Berkeley's active self

European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 1 (1):5-20 (2005)
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Abstract

The Author considers the strengths and weaknesses of Berkeley’s account of what he calls indifferently the soul, mind, spirit or self. Such an account deserves far more credit than he has standardly been awarded for a significantly modern position, most of which has mistakenly been credited to Schopenhauer. The Aauthor relates Berkeley’s views to those recently expressed by Bill Brewer and attempts to isolate the crucial difference between Berkeley and Schopenhauer.

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Jonathan Dancy
University of Texas at Austin

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