La moción divina ante la contingencia y la libertad de las creaturas según santo Tomás y Domingo Báñez
Scripta Fulgentina 30:39-64 (2020)
AbstractAgainst an interpretation of Saint Thomas Aquinas’s thought that understands the divine motion of the created will only providing a generic impulse to it, in this article is defended that God moves specifically for every good choice. This motion doesn’t prevent at all the contingency of creatures and neither freedom of choice. Is also shown how Báñez’s thought is quite faithful to Saint Thomas in this and doesn’t intend anything else but simply to make it known and defend it from molinists misinterpretations. That’s why is shown that the divine motion of the will doesnt's make God responsible for sin, especially since that would only be possible if divine causality were not the action of the eternal God, who is outside the created causality.
Archival historyFirst archival date: 2021-01-21
Latest version: 2 (2021-01-22)
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