On the Nature of Hinge Commitments

Sképsis 19 (forthcoming)
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Abstract
This is a critical commentary on Pritchard's book Epistemic Angst. In Section 2, I present the closure-based radical skeptical paradox. Then in Section 3, I sketch Pritchard’s undercutting response to this paradox. Finally, in Section 4, I put forward two concerns about Pritchard’s response and I also propose a reading of hinge commitments, the ability reading, that might put some pressure on Pritchard’s own reading of these commitments.
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First archival date: 2018-09-26
Latest version: 2 (2018-12-19)
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2018-09-26

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