What is it to have and act on a personal ideal? Someone who aspires to be a philosopher might imaginatively think “I am a philosopher” by way of motivating herself to think hard about a philosophical question. But doing so seems to require her to act on an inaccurate self-description, given that she isn’t yet what she regards herself as being. J. David Velleman develops the thought that action-by-ideal involves a kind of fictional self-conception. My aim is to expand (...) our thinking about personal ideals by developing another way of understanding them. On this view action-by-ideal involves a kind of metaphorical self-conception. I investigate some salient differences between these views with the aim of understanding the different perspectives they take on the rationality of action-by-ideal. Where the fiction view runs into problems of literary coherence, the metaphor view exploits the richness of poetic invention. But action-by-ideal is a complex phenomenon about which there may be no tidy story to be told. This paper is an attempt to clarify and understand more of this messy terrain. (shrink)

Much of the philosophical attention directed to pride focuses on the normative puzzle of determining how pride can be both a central vice and a central virtue. But there is another puzzle, a descriptive puzzle, of determining how the emotion of pride and the character trait of pride relate to each other. A solution is offered to the descriptive puzzle that builds upon the accounts of Hume and Gabriele Taylor, but avoids the pitfalls of those accounts. In particular, the emotion (...) and the trait correspond to two employments of personal ideals: personal ideals as standards of self-assessment and personal ideals as practical guides in one’s deliberation and related activities. This account, in turn, provides a framework for solving the normative puzzle. (shrink)

Respect for autonomy is a central moral principle in bioethics. The concept of autonomy can be construed in various ways. Under the non-ideal conceptualization proposed by Beauchamp and Childress, everyday choices of generally competent persons are autonomous to the extent that they are intentional and are made with understanding and without controlling influences. It is sometimes suggested that authenticity is important to personal autonomy, so that inauthenticity prevents otherwise autonomous persons from making autonomous decisions. Building from Beauchamp and Childress’s (...) theory, this article develops a non-ideal authenticity-based conceptualization of personal autonomy. Factors that indicate inauthentic decision-making are explicated, and the full concept is defended from three expected objections. The theory is then tested on a paradigm case which has concerned theorists and practitioners for some time, namely the possible inauthenticity of anorexia nervosa patients’ decision-making. It is concluded that the theory seems to be fruitful in analyses of the degree of autonomy of patients’ decision-making, and that it succeeds in providing reliable action-guidance in practical contexts. (shrink)

When we admire a person, we don’t just have a wow-response towards them, as we might towards a painting or a sunset. Rather, we construe them as realizing an ideal of the person in their lives to a conspicuous degree. To merit admiration, it is not enough simply to do something valuable or to possess desirable character traits. Rather, one’s achievements must manifest commitments and character traits that define a worthwhile ideal. Agential admiration, I argue, is a person-focused attitude like (...) shame, contempt, and hubristic pride, not an act-focused one like gratitude or guilt, not to mention mere evaluation as excellent. Given its holistic focus, its motivational effects permeate our interactions with its target, who is construed as an exemplar. Consequently, even if someone is admirable in some way, admiring them may be all-things-considered inappropriate, if they fall short of other ideals that we ought to care about. (shrink)

In “Artistic Worth and Personal Taste,” Jerrold Levinson develops a problem for those who think we should strive to be “ideal critics” in our aesthetic lives. He then offers several solutions to this problem. I argue that his solutions miss the mark and that the problem he characterizes may not be genuine after all.

What is it for a person to have style? Philosophers working in action theory, ethics, and aesthetics are surprisingly quiet on this question. I begin by considering whether theories of artistic style shed any light on it. Many philosophers, artists, and art historians are attracted to some version of the view that artistic style is the expression of personality. I clarify this view and argue that it is implausible for both artistic style and, suitably modified, personal style. In fact, (...) both theories of style crack along the same line, which suggests that they can indeed be mutually illuminating. I articulate and defend a view of personal style according to which, roughly, having style is a matter of expressing one’s ideals. I show how this illuminates the widely neglected value of personal style and propose a new, analogous theory of individual artistic style: artistic style is the expression of the ideals the artist has for her art. (shrink)

I argue that advocates of moderate epistemic idealization need some standards against which they can determine whether a particular individual P has a responsibility to acquire some specific piece of information α. Such a specification is necessary for the purpose of determining whether a reason R, the recognition of which depends on accounting for α, can legitimately be ascribed to P. To this end, I propose an initial sketch of a criterion that may be helpful in illuminating the conditions in (...) which P might be said to have a responsibility to take α into account when searching for reasons to act or believe. I worry that reason ascriptions that are based on information acquisition expectations which are not captured by this criterion may be open to charges of authoritarianism, especially when such a reason ascription prompts one person to demand that another act in a way that is responsive to the ascribed reason. (shrink)

Despite the growing attention to oppression and resistance in social and political philosophy as well as ethics, philosophers continue to struggle to describe and appropriately attribute agency under non-ideal circumstances of oppression and structural injustice. This chapter identifies some features of new accounts of non-ideal agency and then examines a particular problem for such theories, what Serene Khader has called the agency dilemma. Under the agency dilemma, attempts to articulate the agency of subjects living under oppression must on the one (...) hand avoid overemphasizing constraints on agency, and thereby producing paternalistic theories that “deny agency” for oppressed subjects, and on the other hand avoid failing to fully appreciate the effects of oppression on agency, thereby missing crucial features of how oppression unjustly shapes a person’s lived possibilities. This chapter traces this dilemma to a preoccupation with ascribing agency, which produces problematic descriptive and political effects for theorizing agency under oppression: what the author calls an asymmetry problem and a disenfranchisement problem. Finally, the chapter proposes that the agency dilemma might be ameliorated if theorists scrutinize more closely how moral, epistemic, and political agency interact and overlap in life under oppression. (shrink)

Rawls’s contractualist approach to justice is well known for its adoption of ideal theory. This approach starts by setting out the political goal or ideal and leaves it to non-ideal or partial compliance theory to map out how to get there. However, Rawls’s use of ideal theory has been criticized by Sen from the right and by Mouffe from the left. We critically address these concerns in the context of developing a Rawlsian approach to climate justice. While the importance of (...) non-ideal theory for climate justice is increasingly being understood, its strategic and institutional importance for a Rawlsian approach needs further elaboration. We focus on the role of the Kantian conception of the reasonable and rational powers of persons in Rawls’s work and show how this helps us to develop a partial compliance theory that focuses on the importance of institutions and strategic political action for achieving climate justice. (shrink)

When involved in a disagreement, a common reaction is to tell oneself that, given that the information about one’s own epistemic standing is clearly superior in both amount and quality to the information about one’s opponent’s epistemic standing, one is justified in one’s confidence that one’s view is correct. In line with this natural reaction to disagreement, some contributors to the debate on its epistemic significance have claimed that one can stick to one’s guns by relying in part on information (...) about one’s first-order evidence and the functioning of one’s cognitive capacities. In this article, I argue that such a manoeuvre to settle controversies encounters the problem that both disputants can make use of it, the problem that one may be wrong about one’s current conscious experience, and the problem that it is a live possibility that many of one’s beliefs are the product of epistemically distorting factors. I also argue that, even if we grant that personal information is reliable, when it comes to real-life rather than idealized disagreements, the extent of the unpossessed information about one’s opponent’s epistemic standing provides a reason for doubting that personal information can function as a symmetry breaker. (shrink)

Obligations to reduce one’s green house gas emissions appear to be difficult to justify prior to large-scale collective action because an individual’s emissions have virtually no impact on the environmental problem. However, I show that individuals’ emissions choices raise the question of whether or not they can be justified as fair use of what remains of a safe global emissions budget. This is true both before and after major mitigation efforts are in place. Nevertheless, it remains difficult to establish an (...) obligation to reduce personal emissions because it appears unlikely that governments will in fact maintain safe emissions budgets. The result, I claim, is that under current conditions we lack outcome, fairness, promotional, virtue or duty based grounds for seeing personal emissions reductions as morally obligatory. (shrink)

We make choices about our own appearance and evaluate others' choices – every day. These choices are meaningful for us as individuals and as members of communities. But many features of personal appearance are due to luck, and many cultural beauty standards make some groups and individuals worse off (this is called “lookism”). So, how are we to square these two facets of personal appearance? And how are we to evaluate agency in the context of personal beauty? (...) I identify three ways of responding to these questions: beauty advo- cacy, beauty skepticism, and beauty revisionism. Advocates connect an honorific sense of beauty with personal charac- ter. Skeptics focus on beauty standards, and primarily offer a social critique of beauty standards. Some skeptics suggest embracing other aesthetic ideals – even ugliness. Revision- ists critique beauty standards, but retain an honorific sense of beauty. Each position offers tools to evaluate personal agency as aesthetic agency, whether first-personally or through our appreciation of others' appearance. (shrink)

What is artistic style? In the literature one answer to this question has proved influential: the view that artistic style is the expression of personality. In what follows we elaborate upon and evaluatively compare the two most plausible versions of this view with a new proposal—that style is the expression of the artist’s ideals for her art. We proceed by comparing the views’ answers to certain questions we think a theory of individual artistic style should address: Are there limits (...) on what range of features can figure in a style? Can flaws be stylistic? Are there limits on the range of art forms across which a given style can be exhibited? To what extent is a style a kind of unity, and why? What makes style an artistic achievement? Why do we care about style? By considering the different views' answers to these questions we argue that our proposal is a workable theory of individual style and suggest that it fares better on the whole than both versions of the influential and widely accepted view. (shrink)

Authenticity has become a widespread ethical ideal that represents a way of dealing with normative gaps in contemporary life. This ideal suggests that one should be true to oneself and lead a life expressive of what one takes oneself to be. However, many contemporary thinkers have pointed out that the ideal of authenticity has increasingly turned into a kind of aestheticism and egoistic self-indulgence. In his book, Varga systematically constructs a critical concept of authenticity that takes into account the reciprocal (...) shaping of capitalism and the ideal of authenticity. Drawing on different traditions in critical social theory, moral philosophy and phenomenology, Varga builds a concept of authenticity that can make intelligible various problematic and potentially exhausting practices of the self. (shrink)

