Perceptual experience and seeing that p

Synthese 190 (10):1735-1751 (2013)
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Abstract
I open my eyes and see that the lemon before me is yellow. States like this—states of seeing that $p$ —appear to be visual perceptual states, in some sense. They also appear to be propositional attitudes (and so states with propositional representational contents). It might seem, then, like a view of perceptual experience on which experiences have propositional representational contents—a Propositional View—has to be the correct sort of view for states of seeing that $p$ . And thus we can’t sustain fully general non-Propositional but Representational, or Relational Views of experience. But despite what we might initially be inclined to think when reflecting upon the apparent features of states of seeing that $p$ , a non-propositional view of seeing that $p$ is, I argue, perfectly intelligible
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Archival date: 2013-03-29
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References found in this work BETA
Mind and World.McDowell, John
Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy
Intentionality.Searle, John
The Transparency of Experience.Martin, Michael G. F.

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