Collectives’ and individuals’ obligations: a parity argument

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):38-58 (2016)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Individuals have various kinds of obligations: keep promises, don’t cause harm, return benefits received from injustices, be partial to loved ones, help the needy and so on. How does this work for group agents? There are two questions here. The first is whether groups can bear the same kinds of obligations as individuals. The second is whether groups’ pro tanto obligations plug into what they all-things-considered ought to do to the same degree that individuals’ pro tanto obligations plug into what they all-things-considered ought to do. We argue for parity on both counts.
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
COLCAI-6
Upload history
First archival date: 2016-06-10
Latest version: 2 (2016-06-10)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2015-11-02

Total views
726 ( #8,089 of 65,602 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
20 ( #36,635 of 65,602 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.