The Galilean explanatory style is characterized by the search for the underlying structure of phenomena, the positing of "deep" explanatory principles, and a view of the relation between theory and data, on which the search for "crucial data" is of primary importance. In this paper, I trace the dynamics of adopting the Galilean style, focusing on the science of episodic memory. I argue that memory systems, such as episodic and semantic memory, were posited as underlying competences producing the observable phenomena (...) of memory. Considered in idealized isolation from other systems, episodic memory was taken to underlay the ability of individuals to remember events from their personal past. Yet, in reality, memory systems regularly interact, standing in many-to-many relations to actual memory tasks and experiences. Upon this backdrop, I explore a puzzle about the increasing prominence of the notion of autonoetic consciousness in Tulving's theory of episodic memory. I argue that, contrary to widespread belief, the prominence is not best explained by the purported essential link between autonoetic consciousness and episodic memory. Rather, it is explained by the fact that autonoetic consciousness, hypothesized to uniquely accompany episodic retrieval, was considered a source of crucial data, predictable only from theories positing a functionally distinct episodic memory system. However, with the emergence of a new generation of theories, positing wider memory systems for remembering and imagination, the question of the relation between episodic memory and autonoetic consciousness has been reopened. This creates a pressing need for de-idealization, triggering a new search for crucial data. (shrink)

What is it to share the same concept? The question is an important one since sharing the same concept explains our ability to non-accidentally coordinate on the same topic over time and between individuals. Moreover, concept identity grounds key logical relations among thought contents such as samesaying, contradiction, validity, and entailment. Finally, an account of concept identity is crucial to explaining and justifying epistemic efforts to better understand the precise contents of our thoughts. The key question, then, is what psychological (...) and social facts could play these roles? Elsewhere, we have argued for a specific relational model of concept identity, the connectedness model (e.g. Schroeter 2012, Schroeter and Schroeter 2014, 2015). Our aim in this chapter is to further explain the motivations behind that account, to address worries about transitivity and vagueness, and to contrast our approach with closely related accounts of concept identity developed by François Recanati and Simon Prosser. -/- What’s distinctive of our approach is that we seek to vindicate the first-person epistemic perspective of concept users. Concepts, on our account, play a crucial normative role in setting regulative ideals for the representational practices in which individual subjects participate. This focus on the normative role of concepts – as opposed to a purely causal explanatory role – motivates our approach to concept identity and our toleration of vagueness and borderline cases. (shrink)

The phrase ‘person‐centred care’ (PCC) reminds us that the fundamental philosophical goal of caring for people is to uphold or promote their personhood. However, such an idea has translated into promoting individualist notions of autonomy, empowerment and personal responsibility in the context of consumerism and neoliberalism, which is problematic both conceptually and practically. From a conceptual standpoint, it ignores the fact that humans are social, historical and biographical beings, and instead assumes an essentialist or idealized concept of personhood in (...) which a person is viewed as an individual static object. From a practical standpoint, the application of such a concept of personhood can lead to neglect of a person's fundamental care needs and exacerbate the problems of social inequity, in particular for older people and people with dementia. Therefore, we argue that our understanding of PCC must instead be based on a dynamic concept of personhood that integrates the relevant social, relational, temporal and biographical dimensions. We propose that the correct concept of personhood in PCC is one in which persons are understood as socially embedded, relational and temporally extended subjects rather than merely individual, autonomous, asocial and atemporal objects. We then present a reconceptualization of the fundamental philosophical goal of PCC as promoting selfhood rather than personhood. Such a reconceptualization avoids the problems that beset the concept of personhood and its application in PCC, while also providing a philosophical foundation for the growing body of empirical literature that emphasizes the psychosocial, relational, subjective and biographical dimensions of PCC. (shrink)

Mistakes are a fact of life, and the criminal law is sadly no exception to the rule. Wrongful convictions are rightfully abhorred, and false acquittals can likewise inspire outrage. In these cases, we implicitly draw a distinction between a court’s finding and a defendant’s actual guilt or innocence. These are intuitive concepts, but as this paper aims to show, contemporary use of the reasonable person standard in the law of self-defense muddles them. -/- Ordinarily, we can distinguish between a person's (...) material guilt or innocence and his juridical guilt or innocence. Someone is materially guilty if his actions in fact matched the conduct proscribed by the penal law. Someone is juridically guilty if he is found guilty by a tribunal, i.e., convicted by a judge or jury. When a tribunal convicts a innocent person or acquits a guilty person, the accuracy of its verdicts can be criticized. -/- There are three definitions of the reasonable person extant amongst courts and commentators: the reasonable person is either (1) a hypothetical ordinary, average person; (2) the embodiment of a community ideal; or (3) an embodiment of an objective ethical standard, i.e., ethical principles independent of community opinion. Nonetheless, after observing the circularity, vagueness, and lack of consistency in the definitions, wise courts and commentators have sometimes resorted to identifying the reasonable person with the judgment of the jury. -/- This piece argues that failure to settle on a fixed definition of the "reasonable person" in the criminal law of self-defense effectively conflates material guilt and innocence and juridical guilt and innocence at the doctrinal level. When courts do not clearly and consistently choose between standards one, two, and three, or when they expressly treat the reasonable person as a form of words standing in for the judgment of the jury, they make it conceptually impossible for observers outside the court system to apply a fixed, definite standard to assess the actual guilt of a person apart from the judgments of tribunals. -/- This paper's main purpose is to identify a conceptual knot rather than propose reforms. Still, it recommends two small changes meant to lift the confusion surrounding the reasonable person. First, it urges that courts expressly settle on one of the three definitions canvassed above. Second, it recommends that courts be mindful of the nature of the reasonable person standard and as such, be wary of treating conclusions about reasonableness as ordinary legal precedents, and wield the power of directed verdict aggressively to protect unpopular defendants from abuse by juries. (shrink)

Publics trust experts for personal and pro-social reasons. Scientists are among the experts publics trust most, and so, epistemic trust is routinely afforded to them. The call for epistemic trust to be more socially situated in order to account for the impact of science on society and public welfare is at the forefront of enhanced epistemic trust. I argue that the value-free ideal for science challenges establishing enhanced epistemic trust by preventing the inclusion of non-epistemic values throughout the evaluation (...) of evidence and communication of these values. By selectively silencing non-epistemic values, the ideal cannot take into account publics’ social and moral responses to inductive risk, which are instrumental for defining and determining public welfare. Furthermore, by emphasising epistemic values almost exclusively in science education and communication, the value-free ideal is presented to publics in such a way that it becomes a social indicator of trust. I show this through examination of the importance of values in decisions to trust, and conclude that values (and restrictions on them) can be used by lay publics to help decide which experts to trust. (shrink)

In an era defined by events that continuously shake Fukuyama’s thesis according to which liberal democracy constitutes the end of History, there is need for a democratic ideal that puts the role of civic action at the heart of its justification. In this article, I argue that John Dewey’s democratic ideal understood as a matter of civic co-creation, where democratic pursuits are continually redefined by citizens through solving communal problems - not set by history, once and for all - provides (...) a valuable response to this need. To this end, this article reconsiders Deweyan democracy by:(1) presenting it as a transformational process, in opposition to liberal democracy; (2) discussing Dewey’s conception of active citizenship as requiring more than mere political participation; (3) articulating Dewey’s democratic ideal as a form of applied social intelligence; (4) making explicit the pedagogical consequences of Deweyan democracy; and (5) interpreting it as a form of peaceful conflict resolution aiming at balance in inter-personal relationships. (shrink)

Public life abounds with examples of people whose beliefs—especially political beliefs—seem suspiciously convenient: consider, for example, the billionaire who believes that all taxation is unjust, or the Supreme Court Justice whose interpretations of what the law says reliably line up with her personal political convictions. After presenting what I take to be the best argument for the epistemological relevance of suspicious convenience, I diagnose how attempts to resist this argument rest on a kind of epistemological ideal theory, in a (...) sense to be made precise. And I argue that the ways in which this ideal theory can be deployed in defense of suspiciously convenient beliefs brings out the pernicious and distorting nature of such ideal theory in epistemology. (shrink)

Part of John Andrew Rice’s legacy, besides being a founder of Black Mountain College, is his vision of what a small liberal arts college curriculum should be. This vision helps shed light on some possible avenues by which to answer the following important questions: What implications do John Dewey’s progressive educational ideas have for experimenting with curricular design at small colleges? Does the college teacher’s struggle for improvement or growth depend on her having a belief that there is an ideal (...) liberal arts college curriculum? Probably the best known of such ready-made curricula is the Great Books Program, which employs a list of classic primary-source texts as the entry point into highly engaged dialogue, scholarship and learning guided by a teacher or tutor. In order to answer these questions, the paper turns to the historical debate between John Dewey and Robert Maynard Hutchins over the relative merits of progressive educational ideals and the Great Books approach. Most who have commented on this debate emphasize the differences between Dewey and Hutchins’ views.[ii] While Dewey emphasized learning through practical problem solving, in a dynamic mix of subject matter and method, Hutchins stressed exposure to and discussion of at least one-hundred primary texts in the Western canon, from Plato and Aristotle to Emerson and J.S. Mill. Hutchins resisted what he saw as the progressive educator’s push to transform the proper end of educating the whole person into training her for a particular vocation. In response, Dewey criticized Hutchins’ insistence that there existed a “hierarchy of truths” and that higher learning should remain aloof to the concerns of everyday life. Few commentators, however, mention the significant areas of agreement between the pedagogical approaches of Dewey and Hutchins, as well as other Great Books scholars. Since Rice praised the ideas of at least one Great Books proponent (Stringfellow Barr of St. John’s College), a more positive reconstruction of the Dewey-Hutchins exchange helps us to see how Dewey’s ideas informed Rice’s vision for the experimental college at Black Mountain—or so I argue.[iii]. (shrink)

