Scepticism

In William J. Abraham Frederick D. Aquino (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Epistemology of Theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 290-308 (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
To what extent are the answers to theological questions knowable? And if the relevant answers are knowable, which sorts of inquirers are in a position to know them? In this chapter we shall not answer these questions directly but instead supply a range of tools that may help us make progress here. The tools consist of plausible structural constraints on knowledge. After articulating them, we shall go on to indicate some ways in which they interact with theological scepticism. In some cases the structural constraints bear directly on whether one can know answers to theological questions. But the structural considerations are related to theological scepticism in other interesting ways as well; for instance we will also be using them to explore the significance of scepticism, by addressing questions such as ‘To what extent does it matter whether or not we can know the answer to theological questions?’
PhilPapers/Archive ID
DUNS-4
Revision history
Archival date: 2017-08-14
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
God and Interpersonal Knowledge.Matthew A. Benton - 2018 - Res Philosophica 95 (3):421-447.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2014-12-03

Total views
202 ( #19,992 of 47,209 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
27 ( #27,318 of 47,209 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.