian basis of the account is a synthesis of Aristotelian and Platonic elements that can explain why our minds are uniquely suited to abstracting intelligibility from sensory data, and how they do so.