More Than a Feeling

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):425-442 (2014)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
According to rationalist conceptions of moral agency, the constitutive capacities of moral agency are rational capacities. So understood, rationalists are often thought to have a problem with feeling. For example, many believe that rationalists must reject the attractive Aristotelian thought that moral activity is by nature pleasant. I disagree. It is easy to go wrong here because it is easy to assume that pleasure is empirical rather than rational and so extrinsic rather than intrinsic to moral agency, rationalistically conceived. Drawing on underappreciated elements of Kant’s moral psychology, I sketch an alternative form of rationalism, according to which moral activity is by nature pleasant because at least some pleasures are by nature rational.
Reprint years
2014
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
ELIMTA
Revision history
First archival date: 2014-09-11
Latest version: 3 (2014-12-16)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Critique of the Power of Judgment.Ginsborg, Hannah; Kant, Immanuel; Guyer, Paul & Matthews, Eric

View all 8 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2014-09-11

Total downloads
197 ( #13,094 of 37,182 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
18 ( #18,480 of 37,182 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.