A Paradox for the Intrinsic Value of Freedom of Choice

Noûs 54 (4):891-913 (2020)
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Abstract

A standard liberal claim is that freedom of choice is not only instrumentally valuable but also intrinsically valuable, that is, valuable for its own sake. I argue that each one of five conditions is plausible if freedom of choice is intrinsically valuable. Yet there exists a counter-example to the conjunction of these conditions. Hence freedom of choice is not intrinsically valuable.

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Johan E. Gustafsson
University of Texas at Austin

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