The attitudes P. F. Strawson dubs reactive are felt toward another (or oneself). They are thus at least in part affective reactions to what Strawson describes as qualities of will that people manifest toward others and themselves. The reactive attitudes are also interpersonal, relating persons to persons. But how do they relate persons? On the deontic, imperative view, they relate persons in second-personal authority and accountability relations. After addressing how best to understand the reactive attitudes as sentiments, I evaluate (...) the deontic imperative view. I argue that the modality of reactive attitudes is not invariably deontic nor is their mood invariably imperative. Certain reactive attitudes are aretaic, appellative sentiments that prescribe non-jural ideals of conduct or character. Although expansive, my resulting conception of the reactive attitudes escapes the charge of failing to distinguish reactive sentiments from “disengaged aesthetic reactions” to the beautiful and ugly in human action and character. (shrink)

Peoples often question the relevance of spiritualism in their modern life. They want to know why they should know what they are within and why should they bother to change themselves. With rapid changes in the socio-economic aspects of life all over the world, peoples are under intense pressure, and are seeking something, which will help them to successfully deal with union with the universal and transcendent existence. Today many people are shifting to spiritual approach to life but relevant number (...) does not know how. We all desire a work experience that can fit neatly with our personal lives. We all seek balance. Too often however people’s work life overpowers the rest if their life. And when that happens, we can very easily find ourselves struggling to keep up in all areas of our lives. Life is not all-play –no –work. Neither it is all-work-no-play. It has its own course of mixed actions. Work culture also plays an important role in human life. It means work-related activities and the meanings attached to such activities in the framework of norms and values regarding work these activities, norms and values are generally conceptualized in an organization. Understanding this chemistry and accepting the facts as its, is the starting point of a better life. When this happens the discussion has developed into a full-fledged philosophical one. And we come to ethics or moral philosophy and spiritualism. In this chapter we will study the philosophical outlook of work as a moral ideal in the form of karma. (shrink)

This article develops and defends a social practice-based theory of personal ideals. After sketching this theory, I show how it undermines the sharp dichotomy between evaluative self-assessment and assessment of one’s social standing that underlies common objections to accounts of pride and shame (such as Rawls’s account of shame) that explain these emotions in terms of personal ideals.

This paper addresses the issue of finite versus countable additivity in Bayesian probability and decision theory -- in particular, Savage's theory of subjective expected utility and personal probability. I show that Savage's reason for not requiring countable additivity in his theory is inconclusive. The assessment leads to an analysis of various highly idealised assumptions commonly adopted in Bayesian theory, where I argue that a healthy dose of, what I call, conceptual realism is often helpful in understanding the interpretational value (...) of sophisticated mathematical structures employed in applied sciences like decision theory. In the last part, I introduce countable additivity into Savage's theory and explore some technical properties in relation to other axioms of the system. (shrink)

Economic theories of democratic legitimacy (discussed here as minimalist theories) have criticized deliberative accounts of democratic legitimacy on the grounds that they do not represent a practical possibility and that they create conditions that make actual democracies worse. It is not simply that they represent the wrong ideal. Rather, they are too idealistic – failing to show proper regard for the cognitive and moral limitations of persons and the depth of disagreement in democratic society. This article aims to show (1) (...) that the minimalist criterion of democratic legitimacy is self-defeating and (2) that even if there are minimal cognitive, moral, and social requirements for the possibility of practicable deliberative democracy, these limitations do not necessarily impose insuperable barriers for democratic deliberation as the normative basis of democratic legitimacy. Thus, the limiting facts do not dictate the structure of appropriate normative models of democracy in the way minimalists have supposed. (shrink)

La question des rapports du spinozisme à l’axiologie a fait l’objet de nombreux débats. Certains commentateurs considèrent Spinoza comme étant profondément immoraliste, alors que pour d’autres, il maintient l'ensemble des valeurs humaines. Spinoza a cherché à dépasser l’utilitarisme propre au conatus de chacun, afin de fonder un altruisme rationnel. Il souligne que le bien auquel l’homme aspire lorsqu’il suit la vertu, il le désirera aussi pour tous les autres hommes. Cependant, les moyens mis en œuvre pour démontrer cette thèse semblent (...) problématiques. Cet article analyse la logique de la coopération interhumaine élaborée par Spinoza, ainsi que son idéal de l’homme libre, montrant, qu'en fait, il n'a pas réussi à surmonter la nature profondément égoïste du conatus. -/- The question of the relationship between Spinozism and axiology has been the subject of much debate. Some commentators consider Spinoza to be profoundly immoralist, while for others he upholds the set of human values. Spinoza sought to go beyond the utilitarianism proper to the conatus of each person, in order to establish a rational altruism. He emphasizes that the good to which man aspires when he follows virtue, he will also desire for all other men. However, the means used to demonstrate this thesis seem problematic. This article analyzes Spinoza's logic of interhuman cooperation, as well as his ideal of the free man, showing that, in fact, he failed to overcome the profoundly egoistic nature of conatus. -/- . (shrink)

This paper focuses on an especially urgent challenge to the legitimacy of the common school ideal—a challenge that has hardly been addressed within contemporary debates within liberal philosophy of education. The challenge arises from claims to accommodation by queer people and queer communities—claims that are based on notions of queerness and queer identity that are seriously underrepresented within contemporary liberal political and educational theory. The paper articulates a liberal view of personal autonomy that is constituted by a conception of (...) practical reasoning rooted in thick communal experiences. It is argued that common schools concerned with equal concern for the autonomy of all children must attend to the specific communal requirements needed to developing the autonomous practical reasoning of queer children—requirements for what is termed a sense of ‘futurity’. Five practical recommendations for common schools are briefly outlined. The paper concludes with some reflections on the divergent and convergent interests of queer theory and liberalism, and considers some possibilities for a partial reconciliation of the two theoretical perspectives. (shrink)

The major stages of development of cosmic pedagogy have been researched. Based on the achievements of the modern neurosciences as well as of psychology, cosmology, and philosophy, the authors provide their reasoning for the cosmic education and its outlooks for the educational systems of the world. Through the studies of how important human mind is for the Earth and the cosmos and by researching the evolution of human mind within the structure of the Universe, the authors create a more advanced (...) scientific and philosophic basis for the cosmic education where the subject is a comprehensive process of formation and directed progress of both an individual mind and a conglomerate of minds called the "psychospace". The cosmic education researches the permanent progress of the intelligent matter of the Earth. The purpose of the cosmic education has been determined as formation of a planetary and cosmic personality. According to the authors, a planetary and cosmic personality is a harmony of mind, soul, and body, and such harmony is directed to usethe internal creative potential of mind to the benefit of the intelligent matter of the entire Earthand the cosmos. The properties of such a planetary and cosmic personality are being improved continuously; they are a sample (the ideal) of the cosmic pedagogy and the image of a human being of the future. Through the usage of the entire potential and art of upbringing and educating, the cosmic pedagogy is called to embody the major properties of the image of a human being of the future in the new generations of minds and to form a planetary and cosmic personalitycapable of self-actualization to the benefit of the permanent progress of the intelligent matter. (shrink)

ABSTRACT A Third-Person-Based or Third-Personal Judgment-Dependent account of mental content implies that, as an a priori matter, facts about a subject’s mental content are precisely captured by the judgments of a second-person or an interpreter. Alex Byrne, Bill Child, and others have discussed attributing such a view to Donald Davidson. This account significantly departs from a First-Person-Based or First-Personal Judgment-Dependent account, such as Crispin Wright’s, according to which, as an a priori matter, facts about intentional content are constituted (...) by the judgments of the subject herself, formed under certain optimal or cognitively ideal conditions. I will argue for two claims: (1) Attributing a Third-Personal Judgment-Dependent account to Davidson is unjustified; Davidson’s view is much closer to a non-reductionist First-Personal Judgment-Dependent account. (2) Third-Personal accounts rest on a misconstrual of the role of an interpreter in the First-Personal accounts; the notion of an interpreter still plays an essential role in the latter ones. (shrink)

I tried to tease out what Gilbert means by "normative". It isn't obvious. I conclude that assumptions about ideal agents – not just ideal in the sense of error-free but also ideal in the sense of unlimited – and assumptions about ideal placement of oneself in another person's situation, are essential to what he means. I conclude that what he says is very plausible given these assumptions, though they themselves are very problematic. Especially problematic is the idea of an unlimited (...) simulation of a limited agent's perspective. (shrink)

