Abstract

What does Martin Heidegger say about sex or gender? According to most accounts, including Derrida’s influential essay “Geschlecht: Sexual Difference, Ontological Difference,” Heidegger makes a marginal reference to sex in a 1928 Marburg lecture later translated as The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic (GA 26). However, an earlier allusion to sexual difference appears in a 1923 Freiburg lecture, translated as Ontology—the Hermeneutics of Facticity (GA 63) where he explains why he uses the term “Dasein” instead of “man” in his existential analytic. “Man” carries his own historical baggage, representing a living being endowed with reason, as well as a pregiven understanding of what it means to be a person. This latter definition has its roots in a Judeo-Christian tradition where “man” is created in the image of God as the first born of many “brethren.” In a perplexing move, Heidegger then cites biblical passages to highlight the sexed emergence of man in Genesis as he poses the question, “Problem: What is woman?” (GA 63, 22/18). This chapter untangles what it means for Heidegger to ask such a question, particularly as he leaves it unanswered and seemingly negligible in his pursuit of a hermeneutics of facticity. Heidegger states, “Hermeneutics is itself not a philosophy. It wishes only to place an object which has hitherto fallen into forgetfulness before today’s philosophers for their ‘well-disposed consideration’” (GA 63, 20/16). I place the object of sex/gender facticity before today’s philosophers, situating the “Problem: What is woman?” within the context of Heidegger’s larger ontological project, namely to rediscover the question of being. Captured in the eponymous title Ontology—the Hermeneutics of Facticity is the insight that the study of being (ontology) can only be carried out as an interpretive non-objectifying process (hermeneutics) of our existence at a particular time in history (facticity). What does it mean to exist as a certain sex or gender during a particular time? How are sex and gender related to the question of being and the ontological difference? How are we defining sex and gender and to which term does Heidegger refer? Throughout this chapter, I will examine a few instances where Heidegger reckons with the sex/gender question. By posing the inquiry, “Problem: What is Woman?” within the parameters of Heidegger’s larger ontological project, I suggest that sex and gender must be fluid categories insofar as such properties describe the “whatness” of our existence rather than the “how” of our world-forming. That is, Dasein is neutral with respect to these categories as such attributes only show up after a time reckoning with an original position of care-lessness. I also suggest that Heidegger privileges sex/gender facticity in undergirding such neutrality as he contests Christian origin stories of the flesh (GA 63) and evolutionary theories associated with the Lebensphilosophie of his time (GA 26). Finally, I conclude by demonstrating how Heidegger’s distinction between Körper and Leib further upholds sex and gender fluidity.