Two-Context Probabilism and the Dissolution of the 'Lottery' Problem


In this paper it will be attempted to dissolve the lottery problem based on fallibilism, probabilism and the introduction of a so far widely neglected second context of knowledge. First, it will be argued that the lottery problem is actually an exemplification of the much wider Humean "future knowledge problem" (ch. 1). Two types of inferences and arguments will be examined, compared and evaluated in respect to their ability to fittingly describe the thought processes behind lottery/future knowledge propositions (ch. 2). A second context of knowledge that underlines the importance of fallibilism and probabilism in a somewhat different manner will be introduced (ch. 3) and, based on that "two-context probabilism," the lottery/future knowledge problem will be dissolved (ch. 4). Lastly, it will be hinted at the necessity of adopting not just fallibilism including and two context minding probabilism, but, beyond that, also the even more encompassing position of both ontological and epistemological "gradualism" (ch. 5).

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Gregor Flock
University of Vienna


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