Will I die? As a hypothesis, in my natural scientific understanding, the psyche, is nothing more than, and exclusively just some states of my living brain – I will die as a result of his death. -/- In presented answer, psyche – itself own immediate reality itself, that is – undoubted. -/- This work was performed in reality “in the first person” (“subjective reality”, “phenomenal consciousness”). To realize, how, what it is the reality of the “in the first person” let’s (...) imagine ourselves as an experimenter, who does not replace reality with reasoning about it. – Now for us, as experimenters, how (what it is) psychic is an immediate and undoubted reality. And the awareness of “I am” is a direct reality, and not knowledge about it, which is always doubtful. That is, in psychic reality, nothing prevents us from answering undoubtedly and definitively the question, asked by this psychic reality itself about itself. The author acts from the position of “being in reality – not going beyond its limits, for example, into philosophy” (philosophy, including methodology, is the replacement of reality itself with always dubious reasoning about reality) – explores phenomenal consciousness (“psychic”) directly and as an immediate reality. That is, this work is the mastery of psychic reality through subjective-psychical experimentation – don’t philosophize, but experiment! -/- For example, Descartes, introspectively experimenting in his own psyche reality with his own psyche, informed us about the immutability of the “mind” and proposed to understand this immutability as our own immortality: “the mind does not represent any combination of accidents, it is a pure substance, and although all its accidents are subject to change, it understands some things, it desires others or feels others, etc. – nevertheless, in itself it does not change; and as for the human body, it changes, if only because they are subject to a change in the shape of some of its parts. It follows from this that the body perishes very easily, while the mind, by its very nature, is immortal” (Декарт Р., p. 13). Note that, Descartes did not realize that he was immortal, but logically deduced his own immortality from the immutability of the mind. However, Descartes’ unchanging “mind” itself is such that there is something to die. And in my natural scientific understanding, the immutability of the mind does not imply its immortality – it will die without changing in its subjective self-perception, while instantly fading away as a result of brain death. Psyche (psychical) – a designation of the fact that this is one’s own immediate reality (that is, undoubtedly) – how (what) I myself am immediately, undoubtedly, and that immediate reality of mine, how and through which I myself and everything in general for me there is, and which is exclusively the only one for me. It should be noted that while I am unconscious (brain injury or dreamless sleep), there is nothing at all. -/- But this does not mean that “I”, having completely gone into oblivion, I'll die. This does not exclude that, I will disappear completely into oblivion and does not exist, but (at the same time) “I” – am. So, let’s define immortality as the impossibility of dying because there is nothing to die (psychic, but is such that there is nothing to die – is immortal) and will make a conclusion important for this work: if I am, as psyche, exclusively only is such that there is something to die and nothing else, then, therefore, my death is not excluded. But am I like that? The idea of this work is that I, as a psyche can to manifest (reveal) and realize myself as such (I such), that there is nothing to die, but (at the same time) I – am. I will realize of myself as immortal – such that to die (to decease) nothing. In other words, if I will approach with a bias and, acting purposefully, will reveal the subjective reality “I (psyche) such is that to die (to decease) nothing, but I – am”, that is – I am immortal, that the hypothesis “I will die” will falsified and excluded. -/- To realize this in the work, it is proposed to use the subject-object model, shift the boundary of “I” to the pole of the subject and become objectless, manifesting (revealing) oneself as such that there is nothing to die. Therefore, the aim (goal) of the work – to realize: I – am, but such that there is to die (decease) nothing. To become objectless and wondering about the possibility to dying, as a result, or I will exclude the immortality of the manifested state, or I will manifest (will reveal) immortal undoubtedly and definitively. -/- At the same time, I, as a subject, am “a necessary pole of subject-object relations. … An object is what the activity of … a subject is directed at. … In fact, everything that exists can become an object. … it is important to keep in mind the fundamental fact that the object is always outside the subject, does not merge with it. This externality also takes place when the subject deals with the states of his own consciousness, his Self ... it is important to emphasize that the relation of the subject and the object is not the relation of two different worlds, but only two poles as part of some unity” (Лекторский В.А., p. 6-7). That is, everything that I find existing in myself, this (such) is as an object. “The subject always refers to all “objects”, but it can never become an object for itself” (Титлин Л.И., p. 23). “… you will not be able to see the seeing vision ...” (Титлин Л.И., p. 40), and in this model this implies the “limit” of the subject. As the limit of the subject, I am “objectless”. And, therefore, in its own pole the subject is “ideal” – in its (own) limit (as its own limit, its own limit), I do not exist for myself (non-existent). -/- Using the “fact of the mobility of the boundaries of the subject” (for example, Тхостов А.Ш., p. 16), I have the opportunity to “pull” the boundary of the “I” into myself and become my own limit. At the same time, it is necessary to realize and accept that “inside” the limit of the subject and behind – “beyond of the subject”, and in general the very “inside” and “behind” in this version – unreality. In such a subject limit, the required paradoxical subjective state is assumed – I exist and see, but at the same time I am such that I do not exist for myself, that is, I am, but (subjectively such that) there is nothing to die (“immortality”). -/- Accordingly, the following tasks are indicated in the experiment: 1. In the object-subject sphere of visual perception, shift (and shift) the boundary of “I” into oneself –» to run into one’s own limit and become one’s own limit (without thickness: without depth, without “from within” and without reverse side) –» 2. Having become your own limit, which in its own limit is, but for myself I do not exist (non-existent), realize: • Myself – I am and this is real; • Will I die? – or there is nothing to die, which of the options is to me, as a psyche (as itself the psychic “I”), is applicable: • or I am such that it is not impossible that I will die, and the realized state is not immortal; • or “I” am such that “I” – am (is reality), but such that myself “I” to die nothing, that is, my own immortality – I am immortal; • Is this real? -/- Instruction for reproducing the target result: sequence of actions and results in a subjective-psychic experiment (hereinafter referred to as SPE) -/- At a distance of 25-40 cm from the wall (so that the wall occupies the entire field of view or its overwhelming part), • Here and now, focus on your face: “I am” – reality (and not is the knowing about it). • In yourself step back and look out of yourself at this wall. • Without moving your head, cover the field of vision with your attention as wide as possible and at the same time perceive everything at once (all this) as a single whole. • Perceive a high and wide wall (option: look up at an angle of 135-150 degrees in front of you) in such a way that the space (volume) surveyed by you without turning your head is a closed asymmetrical “lens” • limited in a circle in the periphery of the field of view, • convex in you; You – the beholder, rearwards concave in self (“subject”) – which one of you are watching? • Without moving your head, perceive the field of view as a single whole –» • Into yourself “draw in” –» “backing away” –» step back from everything –» • lean back into yourself –» up to dead-end limit –» • become a dead end itself – a concave (reflector-like) limit-plane. • You – into yourself – backward concave – a perceiving visual screen (limit-dead end), plane –» • lean back and press –» • something in general somehow inside the dead-end plane and behind the dead-end plane, as well as “inside” and “behind”, “behind the dead-end plane” – unreality; • myself – a dead-end plane without thickness (depth), without “inside”, without a reverse side for oneself. • –» That is, as a psychic reality (what is it psychically) will I die? –» or • Something there is, and that is I will die (it is possible); or • I am such that there is nothing to die, but I – am. or • Subjective-psychic experiment is incomplete… • –» Realize that this is reality (realize the reality of it) and emphasize (answer). -/- As a result, “I” am, but there is nothing to die/not to die, that is, the hypothesis “I will die” is unrealistic. -/- Remarks -/- • Each completed SPE is completed with the target result: “I am such that there is nothing to die, but I – am”. And the that what I will die (not excluded) does not correspond to this, that is unreality and is excluded by this. • But I am not such that I will not die. The concepts “I will die/ I will not die” to me, as a psyche are not applicable. That is, I, as a psyche, is immortal, but I am not eternal (not eternal – endlessly lasting, such that there is something to last) – to last, to be eternal and to end there is nothing. This is “immortality”. • In the target result of this work, I – am, but such that there is nothing to die/not die (“immortality”). And such a “I” is not the Atman of the Hindu schools of Nyaya, Vaisheshika and Purva Mimamsa, which E.A. Torchinov. Since the “I” – psychic, and not a substance with the psyche as an attributes. • According to illusionism, what I am as a result of the experiment given in the work is an illusion. And the impression of immortality is a product of the brain. But in reality I am such that I will die (it is not excluded). However, it is necessary to realize that illusionism is a detached reasoning about the “I”, but not is the self itself. And to what I am (as psiche), reasoning and questions about the reality of the “I” (for example, question: am I really like this, what am I like as psyche?) and other expressing illusionism do not correspond. That is, subjectively (psychic, in the psychic reality of the “first person”, in first person perspective), the illusionism of the “I” is unreality. Subjectively (psychic, in the psychic reality of the “first person”, in first person perspective), this is undeniable and final. • Reasoning about what such a “I” is in this (mine) or not in this brain, as well as (for example, holding a real skull in my hands), questions like “how (or, but now where is it here) such “I” – how is it after brain death?” – To the fact that is such an “I” these questions do not correspond and is falsified by this. • After being unconscious, the impression remains that I'm is not and that there is nothing at all. That is, my “unconsciousness” is psychic indistinguishable from my non-existence. However, science has not shown, but and it is not excluded that before and after I exist physically (there is something to die), I still or I no longer exist, there is still or nothing to die as a soul, substance, or otherwise. But what I am in the target result of this work is what I – am, and not “died and already now or still unreality” and I am such that there is nothing to die, this is – reality. That is, I will die? – there is nothing (to die), but I – am (reality), even if I am not (don’t exist). Or I do not exist as something. • I am such that there is nothing to be and die, but I am. And subjectively (psychic, in the psychic reality of the “first person”, in first person perspective), this immortality is – reality. But this reality eludes my rational explanation. -/- Conclusion -/- Will I die? – In the target result the I am, but at the same time I am such that there is nothing to die. That is, I am immortal, but at the same time, I am not eternal (“I” not something eternal (endlessly continuing)) – I am such that to be eternal there is nothing. And, if we accept the subjective (psychic, “first person”, in first person perspective) reality without trying to understand it rationally, then I am exactly like that – I realize that this is my undoubted nature. That is, “I will die / I will not die” is an unreality. Subjectively (psychic, in the psychic reality of the “first person”, in first person perspective), it is undoubted and final. Despite the unscientific nature, this work is a way of mastering reality. The author would be grateful for the identified and shown unreality of the fact that the “I” – am, but such that there is nothing to die, and ideally, the awareness: “I will die (not excluded).” -/- Bibliography -/- Декарт Р., Размышления о первой философии //Декарт Р. Соч.: В 2 т. Т. 2. М., 1994. Лекторский В.А. Субъект в истории философии: проблемы и достижения // Методология и история психологии. 2010. Том 5. Выпуск 1. С. 5-18. Титлин Л.И. Проблема субъекта в индийской философии («Пудгалавинишчая» Васубандху) [Текст] / [Л. И. Титлин]; Федеральное государственное бюджетное учреждение науки Институт философии Российской академии наук. – Москва: ОнтоПринт: Сделано-Сказано, 2018. – 361, [1] с. Тхостов A. Ш. Культурно-историческая патопсихология: монография, – М.: Канон+ РООИ «Реабилитация», 2020. – 320 с. Торчинов Е.А. «Словарик индуизма» (Дата написания: 2003; дата файла: 15.06.2007). Торчинов Е.А. Пути философии Востока и Запада: познание запредельного — СПб.: «Азбука-классика», «Петербургское Востоковедение», 2005. — 480 с. ISBN 5-352-01371-5 (Азбука-классика) ISBN 5-85803-258-3 (Петербургское Востоковедение). -/- Скончаюсь? – я бессмертен (как осознать бессмертие «от первого лица») -/- Скончаюсь? В качестве гипотезы в моем естественно-научном понимании психическое (каково психически), это не более чем, и исключительно только всего лишь некоторые состояния моего живого мозга – скончаюсь в результате его смерти. -/- В представленном ответе психическое – сама собственная непосредственная реальность, то есть, то, каково психически, это – несомненно. -/- Данная работа выполнена в реальности «первого лица» («субъективная реальность», «феноменальное сознание»). Чтобы осознать то, как, каково это, представим себя экспериментатором, который не подменяет реальность рассуждениями о ней. – Теперь для нас, как экспериментаторов, то, как (каково) психически, это непосредственная и несомненная реальность. И осознание «я есть», это непосредственная реальность, а не знание об этом, которое всегда сомнительно. То есть, в психической реальности, на вопрос, заданный самой этой психической реальностью самой себе о себе самой, нам ничто не запрещает ответить несомненно и окончательно. Автор действует с позиции «быть в реальности – не выходить за ее пределы, например, в философию» (философия, включая методологию, это подмена самой реальности всегда сомнительными рассуждениями о реальности) – исследует феноменальное сознание («психическое») непосредственно и в качестве непосредственной реальности. То есть, данная работа, это овладение психической реальностью посредством субъективно-психического экспериментирования – не философствуй, а экспериментируй! -/- Например Декарт, интроспективно экспериментируя в собственной психической реальности с собственным психическим, сообщил нам о неизменности «ума» и предложил эту неизменность понять в качестве нашего собственного бессмертия: «ум не представляет какого-то соединения акциденций, являет собой чистую субстанцию и, хотя все его акциденции подвержены изменению — он то понимает какие-то вещи, то желает другие или чувствует третьи и т.д.,— тем не менее сам по себе он не изменяется; а что касается тела человека, то оно изменяется хотя бы уже потому, что подвержены изменению формы некоторых его частей. Из этого следует, что тело весьма легко погибает, ум же по самой природе своей бессмертен» /Декарт Р., стр. 13. Заметим, Декарт не осознавал себя бессмертным, а логически вывел собственное бессмертие из неизменности ума. Однако, неизменный «ум» Декарта таков, что скончаться есть чему. А в моем естественно-научном понимании из неизменности ума не следует его бессмертие – он, не изменяясь в своем субъективном само-восприятии, при этом мгновенно угаснув в результате смерти мозга, скончается. Психически (психическое) – обозначение того, что это сама собственная непосредственная реальность (то есть – несомненно) – то, как (каково) я сам непосредственно, несомненно, и та моя непосредственная реальность, как и посредством чего я сам и всё вообще для меня есть, и которое для меня исключительно единственное. Следует заметить, что пока бываю без сознания (травма мозга или сон без сновидений), ничего и никак нет вообще. -/- Но это не значит, что «я» ушедши в небытие окончательно – скончаюсь. Этим не исключено, что таковой ушедший в небытие «я» не существую, но (при этом) есть. Итак, определим бессмертие, как невозможность скончаться потому, что скончаться нечему (например, если «умерший» психически есть, но уже таков, что скончаться больше нечему, то теперь он бессмертен) и сделаем важный для данной работы вывод: если психически я исключительно только таков, что скончаться есть чему и ни каков иначе, то, следовательно, то, что скончаюсь, это не исключено. Но таков ли я? Идея данной работы в том, что мне удастся проявить (выявить) и осознать себя таковым (я таков), что скончаться нечему, но (при этом) я есть. Иначе выражаясь, если я подойду предвзято и действуя целеустремленно, выявлю субъективную реальность «я есть, но таков, что скончаться нечему» – то смерть мне, как психическому несвойственна, то есть, я бессмертен – гипотеза возможности субъективно скончаться («я скончаюсь») будет фальсифицирована и исключена. -/- Чтобы это реализовать в работе предлагается воспользоваться субъект-объектной моделью, сдвинуть границу «я» в полюс субъекта и стать безобъектным, проявившись (выявившись) собой таковым, что скончаться нечему. Следовательно, цель работы – осознать: я таков, что есть, но скончаться нечему. Стать безобъектным и задаваясь вопросом о возможности скончаться, или исключу бессмертие проявленного состояния, или проявлюсь (выявлюсь) бессмертным несомненно и окончательно. -/- При этом, я, как субъект, являюсь «необходимым полюсом субъектно-объектных отношений. … Объект – то, на что направлена активность … субъекта. … В действительности объектом может стать все, что существует. … важно иметь в виду тот принципиальный факт, что объект всегда внеположен субъекту, не сливается с ним. Эта внеположность имеет место и тогда, когда субъект имеет дело с состояниями собственного сознания, своим Я … важно подчеркнуть, что отношение субъекта и объекта – это не отношение двух разных миров, а лишь двух полюсов в составе некоторого единства» /Лекторский В.