On the Nature of Hinge Commitments

Sképsis 10 (19):55-66 (2019)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
This is a critical commentary on Pritchard's book Epistemic Angst. In Section 2, I present the closure-based radical skeptical paradox. Then in Section 3, I sketch Pritchard’s undercutting response to this paradox. Finally, in Section 4, I put forward two concerns about Pritchard’s response and I also propose a reading of hinge commitments, the ability reading, that might put some pressure on Pritchard’s own reading of these commitments.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
First archival date: 2018-09-26
Latest version: 2 (2018-12-19)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
On Certainty.Wittgenstein, Ludwig; Anscombe, G. E. M.; Von Wright, G. H. & Paul, Denis

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
91 ( #31,215 of 45,658 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
33 ( #23,654 of 45,658 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.