The explanatory role of consistency requirements
Synthese:1-19 (forthcoming)
Abstract
Is epistemic inconsistency a mere symptom of having violated other requirements of rationality—notably, reasons-responsiveness requirements? Or is inconsistency irrational on its own? This question has important implications for the debate on the normativity of epistemic rationality. In this paper, I defend a new account of the explanatory role of the requirement of epistemic consistency. Roughly, I will argue that, in cases where an epistemically rational agent is permitted to believe P and also permitted to disbelieve P, the consistency requirement plays a distinct explanatory role. I will also argue that such a type of permissiveness is a live possibility when it comes to rational epistemic standards.
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Archival date: 2018-09-19
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What We Owe to Each Other.Scanlon, Thomas
Rationality Through Reasoning.Broome, John
Justification and the Truth-Connection.Littlejohn, Clayton
Risk and Rationality.Buchak, Lara
Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Lasonen-Aarnio, Maria
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2018-09-19
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2018-09-19
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136 ( #24,059 of 44,434 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
42 ( #18,501 of 44,434 )
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