А., стр. 6-7. То есть, всё, что нахожу в себе существующим, это (таковое) есть в качестве объекта. «Субъект – всегда относится ко всем «объектам», но он никогда не может стать объектом для самого себя» /Титлин Л.И., стр. 23. Иначе это выражая – «ты не сможешь увидеть видящего видение…» /Титлин Л.И., стр. 40, и в данной модели таковое предполагает «предел» субъекта. Как предел субъекта я «безобъектен». То есть, «идеален» – своим (собственным) пределом (в качестве собственного предела) самим для себя не существую (несуществующий). -/- Используя «факт подвижности границ субъекта» /например, Тхостов А.Ш., стр. 16, я имею возможность границу «я» в себя-назад «втянуть» и стать собственным пределом. При этом необходимо осознать и принять, что внутри предела субъекта и сзади – «за пределом субъекта», и вообще само «внутри» и «сзади» в этой модели – нереальность. Таким субъектным пределом предполагается требуемое парадоксальное субъективное состояние – я есть и вижу, но при этом я таков, что для себя не существую, то есть, я есть, но (психически таков, что) умереть нечему («бессмертие»). -/- Соответственно, в эксперименте обозначаются следующие задачи: 1. В объект-субъектной сфере зрительного восприятия сдвинуть (и сдвинув) границу «я» в себя-назад –» упереться в собственный предел и стать самим собственным пределом (без толщены: без глубины, без «внутри» и без обратной стороны) –» 2. Став собственным пределом, которым есть, но для себя не существую (несуществующий), осознать: • Себя – я есть и это реально; • Скончаюсь? – есть ли чему скончаться или скончаться нечему, какой из вариантов мне (как психическому «я») свойственен: • или я таков, что то, что скончаюсь не исключено, и реализованное состояние не бессмертно; • или я есть, но таков, что скончаться нечему, то есть, собственное бессмертие – я бессмертен; • Реальность ли это. -/- Инструкция воспроизведения целевого результата: последовательность действий и результатов в субъективно-психическом эксперименте (далее СПЭ) -/- На расстоянии 25-40 см от стены (так, чтобы стена занимала всё поле зрения или его подавляющую часть), • Здесь и сейчас сосредоточьтесь на своём лице: «я есть» – реальность (а не знание об этом). • В себе отстранитесь назад и смотрите из себя на эту стену. • Не двигая головой, охватите поле зрения вниманием предельно широко и одновременно всё сразу (всё это) воспримите единым целым. • Высокую и широкую стену (вариант: смотрите вверх под углом 135-150 градусов перед собой) воспримите так, что обозреваемое вами без поворота головы пространство (объем), это – ограниченная по окружности в периферии поля зрения замкнутая несимметричная «линза» • плоская с противоположной вам стороны • и выпуклая в вас; Вы – вогнутый в себя-назад смотрящий («субъект») – каков? – кто из вас сейчас на всё это смотрит? • Не двигая головой, поле зрения воспримите единым целым –» • В себя-назад «втянитесь» –» и «пятьтесь» –» «за мысли» и за всё вообще –» из этого всего назад вытесняясь –» от всего вообще взад отстранитесь –» • собой в себя-назад подайтесь и упершись в собственный (себя) задний к объектному обращённый (развернутый) тупиковый предел –» • станьте самим пределом-тупиком – в себя-назад вогнутой (рефлектор-подобной) пределом-плоскостью смотрящей – воспринимающим зрительным экраном –» станьте плоскостью-тупиком –» • «проскользните» по себе – плоскости-тупику и охватите вниманием целиком –» • собой – самим плоскостью-тупиком назад надавить, нажать –» • осознать: что-то как-то внутри плоскости-тупика и сзади за плоскостью-тупиком, и там вообще «что-то как-то», а также само «внутри» и «сзади», «за плоскостью-тупиком» и вообще «там» – нереальность; • самого себя – плоскости-тупика без толщины (глубины), без «внутри», без обратной стороны для себя нет. • –» То есть – в качестве психической реальности (каково психически) я скончаюсь? –» или • скончаться есть чему – скончаюсь (не исключено). или • я таков, что скончаться нечему, но я есть. или • субъективно-психический эксперимент не завершён. • –» Осознайте, что это – реальность (осознать реальность этого) и подчеркните (ответ). -/- В результате я есть, но скончаться/не скончаться нечему, то есть гипотеза «скончаюсь» – нереальность. -/- Замечания -/- • Каждый завершённый СПЭ завершён целевым результатом: «я таков, что скончаться нечему, но я есть». И тому, каков я в результате СПЭ, то, что скончаться есть чему – скончаюсь (не исключено) не соответствует, то есть нереальность и этим исключено. • То есть, я и не таков, что не скончаюсь. «Я скончаюсь/не скончаюсь» ко мне, как к психике, неприменимо. Иначе это выражая, тому, каков я, смерть несвойственна. То есть, я, как психика (психическое), бессмертен, но я не вечен (не вечный – бесконечно длящийся, таковой, что есть чему длиться) – длиться, быть вечным и не скончаться нечему. Таково «бессмертие». • В целевом результате данной работы я есть, но таков, что скончаться/не скончаться нечему («бессмертие»). И таковой «я» не Атман индуистских школ ньяя, вайшешика и пурва-миманса, о котором сообщает Е.А. Торчинов. Так как «я» психичен, а не субстанция с психическим в качестве атрибута. • Согласно иллюзионизму, то, каков я в результате данного в работе эксперимента, это иллюзия. И впечатление бессмертия, это порождение мозга. А реально я таков, что скончаюсь (не исключено). Однако, необходимо осознать, что иллюзионизм, это отстраненные рассуждения о «я», но не сам я непосредственно. И тому, каков я психически (каково психически), рассуждения и вопросы о реальности «я» (например, таков ли я реально, каков психически?) и другие выражающие иллюзионизм «я» не соответствуют. То есть, каково психически, иллюзионизм «я» – нереальность. Психически, это несомненно и окончательно. • Рассуждения о том, что таковой «я» в этом (моем) или не в этом мозге, а также (например, держа в руках реальный череп), вопросы, типа «а как же (или, но теперь где же здесь) таковой «я» – как это после смерти мозга?» тому, каков таковой «я» эти вопросы не соответствуют. • После пребывания без сознания остается впечатление, что без сознания меня нет и ничего никак нет вообще. То есть, моё «бессознание» психически неотличимо от моего несуществования (небытия). Однако, наукой не показано и не исключено то, что до и после того, как я есть физически (скончаться есть чему), меня ещё или уже нет, скончаться ещё или уже нечему в качестве души, субстанции или как-то иначе. Но, то, каков я в целевом результате данной работы, таковой я есть, а не «скончался и уже теперь или ещё нереальность» и я таков, что скончаться нечему – реален (реалия). То есть, скончаюсь? – нечему (скончаться), но я есть, даже если меня нет (не существую). • Я таков, что быть и скончаться нечему, но я есть. И то, как (каково) психически, это бессмертие – реальность. Но эта реальность ускользает от моего рационального её объяснения. -/- Заключение -/- Скончаюсь? – в целевом результате я есть и вижу, но при этом я таков, что умереть (скончаться) нечему. То есть, я бессмертен, но при этом я не вечен (не нечто вечное (бесконечно длящееся)) – быть вечным нечему. И, если принять психическое реальностью не пытаясь понять это рационально, то я именно таков – осознаю, что такова моя несомненная для меня природа. То есть, «скончаюсь/не скончаюсь» – нереальность. Психически, это несомненно и окончательно. Несмотря на ненаучность, данная работа – способ овладения реальностью. Автор был бы признателен за выявленную и показанную нереальность целевого результата данной работы, а в идеале, за осознание: «скончаюсь (не исключено)». -/- Annex 2. The key essence of this work (only in Russian to convey the nuances without distortion) -/- Performed, expressed and transmitted initially by means of Russian, the native language of the author, and, in order to avoid distortions in the correspondence of the linguistic nuances of the reproduced subjective reality, it assumes an independent translation into the language of the experimenter by the experimenter himself in the process of reproducing the target result of this work. -/- «Я» скончаюсь? – нечему (скончаться), но «Я» есть. Will “I” die (decease)? – to die (decease) nothing, but “I” am. -/- Заметить: • Выполнено, выражено и передано изначально посредством русского – родного для автора языка и, чтобы избежать искажений соответствия языковых нюансов воспроизводимой психической реальности, предполагается самостоятельный перевод на язык экспериментатора самим экспериментатором в процессе воспроизведения целевого результата данной работы. • В «кавычки» взяты слова и выражения, требующие «субъективного» приведения в соответствие психическому содержанию. Подготовка: • Вам потребуется уединённое место (там, где вас не отвлекут). • На первоначальном этапе понадобится некоторое (возможно длительное) время для того, чтобы усвоить предложенный алгоритм действий в психической реальности в процессе реализации и воспроизвести целевой результат впервые. • Возможно, результату поспособствует отклонение от предложенного алгоритма «психических действий», импровизация в направлении целевого результата. • В процессе эксперимента количество попыток не ограничено и затраченное на это время не имеет значения. Необходим исключительно только именно целевой результат. Реализация: • В уединении встать перед плоской широкой и высокой (достаточно большой, чтобы её границы были на периферии вашего поля зрения) стеной, например, покрытой однородной светлой (но не белой) керамической, не глянцевой (не отражающей на вас свет или отвлекающих внимание изображений, не дающей бликов) плиткой с лёгким текстурным рисунком (позволяющим глазам «зацепиться» за стену и отчётливо воспринимать перед собой поверхность, а не «утонуть» в однородном (монотонном) пространстве), на расстоянии 25-40 см от неё (так, чтобы стена занимала всё поле зрения или его подавляющую часть) –» • Скончаюсь (1)? – каково психически (психическое), в моем естественно-научном понимании – это (я) не более чем и исключительно только некоторые состояния функционирующего (живого) мозга – скончаюсь, как и уже скончался каждый умерший мозг – того каждого, кто скончался, как реальности (реального, реалии) (2) уже теперь нет окончательно. Теоретически, если психически я исключительно только таков, что скончаться есть чему и ни каков иначе, то, следовательно, что (я) скончаюсь, это не исключено. • Глядя на стену, здесь и сейчас сосредоточиться на своём лице (и осознать): «я есть» – реальность (а не знание об этом) –» • В себе «отстраниться» назад – смотрю из себя на эту стену –» • Не двигая головой, охватить поле зрения вниманием предельно широко (поднять (вздернуть) брови, если это расширит поле зрения) и одновременно всё сразу (всё это) воспринять единым целым –» • Высокую и широкую стену (вариант: смотреть вверх под углом 135-150 градусов перед собой) воспринять так, что обозреваемое без поворота головы пространство (объем), это – ограниченная по окружности в периферии поля зрения замкнутая несимметричная «линза» • плоская (ограниченная стеной) с противоположной мне стороны • и «выпуклая в меня» –» • Я – «вогнутый» в «себя-назад» смотрящий, каков? – кто из меня сейчас на всё это смотрит? –» • Не двигая головой, поле зрения воспринять единым целым –» • в себя-назад «втянуться» –» и «пятиться» –» «за мысли» и за всё вообще –» из этого всего назад «вытесняясь» –» от всего вообще «взад отстраниться» –» • «собой» в себя-назад «податься» и «упершись» в «собственный (себя) задний к объектному обращённый (развернутый)» «предел тупиковый» («тупо-уперто») –» • «стать» самим «пределом-тупиком» – «в себя-назад вогнутой (рефлектор-подобной)» «пределом-плоскостью» смотрящей – воспринимающим «зрительным экраном» –» стать «плоскостью-тупиком» –» • «проскользнуть» по себе – плоскости-тупику и охватить вниманием целиком –» • собой — самим плоскостью-тупиком «назад надавить, нажать»: • осознать: «что-то как-то внутри плоскости-тупика» и «сзади – за плоскостью-тупиком», и «там вообще» «что-то как-то», а также само «внутри» и «сзади», «за плоскостью-тупиком» и вообще «там» – нереальность; • самого себя – плоскости-тупика без толщины (глубины), без «внутри», без обратной стороны для себя нет –» Собой – плоскостью-тупиком: • без глубины (толщины), без «внутри», без обратной стороны таков, что скончаться есть чему – скончаюсь (не исключено) –» • смотрю –» смотря –» «Непосредственно-психически» -/- Заметить: • Специфику используемых в данной работе слов (терминов), названий и выражений необходимо осознать в соответствии с (4.1.) (данный пункт смотрите ниже). • Необходимо от себя – (как) «смотрящего плоскости-тупика», такового, что скончаться есть чему, оттождествиться собой — «самим психическим» (каково психически) (3) –» • –» «отличить (4)» «Я» –» «Я-лик». • Отличив, и себя такового обозначая, но не имея в языке отличающего местоимения, именую «Я» (5). • «Соединённое-через-дефис-в-кавычках» реализовать и/или воспринять «одним-единым-целостным»; • Последовательность слов и знаков предполагает последовательность психических действий (алгоритм действий в собственном психическом); • Вопросительность слова, фразы или отдельной её, именно вопросительной части задаётся знаком «?» расположенным перед и после них. Требование к действию задаётся знаком «!» расположенным перед и после слова (фразы); • Субъективно-психический эксперимент завершён, если воспроизведен (4.1.), иначе субъективно-психический эксперимент не завершён. -/- Собой – плоскостью-тупиком … смотрю –» смотря –» -/- «Психически» (6) 1. ?кто? видит –» !отличить «Я»! –» 2. –» !«Я-видящий-лик»! –» 3. –» !«Я-лик»! –» 4. –» !«Я-ликом» всем «психически-назад-надавить(нажать)»: «Я» ?скончаюсь?! –» !«Я-ликом» всем «психически-назад-давить(жать)»: (4.1.) – нечему (7), но «Я» есть.! -/- Признательность: Согласно иллюзионизму, то, каков «Я» (как (каково) «скончаться нечему, но «Я» есть.»), реально, это не так (не таково). То есть, таковой «Я» нереален (нереальность), а реально – таков, что скончаюсь (не исключено). Однако, необходимо осознать, что это «отстраненные» от «Я» рассуждения о «Я», но не сам «Я» непосредственно. И тому, каков «Я» (как (каково) скончаться нечему, но «Я» есть.) таковое (рассуждения) не соответствует. То есть, эти рассуждения о «Я» – заблуждение. Это (как осознание) несомненно и окончательно. Не так? – за выявленную и показанную нереальность (того, что) «Скончаюсь? – нечему (скончаться), но «Я» есть.», за показанную реальность того, что скончаться не исключено, а в идеале, за осознание: «скончаюсь (не исключено)» я был бы признателен. -/- (Сноски) (1) Именно «скончаюсь, скончался», то есть – как реальности (реального, реалии) нет окончательно. (2) Реалия, реально, реален, реальность, реальное – само то, что (каково это) непосредственно, как само таковое – само то, каково познаваемое и как-либо моделируемое вне его познания и иного (вообще) моделирования. То есть, само само-осознание себя реальностью, например, «я-реалия», «я есть» или «скончаться – нечему, но «Я» есть.» – реальность. То есть – нам ничто не запрещает ответить на вопрос «скончаюсь?» несомненно и окончательно. (3) Психически (психическое) – то, как (каково) я сам непосредственно, несомненно, и та моя непосредственная реальность, как и посредством чего я сам и всё вообще для меня есть, и которое для меня исключительно единственное. Следует заметить, что пока бываю без сознания (травма мозга или сон без сновидений), ничего и никак нет вообще. Также само обозначение того, что это сама собственная непосредственная реальность (то есть – несомненно). И чтобы её осознать, представьте себя экспериментатором, который не подменяет реальность рассуждениями о ней. – Теперь для вас, как экспериментатора, то, как (каково) психически, это – несомненно (непосредственная несомненная реальность). Не философствуй (не рассуждай, не моделируй её), а экспериментируй! (4) «Я-Лик» – специфическое выражение, соответствующее психическому в данный момент СПЭ. (5) «Я» – целевой (конечный, «предельный») и «ключевой» результат данной работы. «Я» в данной работе не склоняется, выделено полужирным подчеркнутым шрифтом и заключено в кавычки. (6) «Каково психически» – то, как (каково) «Я» сам непосредственно, несомненно – само «первое лицо» (субъект психического), а также обозначение принятия позиции «первого лица» и сообщения «от первого лица». (7) Пока я бываю без сознания («бессознание», например, сплю без сновидений), моего сознания нет (оно сведено на нет, угасло) – ничего и никак нет вообще (это моё абсолютное небытие) – (каково) психически, мне скончаться нечем. А в целевом результате данной работы, психически (то есть – непосредственно), «Я» таков, что скончаться не нечем, а именно нечему, но при этом «Я» есть. (shrink)

