One standard to rule them all?

Ratio 32 (1):12-21 (2019)
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Abstract
It has been argued that an epistemically rational agent’s evidence is subjectively mediated through some rational epistemic standards, and that there are incompatible but equally rational epistemic standards available to agents. This supports Permissiveness, the view according to which one or multiple fully rational agents are permitted to take distinct incompatible doxastic attitudes towards P (relative to a body of evidence). In this paper, I argue that the above claims entail the existence of a unique and more reliable epistemic standard. My strategy relies on Condorcet’s Jury Theorem. This gives rise to an important problem for those who argue that epistemic standards are permissive, since the reliability criterion is incompatible with such a type of Permissiveness.
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Archival date: 2018-05-08
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The Uniqueness Thesis.Kopec, Matthew & Titelbaum, Michael
Immoderately Rational.Horowitz, Sophie

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