Self‐Assessment and Social Practices

Journal of Social Philosophy 48 (2):144-164 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article develops and defends a social practice-based theory of personal ideals. After sketching this theory, I show how it undermines the sharp dichotomy between evaluative self-assessment and assessment of one’s social standing that underlies common objections to accounts of pride and shame (such as Rawls’s account of shame) that explain these emotions in terms of personal ideals.

Author's Profile

Jeremy Fischer
Independent Scholar

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-06-22

Downloads
452 (#52,471)

6 months
96 (#57,158)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?