Contemporary knowledge is centered on the research on human dimensions. Philosophy should particularly appeal to values in the process of understanding the human nature. The valuable “becoming” of each human person requires growing ever more aware of his/her personal identity and of his/her role in this lifetime. In ethics, especially, values suppose moral choices or criteria on which a moral behavior is based. Max Scheler based his ethical theory on the distinction between goods and values. The “goods” are things (...) to which we attach some physical worth, and the “values” are the object of emotional perception, of the “sentiment of value” and of the place they have in the hierarchy of values. Even if the human being attributes a certain worth to individual things, he/she is always searching for a universal value, which should exceed the contingency of that thing. This universal validity is a kind of ideal measure of the value of all empiric realities and it is articulated by a normative rationality. It forms a system of universal norms that contribute to the foundation of critical axiological judgments. What values are the most enhanced by our post-modern society? Are they the same as during the modern period? What would distinguish them from the values of other cultural periods of humankind? How do we react to the new challenges generated by technological progress and the media? How do the classical disciplines such as philosophy, religion, anthropology, and art respond to these new challenges? And how could they help us to better adapt the writings of certain significant personalities to the modern and contemporary culture? These are only a few questions this volume will address. It contains a large number of articles by authors from various countries and continents: philosophers, and theologians, as well as researchers in medicine, anthropology, and new scientific technologies. As the variety of topics is impressive, we tried to organize them into three thematic parts: “Part I: Fundamental Human Values. Contemporary Challenging Globalization,” “Part II: New Axiological Challenges in Technologies and Scientific Thinking,” and “Part III: Cultural and Spiritual Personalities: Possible Answers to Our Contemporary Changes.” In the following pages, we shall make a short presentation of each article in order to facilitate a quick familiarization with the entire volume. (shrink)

This master's thesis discusses two key philosophical issues: the concept of personhood and the process of becoming a morally good person. Drawing on the work of philosophers such as Harry Frankfurt, Strawson, and A.J. Ayer, I concur with the view that humanhood is contingent, not necessary, for personhood. Personhood, I argue, is an achievement that emerges from interactions with already-persons who assist in refining human natural and rational capacities. Cases such as feral humans highlight humans who, despite naturally possessing relevant (...) qualities for personhood, failed to achieve it due to a lack of interpersonal interactions. Moreover, just as personhood can be achieved, it can also be lost if certain traits are no longer present. In exploring good moral personhood, I challenge the notion that moral virtue stems is influenced by natural tendencies. Instead, I contend that a person becomes morally good by adhering to moral norms insofar as they promote an ideal interactive environment—one in which individuals are safe from threats to their well-being. This viewpoint emphasizes the significance of normative engagement over innate predispositions in the development of moral character. (shrink)

On 26 January 2021, while announcing that the country had reached the mark of 100,000 deaths within 28 days of COVID-19, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson said that he took “full responsibility for everything that the Government has done” as part of British efforts to tackle the pandemic. The force of this statement was undermined, however, by what followed: -/- What I can tell you is that we truly did everything we could, and continue to do everything that we can, (...) to minimise loss of life and to minimise suffering... -/- Taking these sentiments together, it was hard to avoid the conclusion that the government took responsibility only for doing everything right. Such an admission of responsibility, accommodating no admission of error or wrongdoing, is not really about responsibility at all. Indeed, the UK’s pandemic response has been marked from its earliest days by a shifting of focus from institutional responsibility to personal responsibility for individual UK residents. -/- This paper explores the relationship between these two sites of responsibility—the institutional and the personal—in the context of the sort of pandemic that is ongoing as we write. Section 2 offers some initial definitions and discussions of key terms. Section 3 outlines how these two ideas interact in principle during such emergencies. Section 4 turns to the ‘non-ideal’ implications for personal responsibility of failures of institutional responsibility. While our focus is on the specific context with which we are most familiar, the UK governmental approach, where appropriate we also include examples from other states. (shrink)

Researchers interested in player’s experience would assumedly, across disciplines, agree that the goal behind enquiries into player’s experience is to understand the how games’ features end up affecting the player’s experience. Much of the contemporary interdisciplinary research into player’s experience leans toward the empirical-scientific, in the forms psychology, sociology and cognitive science, to name a few. In such approaches, for example demonstrating correlation between physiological symptoms and an in-game event may amount to ‘understanding’. However, the experience of computer game play (...) is a viable topic also for computer game studies within the general tradition of humanities. In such context, the idea of ‘understanding an experience’ invites an approach focusing on the experienced significance of events and objects within computer game play. This focus, in turn, suggests turning to the principles associated with phenomenology, among which is the idea of describing things as they appear, or as they are given, in the experience, from the first-person perspective. From the first-person perspective the challenge lies not in the subjective experience’s inaccessibility but in the inherent personal richness of the experience’s content. Rather than trying to embrace the richness by engaging in direct introspection, it makes sense to focus the search on the conditions of the player’s experience. In this paper, I discuss the idea of “firstperson perspective” in the context of computer game studies. I propose that conditions for player’s experience could be sought from the materiality of the computer game artefact, rather than from the ‘processual’ or ‘ideal game’. I derive the notion of gameplay condition3 from the overlap of the player’s “lusory attitude” and the materiality of the single-player computer game artefact as it appears in the player’s experience. (shrink)

Trata-se de mostrar em que sentido a concepção normativa de pessoa em John Rawls pressupõe uma transformação semântica da concepção kantiana de subjetividade transcendental, em particular do seu ideal de personalidade. Uma reinterpretação kantiana da concepção normativa de pessoa logra explicar o dispositivo procedimental do equilíbrio reflexivopara responder a críticas comunitaristas em defesa do individualismo inerente ao liberalismo político, concebido não mais como uma doutrina abrangente da auto-identidade mas como um construtivismo, num modelo coerentista dejustificativa epistêmico-moral.The article seeks to show (...) in which sense Rawls’s normative conception of the person does presuppose a semantic transformation of the Kantian conception of transcendental subjectivity, particularly of his ideal of personhood . A Kantian reinterpretation of the normative conception of the person succeeds in accounting for the procedural device of reflective equilibrium so as to address communitarian criticisms in defense of the individualism inherent in political liberalism, conceived no longer as a comprehensive doctrine of self-identity but as a constructivism, within a coherentist model of moral epistemology. (shrink)

This paper will explore the notion that religiously justified acts have often been the source of great harm. From the continued persecution of the LGBTQ community to acts like the Waco incident and in extreme cases, even genocide can often stem from religious belief. There does exist, however, a more generalized, noncentralized belief system (which I call “spirituality”) which seeks similar motives as most organized religions, but rarely—if ever— leads towards such terrifying and monstrous acts. In this paper, I pose (...) that modern organized religion can learn from the individualized focus of spiritualities to create a more open practice which would allow for more personal reflection before engagement in the congregation and, I pose, would lead to less horrendous acts of physical and cultural violence. Neither religion, nor spirituality is wavering in the modern world, so why not learn to use them to benefit the greater society, rather than using them as reasons to harm others? This should be a larger focus of religious congregations—the manner in which they interact with others about their beliefs. (shrink)

Having the emotion of pride requires taking oneself to stand in some special relation to the object of pride. According to agency accounts of this pride relation, the self and the object of pride are suitably related just in case one is morally responsible for the existence or excellence of the object of one's pride. I argue that agency accounts fail. This argument provides a strong prima facie defence of an alternate account of pride, according to which the self and (...) the object of pride are suitably related just in case one's relation to the object of pride indicates that one's life accords with some of one's personal ideals. I conclude that the pride relation, though distinct from the relation of moral responsibility, is nonetheless a relation of philosophical interest that merits further attention. (shrink)

This essay develops a framework for understanding what I call the ethics of reflexivity, that is, the norms that govern attitudes and actions with respect to one’s own worth. I distinguish five central aspects of the reflexive commitment to living in accordance with one’s personal ideals: the extent to which and manner in which one regards oneself from an evaluative point of view, the extent to which one cares about receiving the respect of others, the degree to which (...) one interprets one’s personal ideals in an individualistic or collective manner, the degree to which one’s commitment to living in accordance with one’s personal ideals is rigid or flexible, and the worthiness of one’s personal ideals. This framework, I argue, illuminates the nature and moral significance of virtuous and vicious forms of the character trait of pride. (shrink)

Cognitivism about the emotions is the view that emotions involve judgments (or quasi-judgmental cognitive states) that we could, in principle, articulate without reference to the emotions themselves. D’Arms and Jacobson (2003) argue that no such articulation is available in the case of “possessive” emotions, such as pride and guilt, and, so, cognitivism (in regard to such emotions, at least) is false. This article proposes and defends a cognitivist account of our partiality to the objects of our pride. I argue that (...) taking pride in something requires judging that your relation to that thing indicates that your life accords with some of your personal ideals. This cognitivist account eschews glossing pride in terms of one’s “possession” of what one is proud of and, so, escapes D’Arms and Jacobson’s critique. I motivate this account by critically assessing the most sophisticated possession-based account of pride in the literature, found in Gabriele Taylor (1985). (shrink)

Discursive liberal democracy might not be the best of all possible forms of government, yet in Europe it is largely accepted as such. The attractors of liberal democracy (majority rule, political equality, reasonable self-determination and an ideological framework built in a tentative manner) as well as an adequate dose of secularization (according to the doctrine of religious restraint) provide both secularist and educated religious people with the most convenient ideological framework. Unfortunately, many promoters of ideological secularization take too strong a (...) stance against the manifestation of religiosity in the public sphere. They claim that people may discuss, debate or adopt (coercive) laws and regularities only by means of secular public reasons and secular motivation. We argue that these secular restraints on the ideological framework are unfairly biased against religion, counterproductive and unreasonable. The exaggerated secular restrictions create a strict secular public sphere that appears to be a Pickwickian world suitable just for inoffensive, dull and lethargic people. Deliberately separated from the idea of truth, secular public reasons cannot sustain a complex adaptive system like discursive liberal democracy. Liberal democracy needs citizens with a strong sense of truth and with a sufficient will-power to follow both a personal ideal and a collective ideal. Religious beliefs provide people with just such a sense of truth and with the desire to have a certain kind of character. In the secularized public sphere of liberal democracy, people can manifest just educated religious beliefs that correspond to the real world and respect the principle of peaceable conduct. In the final part of the article we support the assertion that believers could and should educate their religious belief before expressing them in the public sphere. Educated religious beliefs have a wide enough propositional content, obey the moral imperative of William Clifford, are purged from all propositional components against which there is strong evidence and are consciously cultivated by the mechanism of suggestion. (shrink)

Intuitively, it seems that certain basic desires, or urges, are rationally impotent, i.e., that they provide no reasons for action (a famous example is Warren Quinn's story of a man who has a brute urge to turn on every radio he sees). This intuition seems to conflict with the internalist, or Humean subjectivist, claim that our desires give us reasons. But Harry Frankfurt's well-known subjectivist account, with its distinction between first- order and higher-order desires and its concepts of identification and (...) commitment, may be able to accommodate this intuition. Regan Lance Reitsma has argued that to do so, it needs to be supplemented with a concept of "personal ideals", which demand that we give no normative weight to certain inclinations. I argue that Reitsma's account depends on the unexplained assumption that some kinds of desire have special standing, and thus cannot improve on the explanation of the rational impotence of urges already available to Frankfurt. (shrink)

This chapter describes how philosophical theorizing about justice can be connected with empirical research in the social sciences. We begin by drawing on some received distinctions between ideal and non-ideal approaches to theorizing justice along several different dimensions, showing how non-ideal approaches are needed to address normative aspects of real-world problems and to provide practical guidance. We argue that there are advantages to a transitional approach to justice focusing on manifest injustices, including the fact that it enables us to set (...) aside some reasonable disagreements about justice. The ‘bottom-up’ approach we advocate, for which we borrow Wolff’s term ‘real-world political philosophy’, is an empirically-informed normative analysis that attends to specific, identifiable injustices, and thus is partial, though not isolationist. We illustrate our approach by considering how different models of the nature of disability suggest different kinds of remedy for injustices faced by persons living with disabilities. We reflect on the nature and significance of vulnerabilities, and we assess the role of public opinion in normative theorizing, suggesting a particular significance for the opinions and experiences of marginalized groups. We finally reflect on the relevance of European legal and institutional frameworks for theorizing justice in Europe. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose a Kantian framework for moral trust—trust in another person to only act with us in morally permissible ways. First, I derive an understanding of trustworthiness from Kant's second formulation of the categorical imperative. I argue that trustworthiness embodies a moral imperative, guiding us to act in ways that are reliable and recognizable as conducive to engaging in trusting relations. However, this alone is not enough, as it doesn't provide a means to assess whether someone is (...) truly committed to the moral law and thus morally trustworthy. Therefore, in the second part, I explore a basis for assessing their moral conduct found in a local version of the Kingdom of Ends: given an ideal or archetype of a morally perfect interpersonal relationship, an archetype of the morally trustworthy agent allows us to comparatively assess the moral disposition of fellow agents. (shrink)

This volume has its roots in two recent developments within mainstream analytic epistemology: a growing recognition over the past two or three decades of the active and social nature of our epistemic lives; and, more recently still, the increasing appreciation of the various ways in which the epistemic practices of individuals and societies can, and often do, go wrong. The theoretical analysis of these breakdowns in epistemic practice, along with the various harms and wrongs that follow as a consequence, constitutes (...) an approach to epistemology that we refer to as non-ideal epistemology. In this introductory chapter we introduce and contextualise the ten essays that comprise this volume, situating them within four broad sub-fields: vice epistemology, epistemic injustice, inter-personal epistemic practices, and applied epistemology. We also provide a brief overview of several other important growth areas in non-ideal epistemology. (shrink)

A classic debate concerns whether reasonableness should be understood statistically (e.g., reasonableness is what is common) or prescriptively (e.g., reasonableness is what is good). This Article elaborates and defends a third possibility. Reasonableness is a partly statistical and partly prescriptive “hybrid,” reflecting both statistical and prescriptive considerations. Experiments reveal that people apply reasonableness as a hybrid concept, and the Article argues that a hybrid account offers the best general theory of reasonableness. -/- First, the Article investigates how ordinary people judge (...) what is reasonable. Reasonableness sits at the core of countless legal standards, yet little work has investigated how ordinary people (i.e., potential jurors) actually make reasonableness judgments. Experiments reveal that judgments of reasonableness are systematically intermediate between judgments of the relevant average and ideal across numerous legal domains. For example, participants’ mean judgment of the legally reasonable number of weeks’ delay before a criminal trial (ten weeks) falls between the judged average (seventeen weeks) and ideal (seven weeks). So too for the reasonable num- ber of days to accept a contract offer, the reasonable rate of attorneys’ fees, the reasonable loan interest rate, and the reasonable annual number of loud events on a football field in a residential neighborhood. Judgment of reasonableness is better predicted by both statistical and prescriptive factors than by either factor alone. -/- This Article uses this experimental discovery to develop a normative view of reasonableness. It elaborates an account of reasonableness as a hybrid standard, arguing that this view offers the best general theory of reasonableness, one that applies correctly across multiple legal domains. Moreover, this hybrid feature is the historical essence of legal reasonableness: the original use of the “reasonable person” and the “man on the Clapham omnibus” aimed to reflect both statistical and prescriptive considerations. Empirically, reasonableness is a hybrid judgment. And normatively, reasonableness should be applied as a hybrid standard. (shrink)

Persons and nations agree on the importance of justice but disagree on its requirements. In The End of History and the Last Man Francis Fukuyama argues that human history moves towards liberal democracy as the final ideal for all societies. It is conceivable that liberal democratic societies will converge to similar conceptions of justice and that global spread of liberal democracies will promote consensus. This paper tries to show that consensus on justice is, nevertheless, unlikely, due to reasonable disagreement. Reason (...) does not give a single rational or reasonable solution to conflicting demands of justice. This means that apart from reason, other factors play a role in what is regarded as just. Jurisdiction is influenced by tradition and zeitgeist. This explains why also liberal democracies, which may recognize similar principles of justice, still arrive at differing rankings of these principles and divergent results of jurisdiction in time and place. (shrink)

This essay presents the normative foundation of W.E.B. Du Bois’s constructivist theory of justice in three steps. First, I show that for Du Bois the public sphere in Anglo-European modern states consists of a dialectical interplay between reasonable persons and illiberal rogues. Second, under these nonideal circumstances, the ideal of autonomy grounds reasonable persons’ deliberative openness, an attitude of public moral regard for others which is necessary for constructing the terms of political rule. Though deliberative openness is the essential vehicle (...) of construction, reasonable persons only have a pragmatic political obligation to forge ties of deliberative reciprocity with likeminded persons whom they trust will listen and not harm them. Finally, I present Du Bois’s defense of black suffragists’ support of the 19th Amendment to illustrate pragmatic political obligation in action. I sketch successful democratic engagement that reconstitutes a nonideal public sphere. (shrink)